#Russia has become much more dependent on #China as a result of war and #sanctions. This is about shifting trade volumes, but also the changing character of economic cooperation: It increasingly resembles the classic relationship of a petrostate with a modern economy. 1/
Most of the signature projects of the Russia-China economic partnership since 2014 have failed. Highspeed railway between Moscow and Kazan? Cancelled. The Russian-Chinese long-range airliner CR929? Practically dead. Russian 5G networks with Huawei technology? Nowhere in sight. 2/
What is thriving is Russian exports of oil, coal and gas, and Russian import of finished machinery, finished vehicles and finished electronics. This is in line with the "simplification" of Russia's economy that takes place gradually due to technological isolation. 3/
Sanctions and war have diminished the last few things that Russia was able to offer to China besides natural resources: IT experts and aircraft technology. There are still some pockets of Russian advantage, but overall, the table has strongly tilted to Russia's disadvantage. 4/4
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China's Huawei and Russia post 2022: It's complicated. Overall, Huawei tries to respect Western sanctions and is retreating from Russia in crucial areas. It is not delivering network equipment to Russia, which is painful for Moscow. It has closed down offices and sales points.1/6
Huawei has banned Russian MIR cards from its "Huawei Pay" in Russia, an Apple/Google Pay alternative. It has also kicked out the apps of sanctioned Russian banks from AppGallery, its App Store alternative, and is compelling app developers to follow Western sanctions. 2/6
It has also closed down its enterprise sales division in Moscow at the end of 2022, laying off ~2000 employees (while offering some to move to different countries). 3/6
1) New data on Russia's federal #budget in February is out. Some normalization after a high January deficit was expected, but the opposite happened. The deficit grew to 2.6 tn RUB, 1.7% of GDP after two months. Revenues in February 2023 were 1.8 tn RUB, expenditure 2.6 tn RUB.
2) Last year around this time, the Russian budget was firmly in positive territory. The January 2023 deficit was clearly not representative, but an additional deficit of 800 billion RUB in February shows it's not a one-off phenomenon.
3) On the revenue side, the problem for Russia's finance ministry are the very small oil and gas revenues. This will slightly improve in the coming months, as Russia will adopt a new formula to calculate taxes (based on a higher assumed oil price).
1.) Sanctions did not work immediately 100%, because Russia was able to export so much. The West needed Russian oil to stay on the world market to keep prices from rising.
2.) Russian businesses were able to reestablish supply chains quicker than expected.
3.) Public spending rose by more than 30% - a strong fiscal stimulus for Russia's economy.
4.) Sanctions should not be underestimated, will be tightened with new measures and pressure on 3rd countries like Turkey.
5.) Budget deficit could reach ~4% of GDP at current oil price.
One missing aspect is domestic change in Russia. There was a continuous process if increasing radicalisation of Putin, both in domestic and foreign policy. The only exception were arguably the Medvedev years. Putin has contributed more to his own growing resentment than the West.
The second missing aspect is Zelensky's sincere attempt to revive the peace process (together with GER and FRA), which was completely rebuffed by Moscow, which chose to hand out Russian passports en masse in Donbas right after Ze was elected.
#Russia announced it will cut #oil production (read: #sanctions affect oil exports) by around 0.5m barrels per day. The result is higher oil prices and lower export volumes. Will Russia earn more or less as a result? It depends on elasticities and Russia's market share. 1/4
Russia's share in world oil markets is roughly 10%. To compensate for lower exports, i.e. total revenue of all oil producers needs to rise 10x the value of the 0.5m barrels lost volume. This would mean a low price elasticity of demand of -0.1 if supply/reserves are stable. 2/4
Most estimates of short run demand elasticity are close to -0.1, but elasticities are already very different for 3-6 months time. So, in theory, cutting 0.5m bpd could be revenue neutral for Russia, but already after a short time normalizing prices lead to a net revenue loss. 3/4