1/ANATOMY OF A SWARM: How #China sent its ships to swarm & intimidate the #Phlippines’ largest outpost in the West Philippine Sea, then scattered after its tactics were made public, 3-11 March 2023.
By 5 March the swarm of Pag-Asa Island was well underway. (1/9) #SouthChinaSea
2/However, by 10 March—perhaps due to the #Philippines’ new transparency initiative—#China had apparently recalculated & decided that swarming was no longer in its interest. Only 10 ships remained in the Pag-Asa Cays. Where did the rest go?
(Hint: not very far) (2/9)
3/Maritime open-source intelligence (#OSINT) relies on a suite of tools. The automated information system (AIS) broadcast by most ships is the simplest, but it has limitations. We used AIS to track the arrival of 7 new PRC militia ships to the Pag-Asa Cays on 3 March. (3/9)
4/#China had 42 ships in the Pag-Asa Cays by 5 March. #Philippines-held Pag-Asa (a “rock” under @UN law) earns a 12nm territorial sea. Nearby PRC base at Subi Reef earns zero because it’s a “low tide elevation”--meaning in its original state it was below water at high tide. (4/9)
5/By 6 Mar we wondered if there was a rotation underway, as 4 militia ships were seen on AIS returning to port at Hainan Island,while one more ship deployed from Hainan to the Pag-Asa Cays. By this time the @coastguardph’s new transparency policy was beginning to take hold. (5/9)
6/Starting 8 March it seemed #China had made a recalculation based on the #Philippines’ recent transparency initiative. At least 3 of the (AIS-visible) militia ships started a meandering dispersal away from Pag-Asa, and we wondered if there were more.
Hint: yes—there were. (6/9)
7/Fortunately 10 March offered a clear day when we could go looking for ships not visible on AIS that might be lingering around. We found them. It seemed #China wasn’t enjoying the exposure of the @coastguardph’s new transparency policy & had scattered its swarming fleet. (7/9)
8/#China’s intimidation force dispersed mostly to the north & west in an apparent attempt to evade the #Philippines’ surveillance. Unfortunately for them the weather didn’t cooperate & can see how they’re hiding in plain sight—away from Pag-Asa but close enough to return. (8/9)
9/We can now see maritime gray-zone bullying tactics in near-real time. The #Philippines’ new transparency policy is a game-changer, but efforts like Project Myoushu at @StanfordGKC are also ready to support the free-and-open community to expose #China’s maritime bullying. (9/9)
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🚨NOW WE KNOW🚨
Q: Why was 🇨🇳#China's deep-sea research ship Tan Suo Yi Hao traversing 🇦🇺#Australia's southern coast? This route clearly was not the most direct back to its home port of Sanya--it obviously had another objective.
A: The Diamantina Trench. I'll explain...🧵1/10👇
Concern about 🇨🇳#China's research ships is well founded, with strong evidence they act as dual-use intelligence collection platforms for the 🇨🇳#PLA.
Ex: the Song Hang's oddly meandering route through the 🇵🇭#Philippines' archipelago last week. 👇 🧵2/10 inquirer.net/434714/chinese…
However, the 🇨🇳Tan Suo Yi Hao's route didn't veer north toward 🇦🇺#Australia's southern coast, but kept mostly outside its 200nm exclusive economic zone after it passed through the Bass Strait (north of Tasmania). Nor did it loiter to conduct detailed survey ops...until... 🧵3/10
"What are these ships doing? We don't know" said @mercoglianos on dark fleets for @IndoPacPodcast (below). Meanwhile 2 mystery cargo ships have loitered by 🇹🇼#Taiwan's Penghu Islands for months--*not* carrying cargo anywhere. What do we know about these suspicious ships? [🧵1/5]
First, @mercoglianos's point about dark fleets' risk to subsea cables is highly relevant to these mystery ships' activity, since 🇹🇼#Taiwan's Penghu Islands were a recent target of cable sabotage & also connect the Kinmen Islands to the main island. [🧵2/5]
The loitering 🇨🇳#China-flagged ship has visited 4 eastern 🇹🇼Penghu harbors since 1st appearing 10 June--often arriving/departing at night & usually very briefly. Most of its ops since then have been "dark" () & its AIS has almost no ID'ing info. [🧵3/5]sealight.live/posts/gray-zon…
1/Another suspicious ship loitering off 🇹🇼#Taiwan's SW coast is the 🇨🇲#Cameroon-flagged Da Li. Like others we've tracked (some of which have been involved in subsea cable sabotage), this is a "cargo" ship that clearly doesn't transport cargo. So what exactly is it doing? [🧵1/8]
2/The Da Li is registered to 🇰🇭#Cambodia company "PHEAR S", which owns/operates only this one ship. In other words, if PHEAR S is a cargo shipping company, its only vessel does not ship cargo. [🧵2/8]
3/Since arriving in Jan 2024 the Da Li has spent most of its time off 🇹🇼#Taiwan's SW coast, but starting in June 2024 it began taking trips into the #SouthChinaSea--especially around 🇹🇼Taiwan's Pratas Island & in the 🇵🇭#Philippines' exclusive economic zone. [🧵3/8]
1/Suspicious ship update: Just 1 month after the 🇹🇼#Taiwan Coast Guard reported driving away 🇲🇳#Mongolia-flagged, 🇭🇰#HongKong-registered Bao Shun from around its subsea cables, the ship is again loitering off Taiwan's coast, now near Qimei Island. So what is this ship? [🧵1/10]
2/As reported by @keverington in @TaiwanNewsEN, on 6 Jan the Bao Shun "was spotted taking an erratic course in the same area of subsea cables, sparking further national security concerns after a 🇨🇳Chinese ship allegedly damaged a subsea cable." [🧵2/10]
3/@keverington, citing @VesselFinder, further reported that the ship "was built in 2005 when it was a 🇨🇳Chinese-flagged ship under the Mandarin name Shun Tai 188 and has subsequently had three other Mandarin names." [🧵3/10]
🚨🤔Why has the cargo vessel VASILIY SHUKSHIN been aimlessly criss-crossing the area near 🇹🇼#Taiwan's Fangshan cable landing station () for 3+ weeks⁉️👀
Some curious facts about this ship in the thread below. [🧵1/6] @submarinecablemap.com/landing-point/…
The VASILIY SHUKSHIN left 🇷🇺#Russia's Vostochnyy port 8 Dec, stopped briefly in 🇰🇷#SouthKorea & then began trolling off 🇹🇼#Taiwan's SW coast on 19 Dec. According to self-reporting it was to have reached Qui Nhon 🇻🇳#Vietnam on 27 Dec.
It's still off Fangshan. [🧵2/6]
VASILIY SHUKSHIN carries a "flag of convenience" from🇧🇿#Belize, which has "earned a reputation for accepting ships that more reputable registries wouldn't consider -- ships that are older, are in bad repair or have histories of mismanagement." () [🧵3/6]pbs.org/frontlineworld…
1/🚨Flashpoint Sabina Shoal: 🇨🇳PRC ships now deploying south of Sabina Shoal this past 6 hours.
Over past week #China has been messaging intent to aggressively contest any 🇵🇭#Philippines missions to Sabina, where the BRP Teresa Magbanua has been posted since mid-April. [🧵1/x]
2/While no 🇵🇭#Philippines ships are openly broadcasting on AIS () approaching Sabina Shoal, 🇨🇳#China's deployments are clearly intended to cut off approaches from/via the 🇵🇭@coastguardph's base at Buliluyan Port at the southern tip of Palawan. [🧵2/x] sealight.live/posts/what-is-…
3/Last week, 🇨🇳#China's spokespeople & propaganda outlets repeatedly telegraphed 🇨🇳's intent to oppose any attempt by 🇵🇭#Philippines to replace or extend the BRP Teresa Magbanua's stay at Sabina Shoal, which it calls "Xianbin Jiao" and now claims as its "territory". [🧵3/x]