1/ANATOMY OF A SWARM: How #China sent its ships to swarm & intimidate the #Phlippines’ largest outpost in the West Philippine Sea, then scattered after its tactics were made public, 3-11 March 2023.
By 5 March the swarm of Pag-Asa Island was well underway. (1/9) #SouthChinaSea
2/However, by 10 March—perhaps due to the #Philippines’ new transparency initiative—#China had apparently recalculated & decided that swarming was no longer in its interest. Only 10 ships remained in the Pag-Asa Cays. Where did the rest go?
(Hint: not very far) (2/9)
3/Maritime open-source intelligence (#OSINT) relies on a suite of tools. The automated information system (AIS) broadcast by most ships is the simplest, but it has limitations. We used AIS to track the arrival of 7 new PRC militia ships to the Pag-Asa Cays on 3 March. (3/9)
4/#China had 42 ships in the Pag-Asa Cays by 5 March. #Philippines-held Pag-Asa (a “rock” under @UN law) earns a 12nm territorial sea. Nearby PRC base at Subi Reef earns zero because it’s a “low tide elevation”--meaning in its original state it was below water at high tide. (4/9)
5/By 6 Mar we wondered if there was a rotation underway, as 4 militia ships were seen on AIS returning to port at Hainan Island,while one more ship deployed from Hainan to the Pag-Asa Cays. By this time the @coastguardph’s new transparency policy was beginning to take hold. (5/9)
6/Starting 8 March it seemed #China had made a recalculation based on the #Philippines’ recent transparency initiative. At least 3 of the (AIS-visible) militia ships started a meandering dispersal away from Pag-Asa, and we wondered if there were more.
Hint: yes—there were. (6/9)
7/Fortunately 10 March offered a clear day when we could go looking for ships not visible on AIS that might be lingering around. We found them. It seemed #China wasn’t enjoying the exposure of the @coastguardph’s new transparency policy & had scattered its swarming fleet. (7/9)
8/#China’s intimidation force dispersed mostly to the north & west in an apparent attempt to evade the #Philippines’ surveillance. Unfortunately for them the weather didn’t cooperate & can see how they’re hiding in plain sight—away from Pag-Asa but close enough to return. (8/9)
9/We can now see maritime gray-zone bullying tactics in near-real time. The #Philippines’ new transparency policy is a game-changer, but efforts like Project Myoushu at @StanfordGKC are also ready to support the free-and-open community to expose #China’s maritime bullying. (9/9)
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1/#IntrusivePatrol: As of last night (6 Nov) three large 🇨🇳#China Coast Guard ships--CCG 5302, 5304 & 5306--were patrolling within 🇲🇾#Malaysia's exclusive economic zone, including one (5304) within 50 nautical miles of its coastline.
Image credit: @StarboardIntel [🧵1/4]
2/🇨🇳CCG 5306 appears to be rotating in to replace 5302 to patrol the EEZs of 🇮🇩#Indonesia, 🇻🇳#Vietnam & 🇲🇾#Malaysia.
CCG 5304 has been patrolling Malaysia's oil & gas operations at Luconia Shoals since 12 October, when it replaced 5306 on its previous patrol. [🧵2/4]
3/🇨🇳#China Coast Guard ships conduct intrusive patrols within the exclusive economic zones of neighboring countries in order to normalize Chinese claims of jurisdiction over areas granted to its neighbors under international law.
[🧵3/4]sealight.live/posts/gray-zon…
1⃣Several new developments this morning at #ScarboroughShoal, following Monday's 🚢💥🚢 collision between 2 🇨🇳#PRC ships & subsequent search & rescue ops🛟.
Let's unpack🧳... [🧵1/5]
2⃣First, #China is reducing the number of ships enforcing its #ScarboroughShoal exclusion zone, which was temporarily plussed-up to at least 8 China Coast Guard & 14 militia starting on 5 August.
Today we can see 3 🇨🇳CCG & 8 🇨🇳militia ships leaving the area. Most are headed back to #China, but 2 of the militia are headed SW toward the Spratly Islands.
This suggests Beijing had 🕵️intelligence that the 🇵🇭#Philippines was planning Monday's "Kadiwa" 🎣 operation & augmented its force in anticipation. [🧵2/5]
3⃣The #Philippines' Bureau of 🎣Fisheries & Aquatic Resources (BFAR) ship BRP Datu Matanam Taradapit is on its way back to Sual Fish Port in Pangasinan after checking in on Reed Bank, Iroquois Reef & the 🇵🇭 bases at Lawak & Patag Islands. It has picked up a 🇨🇳#PRC "escort" (#China Coast Guard 5303) as it passed Scarborough to make sure it goes home & doesn't decide to visit again. [🧵3/5]
1/🚨🇵🇭BATANES NOW BRACKETED BY 🇨🇳#CHINA COAST GUARD SHIPS🚨
Three large CCG ships have taken up positions east, west and possibly north of the #Philippines' northernmost Batanes Islands (those nearest 🇹🇼#Taiwan).
Details follow in thread below:👇👇👇 [🧵1/5]
2/The 112-meter 🇨🇳#China Coast Guard 4304--a Zhouyu-class patrol ship armed with a 76mm main gun--has been patrolling 70nm west of 🇵🇭Batanes since 2100 last night. [🧵2/5]
3/A second Zhouyu-class patrol ship of similar size, 🇨🇳#China Coast Guard 3304 (also armed with a 76mm main gun) passed north of the 🇵🇭Batanes Islands and has been patrolling 45nm to the east since 1300 this afternoon. [🧵3/5]
🚨NOW WE KNOW🚨
Q: Why was 🇨🇳#China's deep-sea research ship Tan Suo Yi Hao traversing 🇦🇺#Australia's southern coast? This route clearly was not the most direct back to its home port of Sanya--it obviously had another objective.
A: The Diamantina Trench. I'll explain...🧵1/10👇
Concern about 🇨🇳#China's research ships is well founded, with strong evidence they act as dual-use intelligence collection platforms for the 🇨🇳#PLA.
Ex: the Song Hang's oddly meandering route through the 🇵🇭#Philippines' archipelago last week. 👇 🧵2/10 inquirer.net/434714/chinese…
However, the 🇨🇳Tan Suo Yi Hao's route didn't veer north toward 🇦🇺#Australia's southern coast, but kept mostly outside its 200nm exclusive economic zone after it passed through the Bass Strait (north of Tasmania). Nor did it loiter to conduct detailed survey ops...until... 🧵3/10
"What are these ships doing? We don't know" said @mercoglianos on dark fleets for @IndoPacPodcast (below). Meanwhile 2 mystery cargo ships have loitered by 🇹🇼#Taiwan's Penghu Islands for months--*not* carrying cargo anywhere. What do we know about these suspicious ships? [🧵1/5]
First, @mercoglianos's point about dark fleets' risk to subsea cables is highly relevant to these mystery ships' activity, since 🇹🇼#Taiwan's Penghu Islands were a recent target of cable sabotage & also connect the Kinmen Islands to the main island. [🧵2/5]
The loitering 🇨🇳#China-flagged ship has visited 4 eastern 🇹🇼Penghu harbors since 1st appearing 10 June--often arriving/departing at night & usually very briefly. Most of its ops since then have been "dark" () & its AIS has almost no ID'ing info. [🧵3/5]sealight.live/posts/gray-zon…
1/Another suspicious ship loitering off 🇹🇼#Taiwan's SW coast is the 🇨🇲#Cameroon-flagged Da Li. Like others we've tracked (some of which have been involved in subsea cable sabotage), this is a "cargo" ship that clearly doesn't transport cargo. So what exactly is it doing? [🧵1/8]
2/The Da Li is registered to 🇰🇭#Cambodia company "PHEAR S", which owns/operates only this one ship. In other words, if PHEAR S is a cargo shipping company, its only vessel does not ship cargo. [🧵2/8]
3/Since arriving in Jan 2024 the Da Li has spent most of its time off 🇹🇼#Taiwan's SW coast, but starting in June 2024 it began taking trips into the #SouthChinaSea--especially around 🇹🇼Taiwan's Pratas Island & in the 🇵🇭#Philippines' exclusive economic zone. [🧵3/8]