In December 2022, @ZelenskyUA proclaimed “we will restore the normality of life in the territory of Donbas and Crimea, which were illegally occupied in 2014 and have been brought to the point of disaster.” How might #Ukraine retake Crimea? 1/25 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/all-roads-le…
2/ With all the speculation about the potential locations and objectives of forthcoming Russian and Ukrainian offensives in 2023, there is one strategic objective that may be the culminating point of this war. Crimea.
3/ Whether it is a major military campaign on the ground, a Ukrainian long range strike campaign to make Crimea untenable for Russia, or a forced negotiation, Crimea may be this war’s last campaign. But before examining the ‘how’ of such a campaign, why might #Ukraine conduct it?
4/ First, politics. President Zelensky has repeatedly included Crimea in the territory that he wants liberated. It is one of his core war termination aims. Things may be difficult for President Zelensky if the war to end with Crimea still in Russian hands. president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup…
5/ Second, #Crimea is part of #Ukraine. It became a part of Ukraine in 1991 after a national referendum in which the majority of Crimean residents voted for independence from the Soviet Union. It is recognized as part of Ukraine by the majority of nations at the United Nations.
6/ Third, Russian retention of Crimea would present an ongoing military threat to Ukraine. If Russia was to retain Crimea as part of some future negotiation (I am not advocating this), it would pose a significant and ongoing threat to Ukraine.
7/ As Clausewitz tells us: "In war, the result is never final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may be found in political conditions at some later date."
8/ This cuts both ways of course. But, if #Ukraine were to recapture #Crimea, it would be much more difficult for Russia “to remedy its losses" in this war at some later date. What might be the reasons for Ukraine to not take back its Crimean territory?
9/ First, there are sound reasons for thinking that a military conquest of Crimea will be very difficult & require significant land, sea and air forces. The terrain hardly assists the attacker. There are two narrow land approaches, & both are likely to be heavily fortified.
10/ A second reason is Putin’s view of Crimea. As Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage have written, "Putin surely regards losing Crimea and surviving as president as irreconcilable. He will go to great lengths to hold on to Crimea." foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/go-slo…
11/ As such, Putin could decide, despite his recent ratcheting down of nuclear rhetoric, that his only option to defend Crimea is nuclear weapons. A recent discussion on Michael Kofman’s podcast, The Russia Contingency, explores this issue in detail.
12/ Finally, some propose that a Ukrainian conquest of Crimea might split European support. In a 2022 article, Boris Johnson proposed that a return of Crimea to Ukraine was fraught with risk. But, European and American concerns about Crimea have gradually, if not fully, abated.
13/ In June 2022, it was reported that France sought a full military victory for Ukraine, including the return of Crimea. An early 2023 report notes that the US President is “prepared to arm Ukraine to recapture Crimea”. telegraph.co.uk/world-news/202…
14/ So, there are strategic advantages and disadvantages for a Ukrainian campaign to recapture its Crimean territory. And, both sides are entrenched with their positions on retention or return of Ukraine. What might be the precursors to a military campaign?
15/ The first element of preparation is western industry stepping up the production of munitions and the transfer of armoured vehicles and other offensive capabilities to Ukraine.
16/ A second precursor to any Ukrainian move to retake its Crimean territory is the recapture all of its southern territory. The liberation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces will be the operational and tactical foundations for any Ukrainian campaign in Crimea.
17/ A 3rd enabler will be influence operations to ensure that the population of Crimea understand that a Ukrainian move to retake its territory will not result in discrimination against them in the aftermath.
18/ Finally, strategic patience Although Putin reputedly told the Israeli Prime Minister earlier this year, “we are a big country and we have patience”, the West is surprising Putin by showing resilience & ongoing support for Ukraine. This has to continue, probably into 2024.
19/ All of these are necessary precursors to Ukraine considering a large military campaign to seize Crimea. There are two broad options for a Ukrainian conquest of Crimea.
20/ First, Ukraine could undertake a large-scale air, sea and land operation to advance on several axes against key land objectives in Crimea. A robust air and sea campaign would be needed to accompany the hundred thousand or so Ukrainian troops required to capture Crimea.
21/ A 2nd option would be for Ukraine to capture the entirety of its southern provinces of Kherson & Zaporizhzhia and hold fast, forming a land blockade and fire support base. Ukraine could hold Crimea at risk of large-scale missile and drone attacks. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/g…
22/ These are not mutually exclusive options. Both are saleable and have multiple variations & branch plans. Knowing how bloody an invasion would be, planners would also phase their campaign to attempt the latter first before launching a large-scale operation to retake Crimea.
23/ If Ukraine was in a position to undertake either of these two options, there could be an opportunity for negotiations about the future of Crimea. Russia would be in a difficult position if it holds out on negotiations. And of course, it may still consider the nuclear option.
24/ At some point, if #Ukrainians is able to sustain the momentum generated at the end of 2022, and retain the initiative on the battlefield, they may find themselves on the cusp of military operations to seize back Crimea. End. mickryan.substack.com/p/all-roads-le…
25/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @thewarzonewire @DefenceU @ForeignAffairs @ZelenskyyUa @IAPonomarenko @TDF_UA

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More from @WarintheFuture

Jan 25
One of the best ways to defeat an adversary is to target their #strategy. To do that, we must understand it. Therefore, in my latest article, I explore Russian strategy, and its various components, for its continuing #Ukraine invasion in 2023. 1/25 🧵🇺🇦 mickryan.substack.com/p/thinking-abo…
2/ The plan for a ten-day lightening conquest of Ukraine, as described in a recent RUSI report, was – in the main – a failure. The Russians did make considerable gains in the south and the east, but their northern campaign was a military disaster. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
3/ Despite battlefield setbacks in the north and northeast of Ukraine, Putin and his defence and intelligence chiefs proceeded to assemble an alternative theory of victory for their invasion and attempted takeover of #Ukraine.
Read 25 tweets
Jan 19
From the beginning of the Russian invasion, arguments over provision of different weapons & technologies to #Ukraine have been waged in Europe and the US. Perhaps the most long-standing, and important, is provision of American or European tanks. 1/22 🧵🇺🇦
2/ My aim in this thread is not to argue whether they should be provided. I think it is obvious they should. If Russia can deploy T90s or even its new T-14s (according to British Intelligence), why are we denying similar capabilities to #Ukraine?
3/ The objective here is to explore the considerations for the introduction of western tanks into the Ukrainian armed forces. The need is well established. Tanks are a valuable part of the modern combined arms team. Tanks save lives!
Read 22 tweets
Jan 19
This week - big additional commitments to #Ukraine from Canada, the UK, Poland, Estonia, Sweden & the Netherlands. Another big package from the US coming soon. Since the October 2022 announcement, nothing new from Australia. 1/6 🧵 reuters.com/world/europe/d…
2/ On total bilateral commitments Australia just scapes into the top 30 beneath Latvia and Lithuania according to the @kielinstitute app.23degrees.io/view/DUeaa54W7… #ukrainesupporttracker
3/ This is parsimonious and short sighted from the world’s 13th biggest economy. Lighting up the Sydney Opera House, and kind words, will not help Ukrainian civilians injured and killed by Russian attacks.
Read 6 tweets
Jan 18
Over the northern hemisphere winter, eastern Ukraine has been the scene of bitter and intense combat. The offensives around #Bakhmut & #Kreminna highlight the different strategic & cultural approaches that Ukraine and Russia have applied in this war. 1/23 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Both offensives have featured trench and urban warfare, artillery duels, very short-range engagements between infantry and tanks, as well as long range strikes on supply and headquarters locations. But there are differences. abc.net.au/news/2023-01-1…
3/ One of the key differences is an asymmetry between Russian and Ukrainian operational thinking. For this Russian offensive, there has been a focus on securing towns like #Bakhmut & #Soledar that have limited strategic utility.
Read 23 tweets
Jan 16
Recently, comparisons with the WW1 stalemates on the western front from 1915 have been used by some observers of the war in #Ukraine. It makes for good headlines but there is one problem; it just isn’t true. 1/22 smh.com.au/world/europe/n…
2/ At the beginning of 1915, the war on the Western Front had reached a stalemate. There were technical, strategic and doctrinal reasons for this. The machine gun changed tactics and killed soldiers by the thousands, as did more accurate and concentrated artillery.
3/ Poor communications hampered the coordination of the different elements of the massive armies. A lack of protected mobility meant that even when a breach was made in enemy lines, the enemy could more quickly fill the gap than the attacker could exploit it.
Read 22 tweets
Jan 13
Earlier this week, I published a thread that was the first of two parts examining how #Ukraine and Russia might think about – and plan – the inevitable offensives to come in 2023. The #Gerasimov appointment pushed this second part back a couple of days! 1/25 🧵
2/ In Part 1, I proposed seven considerations for those planning these offensives: purpose; design; timing; location; resources; adaptation; & politics. I then examined the first 4 in detail. Today, I explore the final 3 considerations.
(Part 1👇)
3/ Resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades, Divisions or Corps, will be needed.
Read 25 tweets

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