🧵I keep getting emails from various people to tell me that 1. #Ukraine can’t win or 2. that the war in UKR is a distraction from the real threat posed by #China. Then I get those about how we are depleting our stocks and won’t have enough should a crisis erupt over #Taiwan 1/5
To the first point: Neither I nor the naysayers know what the final outcome in #Ukraine will be. Wars are inherently unpredictable.They are not just about mass, population, or resources. History is replete with wars where a smaller but better motivated and led force prevailed 2/5
To the second point: We are in a global contest between democracies and dictatorships. #Russia and #China are aligned against us not because we pushed them together but because they share the same interest: to dismantle the current order. These theaters are interconnected. 3/5
So for the US, focusing on #Europe vs #Asia is not an “either-or” proposition; it’s “together-with.” What happens in one theater shapes what will happen in the other, and vice versa. Russia’s victory in Ukraine will reverberate in the Pacific, as will #Ukraine’s win. 4/5
To the third point: Yes, if we want to help #Ukraine win we will continue to deplete our stocks of weapons and munitions UNLESS govts finally decide to move to wartime production, spend the money. It is about political will. How determined are we to ensure democracies win? 5/End
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🧵Recently a parliamentarian from #Ukraine said to me: "You give us enough to defend ourselves, but not enough to win." Too true. No war can last forever, no nation has infinite resources or stamina. In the end one side breaks. 1/
Wars are decided not just by resources, planning or morale. There is a temporal factor when all elements come together. We are at such a moment in this war when #Ukraine - if given MBTs, long-range fires, aircraft and munitions can defeat the Russian forces on its territory. 2/
I have to ask myself why so many governments in the West continue to delay, debate, hesitate and then send only a few tanks, howitzers or limited shipments of ammunition that will arrive at some later date? Why with our stocks depleted we are not moving to wartime production? 3/
🧵As I watch delays in weapons and munitions deliveries to #Ukraine amidst incessant talk about “redlines” and “risk of escalation, let me offer a few thoughts. First,why are we second-guessing ourself as to what Russian reaction might be when #Europe’s security is at stake? 1/
The reality is that we are self-imposing those redlines. We keep communicating our anxiety at every turn, while we should actually keep Russia guessing as to what we will do when it comes to both policy and weapons deliveries to #Ukraine. In effect, we are “self-deterring.” 2/
On my 2nd point, i.e., the risk of escalation let’s remember that in the final analysis we have limited capacity to control what Putin does next. I say this not to dismiss the threat but to focus on what we need to do to help #Ukraine win because it is fighting for us as well.3/
🧵Remember how, because of “globalization,” communist China was to become more open, more democratic, more like us-to quote a former U.S. official: “a responsible stakeholder in the international system”? This was nonsense, showing how little we understood culture and history.1/
Here is a small example of how off-base we were: EY China staff is being encouraged to wear Communist party badges on.ft.com/3Y4843K Rather than democratizing, the PRC has reasserted its commitment to the very ideology that, in CCP’s view, made China’s rise possible. 2/
Had we paused for a minute in 1991 and thought of what happens each time a country rapidly modernizes, three things hold: 1. The country becomes more geostrategically assertive and expansionist; 2. The leadership and political class become more self-confident; and finally, 3/
🧵I have read reports of leaks that Germany and France are talking about offering #Ukraine a security guarantee if it agrees to peace talks with Russia/
Assuming these reports are accurate, let me point out a few basic facts: 1. Russia has shown no interest in peace talks. 1/
Any peace deal now would amount to a Russian victory. Pushing for negotiations now would amount to another case of appeasement towards Russia. 2. No country in Europe has military power sufficient to guarantee #Ukraine's security without the United States at the table. 2/
If you doubt me, ask yourself which country other than the US has logistical capacity to execute the supply operation that has kept #Ukraine in the fight for a year. 3. A guarantee against Russia must include a credible nuclear deterrent. Which EUR country could provide it?3/
🧵It's fair to ask why the US has not had many foreign policy successes during the three post-Cold War decades. This in contrast to the Cold War era, when the overall strategy of containment proved effective in leading democracies to victory-notwithstanding occasional detours.1/
Let me suggest a possible explanation. The end of the Cold War was marked by triumphalism that was matched only by our conviction that institutions would always trump culture, that the key to democratization worldwide was effective institution-building. 2/
The argument that "anyone can become like us" eliminated Area Studies as a pathway to tenure in US academia, with cohort after cohort of institutionalists and model-builders graduated from our colleges and universities entering our government, think tanks and our corporations. 3/
🧵We need a larger conversation with our European @NATO allies on how they interact with Russia and especially China going forward when it comes to trade and technology. We need to take a page from the Cold War playbook when it comes to transfers of sensitive technology. 1/
Russia is a neo-imperial revisionist state. Secretary Austin described as China as America’s “pacing threat." We need to work closely with our allies and partners to ensure they do not feed technology and money to our adversary in Asia. 2/
I've advocated that @NATO restore COCOM restrictions from the Cold War era. COCOM (The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) was established after WWII to control what technology was allowed to be sold to the Soviet bloc. 3/