Thread by @WarintheFuture

Recently there has been more speculation about the timing & size of 2023 Russian offensives in #Ukraine. That the Russians will attempt them is almost a given. Russia has been assembling the pieces of their 2023 offensives since late last year. 1/21 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-rus…

2/ Russia has provided a political rationale through Putin’s annexation declaration, the personnel and industrial resources with the mobilisation decree in late 2022, and the changes in command that resulted in General Gerasimov being appointed as unified commander.

3/ The east is the most likely location for Russian attacks, although attacks in the south are also possible. Russian forces might use attacks in the south as feints or demonstrations to draw away Ukrainian forces in the east before launching their main effort in the Donbas.

4/ The east is a logical political and military objective for Russia. It has been supporting separatists there since 2014, and before launching his 2022 invasion, Putin recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. bbc.com/news/av/world-…

5/ What will the Ukrainians be doing to confirm this or ascertain other Russian intentions, locations for attacks and numbers and types of forces to be used?

6/ First, they would be seeking as much western intelligence as possible. This will include information on troop movements between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine as well as production numbers, and stock holdings, of long range missiles, drones, and artillery ammunition.

7/ The visit to Ukraine by the CIA director in mid-January probably facilitated the provision of some of this intelligence but there are other nations in Europe which will also be providing intelligence to assist the Ukrainians for the coming offensives. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…

8/ Second, Ukraine will also have been conducting tactical reconnaissance in the south and east with ground and aerial reconnaissance elements. This would have been occurring for months now as they seek Russian strong and weak points in their defensive lines.

9/ These close reconnaissance missions would also be looking for locations of ammunition stockpiles and supplies, headquarters, concentrations of reserve troops, and Russian army engineer equipment that is vital in the advance to get through obstacles and over rivers.

10/ But beyond targeting, the locations of Russian concentrations of ammunition, reserves and engineer equipment provide insights into what might be Russia’s main effort for the coming offensives.

11/In ascertaining the most likely Russian main effort, the Ukrainians can ensure they have defensive forces in place and can plan pre-emotive strikes to weaken and spoil Russian attacks. And, it can assist the Ukrainians in deciding where and when to commit operational reserves.

12/ Third, Ukraine will continue to leverage open sources of intelligence like satellite images, blogs, social media for discussions on Russian troop movements etc. this has become a very important source of intelligence.
foreignaffairs.com/world/open-sec…

13/ The meshing of civil and military collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence in this war has been one of its defining features. While perhaps not yet revolutionary, it is a significant evolution in the conduct of warfare.

14/ Finally, Ukraine will probably be using human intelligence & resistance networks in Russian-occupied areas to provide insights. This has been a source of information for deep strikes against Russian logistics, headquarters and troop accommodation locations with #HIMARS

15/ With the United States about to provide the long range Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb to Ukraine, the contribution of this network for targeting deep within Russian-held territory will only grow. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u…

16/ General Gerasimov was not appointed to defend current Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine & will be under pressure from Putin to deliver fast results in early 2023. Putin will definitely want something to talk about by the 1 year anniversary of his invasion.

17/ However, as we have seen from the first day of this invasion, Putin wanting battlefield victories and Putin getting battlefield victories are two very different things.

18/ Despite the influx of tens of thousands of mobilised troops, it is highly likely that there will again be a gap between Putin’s expectations for the 2023 offensive operations of the Russian military in #Ukraine, and their capacity to actually deliver their results.

19/ It is almost certain that the Russian Army will undertake offensive operations to meet Putin’s political objectives of securing his annexed territory in the coming weeks and months. It is unlikely they will be any more successful than in 2022. mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-rus…

20/ The Ukrainians will be doing everything possible to estimate the most likely areas where these offensives will take place. If they can do this, they may be able to both blunt the Russian attacks while undertaking their own offensives to recapture Ukrainian territory. End.

21/ Thank you to the following for the links and images used in this thread: @POLITICOEurope @thedrive @IAPonomarenko @washingtonpost @ForeignAffairs @BBCNews @UAWeapons