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More from @Beefeater_Fella

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 23

Two can play the ignore game. But there can only be one winner.

👉 Russian Gas to Europe:

The energy implications of the Kursk invasion go far beyond Russia. At Sudzha, a pipeline sends Russian natural gas to the EU. While it may come as a surprise to many given the war in Ukraine, European countries like Austria, Hungary and Slovakia still buy gas from Russia – all of it flowing through the town of Sudzha in Kursk.

Sudzha, located about 10km (6 miles) from the Ukrainian border, plays a key role in the transit of natural gas to the EU. An average of 42 million cubic metres (1.5 billion cubic ft) of Russian gas flows into Ukraine every day, the town playing host to a gas metering system that measures supplies flowing into Europe.

Despite the war with Russia, Kyiv has allowed the gas to continue flowing through its Soviet-era gas pipeline unabated as part of a $2bn-a-year contract between state-owned Naftogaz and Russia’s Gazprom.

👉 Russian Oil to Europe:

The European Commission has said there was “no immediate risk” of oil shortages in Hungary or Slovakia after the two countries complained about Ukraine’s decision last month to place sanctions on Russian supplier Lukoil, which transits exports to the two countries via the war-torn country.

While the EU as a whole has moved to diversify its oil and gas supplies away from Russia, the two eastern members have continued to receive oil via the Soviet-era Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline, and Ukraine’s move prompted Budapest and Bratislava to demand intervention from the Commission.

The Druzhba oil pipeline has remained functioning following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, even as the EU weaned itself off most other sources of Russian energy. The southern branch of the pipeline runs via Ukraine to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and has been the primary source of supply for their refineries for years.

A few countries in the EU were given temporary dispensation to continue receiving Russian oil in December 2022 when the EU began to sanction russian oil supply into Europe. That temporary dispensation was offered to give the countries time to set up alternative, non-russian supply sources.

In the nearly three years since, Hungary has not attempted to arrange alternative suppliers - they have instead increased their dependence on Russian oil, and Orban has put Hungary at risk of Energy meltdown-down as the EU was always committed to cutting off Russia entirely.

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Next 👉 Hungary and Slovakia have abused the temporary dispensation given to them by the EU.

Hungary and Slovakia used a sanctions carveout to keep pumping it in. Hungary has even ramped up Russian oil imports.

Only around 3% of Europe’s crude oil supplies now come from Russia, the EU claims, an alternative pipeline route through Croatia has sufficient spare capacity to meet the needs of both countries.

The argument comes at a time of increasing diplomatic tensions between Brussels and Budapest. Ukrainian is now blocking the transit of pipeline crude sold by Russia's largest private oil firm, Lukoil, effectively stripping the two countries of a third of their oil imports.

Szíjjártó from Hungary warned in an interview on Hungarian television station ATV last week that until the issue of oil transit is settled, Hungary would continue to block €6.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

He claims that hat Lukoil currently accounts for one-third of Hungarian oil imports and around 45 per cent of Slovakian oil imports, making the Ukrainian ban a fundamental threat to the energy security of both countries.

‘This is an unacceptable and incomprehensible move by a country that wants to be a member of the European Union and that, with a single decision, puts the oil supply of two EU member states at fundamental risk,’ he said.

Slovakia and Hungary - two countries that have opposed western allies' military aid to Ukraine as it fights Russia's invasion - have complained to Brussels about Kyiv's move to put Lukoil on its sanctions list, saying it prevented them from buying Russian oil for their refineries, threatening security of supply.

Hungary and Slovakia have gone to the rule book, arguing the penalties violate a 2014 trade deal between Kyiv and the EU and asking the European Commission, the EU’s executive, to intervene.

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Next 👉 Remember Hungary ignoring the EU over their concerns of Hungary relaxing Russian visa entry into the EU?

👉 Hungary relaxing Russian visa requirements to enter and work in the EU:

Remember how Hungary ignored the August 19th deadline to respond to the EU about their concerns of Hungary relaxing visa restrictions for Russians being allowed to/ encouraged to come to Hungary?

The EU set out its concerns that Hungary’s actions are a substantial security risk for the European Union and the Schengen free movement - which russian can now take advantage of and infiltrate the EU with belligerent actors.

Hungary chose to ignore the EU’s request and missed the deadline. Meanwhile after months of using its veto in the EU Council to delay sanctions against Russia and block EU aid to Ukraine, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán sparked outrage when he used the first weeks of his country’s turn as chair of intergovernmental talks to conduct a unilateral “peace mission” to Moscow and Beijing.

Fast forward to August 23, 2024 - news has broken that the EU have ignored and refused to meet with vatnik Szíjjártó to discuss his concerns about Lukoil oil now being sanctioned. A major blow to the pro-russian relationship Victator Orban established with Putin.

Fast forward to today: Two can play the ignore game:

BRUSSELS, Aug 23 (Reuters) - The European Commission has declined Hungary and Slovakia's request that it mediate a consultation procedure with Ukraine over sanctions imposed by Kyiv on Russian oil producer Lukoil, a Commission spokesperson said on Friday.

"Commission services have preliminarily concluded that urgent consultations do not appear to be warranted," the spokesperson said.

The spokesperson said Brussels had no indication Ukraine's sanctions had caused a risk to European security of energy supplies, since Russian oil was still flowing through the Druzhba pipeline that links Russia, via Ukraine, to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

"It appears that the sanctions imposed by Ukraine on Lukoil do not affect ongoing oil transit operations via Druzhba carried out by trading companies, as long as Lukoil is not the formal owner of the oil," the spokesperson said.

Check mate Orban.

Get in line vatnik, follow the European Union’s policies and principals or pay the price.

3/3

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Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 23

OFAC implements new sanctions - 23 August 2024

Context:

Building on the sanctions already imposed on Russia in response to its continued war of aggression against Ukraine, today the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State targeted nearly 400 individuals and entities both in Russia and outside its borders—including in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions.

The United States government will continue to support Ukraine as it defends its independence and hold Russia accountable for its aggression.

“Russia has turned its economy into a tool in service of the Kremlin’s military industrial complex. Treasury’s actions today continue to implement the commitments made by President Biden and his G7 counterparts to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial base supply chains and payment channels,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo.

“Companies, financial institutions, and governments around the world need to ensure they are not supporting Russia’s military-industrial supply chains.”

Treasury is targeting numerous transnational networks, including those involved in procuring ammunition and military materiel for Russia, facilitating sanctions evasion for Russian oligarchs through offshore trust and corporate formation services, evading sanctions imposed on Russia’s cyber actors, laundering gold for a sanctioned Russian gold company, and supporting Russia’s military-industrial base by procuring sensitive and critical items such as advanced machine tools and electronic components.

Today’s sanctions further limit Russia’s future revenue from metals and mining. Treasury is also targeting Russian financial technology companies that provide necessary software and IT solutions for Russia’s financial sector.

Treasury is aware of Russian efforts to facilitate sanctions evasion by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions.

Foreign regulators and financial institutions should be cautious about any dealings with overseas branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions, including efforts to open new branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions that are not themselves sanctioned. Treasury has a range of tools available to respond to the establishment of new evasion channels.

The State Department is targeting entities and individuals involved in Russia’s future energy, metals, and mining production and exports; sanctions evasion; Russia’s military-industrial base, including armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production, Belarusian support for Russia’s war effort, and air logistics entities; additional subsidiaries of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom; and malign actors involved in the attempted, forcible “re-education” of Ukraine’s children.

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Next 👉 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION

🔐 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION, AND BACKFILL

Consistent with commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders, Treasury continues to target transnational networks that supply Russia with military materiel and sensitive dual-use goods like those included in the multilateral Common High Priority List, jointly developed by the United States, European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Treasury is also targeting multiple networks that facilitate or enable illicit financial schemes and sanctions evasion on behalf of Russian revenue generators and oligarchs.

Many of today’s designations were enabled or informed by extensive coordination with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Today’s action targets almost a dozen distinct networks, designating more than 100 individuals and entities across 16 jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.

🔐 RUSSIA’S TECHNOLOGICAL BASE

Today, Treasury is targeting more than 60 Russia-based technology and defense companies that are critical for the sustainment and development of Russia’s defense industry, including entities involved in weapons development and modernization, automation and robotics, development and acquisition of dual-use electronics, digital surveillance, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence.

These sanctions target Russia’s defense industry while protecting the access by Russian citizens to crucial telecommunications and other digital technology.

🔐 LIMITING RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC METALS AND MINING SECTOR

Guided by commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders to reduce Russia’s revenues from metals, today Treasury is targeting entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining sector, including steel, iron, and coal mining firms and auxiliary firms that provide specialized services to Russian metals and mining companies.

🔐 RUSSIAN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Today, OFAC is targeting Russian financial technology companies as a part of implementing G7 commitments to curtail Russia’s use of and access to the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine.

👉 Atol is a Russian technology developer involved in services related to payments.

👉 Centre of Financial Technologies Group (CFT)is one of the largest software companies in the Russian market. CFT provides an array of software products for banking and payment solutions for the Russian financial market.

👉 Diasoft Ltd (Diasoft) is one of Russia’s largest developers and suppliers of information technology (IT) solutions for the financial sector.

Atol, CFT, and Diasoft were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

2/9
Next 👉 Ammunition Procurement Network

🔐 Ammunition Procurement Network:

Italian national Giulio Sfoglietti (Sfoglietti) has been involved in a procurement network involving a Türkiye facilitator to purchase more than $150 million worth of military equipment, ammunition, and ordnance for the Russian military from potential suppliers in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran. Türkiye national Hayri Tahirbeyoglu (Tahirbeyoglu) is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Türkiye-based ammunition, weapons, and military materiel company Taha Savunma Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (Taha Savunma) and has worked with Sfoglietti on the procurement of ammunition and weapons for likely Russian end-use. Sfoglietti has also worked to procure microelectronics and chips for Russia-based end-users.

Sfoglietti associate Russian national Marat Khanbalevich Gabitov (Gabitov) has worked with an employee of U.S.-designated Russian defense conglomerate State Corporation Rostec to procure microelectronics related to radio frequency (RF) equipment. Gabitov has also worked to procure microelectronics, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other machinery and equipment for Russia-based end-users.

Sfoglietti was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel and technology sectors of the Russian Federation economy. Tahirbeyoglu and Taha Savunma were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. Gabitov was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

🔐 Promtekh Supply Chain:

U.S.-designated Russia-based Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Promyshlennye Tekhnologii (Promtekh) has used a network of companies located in Türkiye, France, and Hong Kong to send high priority goods to Promtekh’s subsidiaries. Russia-based Aspectriym Limited Trade Development (Aspectriym) is a subsidiary of Promtekh and is a defense procurement firm involved in the wholesale of electronic equipment and parts.

France-based Industrial Technologies Group France (ITGF) is a sister firm of U.S.-designated Promtechcomplekt JSC, a subsidiary of Promtekh, and has worked with Aspectriym to procure foreign- and U.S.-made electronic components. Hong Kong-based Interasia Trading Group Limited (Interasia Trading) is the sole owner of ITGF. Russian national Igor Aleksandrovich Reutov (Reutov) is the Executive Director of ITGF. Reutov is also the owner of Estonia-based Free Sky Solutions OU (Free Sky) and the Managing Partner of France-based Aerialia. Aerialia was established in January 2024.

ITGF also created a Türkiye-based firm, Enutek Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Enutek). Enutek has made hundreds of shipments of technology, including high priority dual-use technology such as electronic integrated circuits and ceramic capacitors, to U.S.-designated Promtekh subsidiaries, including Promtech Ulyanovsk, Dubna Switching Equipment Plant, and Promtech Irkutsk. Enutek was established in December 2022.

3/9
Next 👉 Other foreign suppliers

Read 12 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 20

India is fuelling the genocidal invasion of Ukraine by propping the russian regime up with expanding trade - financing the regimes federal budget to fund its military industrial complex.

India's expanding commerce with Russia has raised concerns, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. However, India’s relationship with Russia is driven by a complex mix of historical ties, strategic interests, and economic pragmatism, rather than a desire to deepen ties in a way that directly supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Here's how India navigates this delicate situation:

1. Historical and Strategic Relationship:

Long-standing Partnership: India and Russia have a deep-rooted relationship that dates back to the Cold War era when the Soviet Union was a key ally of India. This partnership continues to influence their diplomatic and defense relations today.

Defense Dependence: India relies heavily on Russia for military hardware, with about 60-70% of its defense equipment being of Russian origin. This dependence compels India to maintain a functional relationship with Russia, despite the latter's controversial actions.

2. Economic “Pragmatism” and reputation white-washing:

Energy Needs: India is one of the world’s largest energy consumers, and Russia has become a significant supplier of crude oil to India, particularly after Western sanctions on Russia limited its market access.

India has taken advantage of discounted Russian oil, which has helped it manage inflation and energy costs domestically, while filling the coffers of the federal government in Russia, used to fund the illegal war in Ukraine.

Trade Growth: Bilateral trade between India and Russia has grown significantly since the invasion of Ukraine, driven largely by energy imports. However, this trade is framed as a part of India's broader strategy to diversify its energy sources and manage its economic needs, rather than an endorsement of Russia's policies.

3. Diplomatic Whitewashing Act:

Neutral Stance on Ukraine: India has tried hard to convince the world it has a “neutral stance” on the Ukraine conflict, often abstaining from UN votes condemning Russia. This neutrality is positioned as part of India’s non-alignment policy and its broader strategic autonomy, where it seeks to avoid taking sides in conflicts between major powers.

Of course as tensions simmer with Pakistan and China - sooner or later it will become embroiled in a large conflict - probably with China over land and water resources in the next decade.

India should find no support in the future, especially from countries who have made huge financial sacrifices in changing their dependence on cheap russian fossil fuels, and who have also made substantial financial and military support aid donations. While India chooses to opaquely support Russia in the war in Ukraine conducted by a psychopathic russian.

Most of the EU, G& and coalition countries (excluding the likes of Hungary), have all worked hard to reduce trade with Russia to limit it’s revenues to support the war - India has continued expanding it’s trade, knowing it will have consequences to face at some point for this expansion and support.

Dialogue with All Sides: Despite its growing commerce with Russia, India continues to engage diplomatically with Western countries and has called for dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. This balanced approach helps India avoid alienating Western partners, who are critical to its economic and geopolitical interests.

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Next 👉 BRICS and India’s feigning of neutrality

4. Global South Leadership:

Advocating for Developing Countries: India has framed its engagement with Russia as part of its broader responsibility towards the Global South and its position in BRICS.

It argues that sanctions on Russia disproportionately affect developing countries, and by continuing trade, India positions itself as a voice for these nations, which is a whitewashing of it’s support of a regime led by an indicted war criminal.

5. Avoiding Direct Support:

Limited Military Engagement: While India continues to purchase Russian defense equipment, it has not provided direct military support to Russia's war efforts. India’s relationship with Russia in the defense sector is portrayed as fulfilling its own security needs rather than supporting Russia’s military agenda.

But all is not what it seems:

India is expanding its commerce with Russia, but it does so with a clear understanding of the geopolitical risks - sooner or later it will be held to account for fuelling the genocidal regime in Russia. It chooses to advocate maintaining a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict which is a contradiction in terms - as data shows the level and type of trade it conducts with Russia.

It supports a normalisation of business as usual in russian society against the ongoing brutal suppression of Putin dissenters and opposition in Russia - and it choses to ignore the regimes daily war crimes and society destabilisation schemes it conducts globally, both in country with malevolent actors and through the propagation of propaganda and misinformation across governments and social media platforms.

India is masquerading as an innocent bystander, framing its actions in terms of national interest and global equity.and in doing so it tries to convince the world - india sidesteps direct involvement in the war.

This strategy is about India trying to manage its energy needs and maintain its strategic autonomy while limiting damaging its relations with Western countries by avoiding public scrutiny and attention.

2/3
Next 👉 Trade details reveal the extent of their support for Russia and its war time budget.

Trade:

Trade between Russia and India reached a record US$17.5 billion in the first quarter of this year, while the exchange between the two countries exceeded $50 billion for the first time. In a statement carried by Russia Today, India's Ministry of Industry and Commerce said India-Russia trade recorded a 5 percent year-on-year growth, with the previous increase being $17 billion in the second quarter of last year.

Russia exported $16.3 billion worth of goods to India in the first quarter, up from $15.6 billion a year earlier. Indian goods exports to Russia also rose 22 percent to $1.2 billion between January and March. Russia is the second major supplier of goods to India after China with shipments of $24.8 billion.

2023 Exports from India to Russia - in the middle of the genocidal war:

Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers $576.88M
Pharmaceutical products$371.72M
Organic chemicals $323.87M
Iron and steel $321.90M
Electrical, electronic equipment $269.43M
Inorganic chemicals, precious metals, isotope. $209.25M
Miscellaneous chemical products $150.45M
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatics invertebrates $149.91M
Optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus $125.31M
Ceramic products $116.35M
Coffee, tea, mate and spices $92.29M
Miscellaneous edible preparations $86.13M
Lac, gums, resins $80.11M
Rubbers $77.77M
Plastics $77.68M
Tobacco and manufactures tobacco substitutes $69.51M
Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, pigments $67.08M
Cereals $66.35M
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruits $60.05M
Aircraft, spacecraft$58.27M
Articles of iron or steel$53.82M
Meat and edible meat offal$47.33M

In particular the amount of machinery exported by India to facilitate Russia in it’s war in Ukraine the following was exported to Russia in 2023:

Automatic Data Processing Machines, Magnetic or Optical Readers $85.98M
Machinery for Sorting, Screening, Separating, Washing, Crushing or Mixing $51.86M
Self-propelled bulldozers, graders, scrapers $45.38M
Apparatus for Treatment of Materials $35.93M
Ball or Roller Bearings $35.26M
Machines and Mechanical Appliances $31.44M
Parts of Internal Combustion Piston Engines $31.31M
Taps, Cocks, Valves for Pipes, Tanks or the Like $27.88M
Centrifuges; Filtering or Purifying Machinery $23.40M
Lathes for removing metal $20.32M
Machining Centres for Working Metal $19.99M
Turbo-jets, Turbo-propellers and Other Gas Turbines $18.70M
Machines for Uses Ancillary to Printing $15.29M
Pumps for Liquids, Liquid Elevators $12.93M
Parts and Accessories of Machine-tools; Tool Holders $9.42M
Machinery for Working Rubber or Plastics $9.02M
Transmission Shafts, Cranks, Bearing Housings, Gears $8.09M
Air or Vacuum Pumps, Air or Other Gas Compressors $7.11M
Parts of Pulley Tackle, Derricks, Cranes, Lifts $6.70M
Spark-ignition Internal Combustion Piston Engines $6.45M

As a comparison - India’s trade with the United States in 2023:

In 2022–2023, bilateral trade between the two countries increased by 7.65% to $128.55 billion, making the U.S. India's largest trading partner.

The U.S. exported $48.5 billion in goods to India in 2022, including $10.8 billion in crude petroleum, $6.08 billion in coal briquettes, and $5.07 billion in diamonds. India exported $82.9 billion in goods to the U.S. in 2022, including $9.75 billion in diamonds, $7.54 billion in packaged medicaments, and $4.87 billion in refined petroleum

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Next 👉 Latest reported statistics in 2024

Read 7 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 20

Hungary refuses to provide the EU with an explanation regarding the issuance of visas to Russians and Belarusians

Hungary missed the European Commission's deadline this week to respond to questions about its decision to ease entry requirements for Russian and Belarusian nationals, raising concerns across the EU.

Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson had given Budapest until 19 August to explain the changes in its immigration policy, but as of Monday afternoon, no reply had been received, the commission confirmed. Frustration is boiling over with Viktor Orbán's rogue foreign policy in EU capitals.

In August 2024, Viktor Orban signed a decree on the extension of the accelerated visa issuance program to eight countries, including Russia and Belarus.

Hungary recently relaxed entry rules for Russians and Belarusians, allowing "guest workers" to stay for two years, with an option to extend for another three years. Johansson sent a letter in August to Hungary's Interior Minister, Sándor Pintér, requesting an explanation for these changes.

The European Union began to publicly demand explanations from Hungary regarding its decision to ease the visa regime for citizens of Russia and Belarus.

Several EU countries, led by the Czech Republic, pushed to ban Schengen travel for Russian diplomats due to espionage concerns. After entering the passport-free zone, Russian diplomats could potentially travel freely across the bloc.

Points of concern:

👉 Hungary's decision to issue visas to Russians and Belarusians without providing explanations to the EU has raised concerns in the European Union.

👉 The relaxation of the visa regime by Hungary for citizens of Russia and Belarus may have security implications for the EU, leading to demands for clarifications from Hungarian authorities.

👉 The EU's Internal Affairs Commissioner expressed concerns about the risk of espionage due to the simplified visa regime, urging Hungary to respond to inquiries by a specified deadline.

👉 Viktor Orban's decree to extend the visa program to include citizens of Russia and Belarus with 'national cards' for work has further fueled the controversy and prompted the EU to take action if necessary.

👉 The issue highlights the need for balanced immigration policies that consider security implications and the integrity of the EU's internal border control, emphasizing the importance of transparency and cooperation among member states.

History of ignoring the EU Commission:

In June 2024, the European Court of Justice fined Hungary €200 million for breaking the EU’s asylum laws and ignoring an earlier judgment.

The Luxembourg court first ruled in December 2020 that Hungary had failed to comply with the bloc’s rules on the treatment of migrants by “unlawfully detaining” asylum seekers and deporting them before they could appeal the rejection of their applications, ordering Budapest to make changes to its policies.

Hungary ignored the judgment, which the ECJ described in a statement on Thursday as “deliberately evading the application of the EU common policy.” Along with the €200 million fine, Hungary will be fined an additional €1 million per day that it fails to comply with the court’s judgment. If Budapest refuses to pay the fines, they can be deducted from its share of the EU budget, as was the case with Poland.

Orbán, imitating his super-hero Donold Trump, lashed out at the judgment, calling it “outrageous and unacceptable” in a post on X.

Viktator Orbán has undermined Europe for long enough, Hungary brazenly flouts EU laws as Orbán openly courts and admires indicted war criminal Vladimir Putin, dictator Xi JingPing who has over one million ethnic Chinese in concentration camps and Turkey’s right wing Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The EU should have called the Vatnik’s bluff 2 years ago.

References and sources:

uk.news.yahoo.com/tensions-rise-…
news.online.ua/en/hungary-ref…
euronews.com/my-europe/2024…
politico.eu/article/hungar…

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Read 4 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 11

Russia-linked social media accounts have incited violence and racism in online groups discussing the far-right disorder that have engulfed the UK.

This thread is long - why not consider listening to the audio narration. Great for multi-tasking and commuting. The audio link can be found in the first answer to the last tweet in this thread.

In July and August 2024, far-right riots occurred in England and Northern Ireland, after a mass stabbing in Southport on 29 July. The first riot started in Southport and later many protests and riots spread across the country.

The riots involved racist attacks, arson and looting, and were the worst disorder in the United Kingdom since the 2011 England riots. The riots were fuelled by underlying Islamophobic, racist, anti-immigrant sentiments, and disinformation about the identity of the Southport stabber.

Far-right groups spread misinformation online, and the UK government under Keir Starmer accused Russia of spreading disinformation to stoke the unrest.

The Prime Minister’s spokesman said the Government has “seen bot activity online, much of which may well be amplified by foreign-state actors amplifying some of the disinformation and misinformation that we’ve seen”.

It comes after it emerged that initial disinformation that the teenager accused of killing three girls in Southport was an asylum seeker who had crossed the English Channel can be traced back to Channel3 Now, a Russia-linked website that claims to be a legitimate American news outlet.

Channel3 Now incorrectly claimed the suspect was an asylum seeker named Ali Al-Shakati, and circulation of the name was boosted by thousands of other accounts on X, formerly known as Twitter. As the protests unfolded, two key far-right Telegram channels linked to the protests were flooded with words of encouragement from people purporting to be from Russia.

A post discussing leafleting about the “demographic demise” of Britons “because of mass immigration” in the channel of far-right group Patriotic Alternative received praise from several accounts claiming to be run by Russians.

The Daily Mail reported in recent days that Channel3 Now — whose post was viewed by more than 2 million people before being deleted and followed by an apology — started life 11 years ago as a Russian YouTube channel.

The Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) says rightwing violence “is often classified as mere thuggery” by politicians, prosecutors and the security services. Equivalent acts by Islamists would “swiftly be labelled as terrorism”, it says in an article in the Guardian.

It’s not the first time Britain has probed state interference in its domestic affairs. Russian state media outlets RT and Sputnik pushed false narratives about the 2018 poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal on British soil.

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Next 👉 Who or what is the far-right?

Who or what is the far-right?

The right-wing spectrum consists of many sub-variants of ideology; however, the landscape contains actors who are – to varying degrees – “right of” centre on the political spectrum.

A Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) report clearly explains how the right-wing spectrum holds that inequalities and superiority are natural states, which allow for, and inform, the nativist and authoritarian views of society that some of them adhere to.

Essential features of groups and individuals on the right-wing spectrum that are discussed in the literature include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and advocacy for a strong state.

While “law and order” are essential to maintaining the natural hierarchy and societal system on the right-wing spectrum, the extent to which this can be achieved within democratic means varies across the spectrum.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, scholars have often distinguished between those hostile to liberal democracy and those strictly in opposition to democracy by referring to them as the radical right and extreme right respectively.

Nativism (i.e., a policy of favouring native inhabitants) is often based on either biological racism, from which white supremacism promotes racial interpretations of ethnic superiority, or ethnic nationalism, from which an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation is used to challenge pluralism, promote xenophobia, and stoke anti-immigration sentiment.

The right-wing spectrum comprises of and is influenced by everything from political parties and organisations to social movements, as well as the media and intellectual organisations.

Often the line between mainstream and extreme is very blurry, with some right-wing groups combining political participation and sometimes-violent forms of activism and expression. The current global political and social climate, including the escalating impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, has encouraged the spread of and mainstreaming of this threat, as well as the nebulous use of political speech, left-wing causes, and pop cultural symbols.

Governments and international bodies are increasingly recognising the threat posed by the far-right, both at national and international levels.

The right-wing spectrum consists of many sub-variants of ideology; however, the landscape contains actors who are – to varying degrees – “right of” centre on the political spectrum. A Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) report clearly explains how the right-wing spectrum holds that inequalities and superiority are natural states, which allow for, and inform, the nativist and authoritarian views of society that some of them adhere to.

Essential features of groups and individuals on the right-wing spectrum that are discussed in the literature include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and advocacy for a strong state.

While “law and order” are essential to maintaining the natural hierarchy and societal system on the right-wing spectrum, the extent to which this can be achieved within democratic means varies across the spectrum.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, scholars have often distinguished between those hostile to liberal democracy and those strictly in opposition to democracy by referring to them as the radical right and extreme right respectively.

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Next 👉 Nativism and Transnational far-right extremism

Nativism (i.e., a policy of favouring native inhabitants) is often based on either biological racism, from which white supremacism promotes racial interpretations of ethnic superiority, or ethnic nationalism, from which an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation is used to challenge pluralism, promote xenophobia, and stoke anti-immigration sentiment.

The right-wing spectrum comprises of and is influenced by everything from political parties and organisations to social movements, as well as the media and intellectual organisations.

Often the line between mainstream and extreme is very blurry, with some right-wing groups combining political participation and sometimes-violent forms of activism and expression.

The current global political and social climate, including the escalating impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, has encouraged the spread of and mainstreaming of this threat, as well as the nebulous use of political speech, left-wing causes, and pop cultural symbols.

Governments and international bodies are increasingly recognising the threat posed by the far-right, both at national and international levels.

Transnational far-right extremism is truly a global concern. While the dominant force of research has focused on the Western European and North American context, far-right threats spread across the Global North and South (e.g., North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia).

A Counter Extremism Project (CEP) report highlights how national politics often remain a primary channel of engagement; however, international linkages offline and online allow for increasingly strong connections to be formed across borders.

While the transnational connection of far-right elements is not a new phenomenon, in recent years far-right elements are often linking transnational movements through apocalyptic narratives (e.g., the ‘Great Replacement’ and ‘white genocide”) and are drawn together through music, violent sport, money, and violence.

There are also many instances of ideological convergences across borders. However, while there is an extremely robust online far-right community that embraces and encourages violence, it does not equally translate into either online or offline operational capabilities for action.

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Next 👉 Far right groups in the UK, a potted history.

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Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Aug 7

The United States has threatened Turkey with "consequences" for exporting technology to Russia.

This thread explores Turkey’s trade with Russia - and questions whether equal threats should now be made to EU countries complicit in building Turkey as a hub for their products being re-exported into the russian parallel market.

07 August 2024, The Financial Times reports on possible sanctions against Ankara for cooperation with Moscow.

“Washington has warned Turkey that there will be “consequences” if the country does not curtail its exports to Russia of US military-linked hardware that is vital to Moscow’s war machine.”

As part of efforts to curb illegal trade, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Matthew Axelrod met with Turkish officials. According to the representative of Ankara, the American official demanded that they work harder to limit trade in American-made chips and other spare parts that may be in demand in Russia.

Washington’s warning is the latest sign of how Turkey’s decision to retain strong trade ties with Russia has tarnished relations between the two Nato allies. The US, EU and other western partners have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Turkey has eschewed the curbs and increased trade with the country since the war broke out.

Of particular concern to the United States is the fact that Turkey has become a key hub through which Western-made electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, enter Russia.

At the end of 2023, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury for Counterterrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian Nelson, already shared his disappointment about Ankara's trade in military goods. The US Department of Commerce has already imposed sanctions against Turkish companies for allegedly supplying products to the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Russia.

Earlier, Turkish analyst Mehmet Perincek said that Turkey is being forced to impose anti-Russian sanctions in order to weaken its economy and make it not resist the plans of the United States. In his opinion, the conflict in Ukraine is also being used to worsen relations between Moscow and Ankara. This is done to leave Turkey without partners, the analyst believes.

Turkish economic commentator Mustafa Recep Ercin added that because of the sanctions, trade with Russia has turned into a nightmare. In May, he complained that the United States and the EU were intimidating Turkish financial institutions in the event of their cooperation with Russia.

Because of this, the volume of banking transactions fell, and importers faced difficulties in making transactions for purchased products. According to the Turkish Institute of Statistics, shipments to Russia decreased by 32 percent year-on-year in the first quarter.

Washington’s warning is the latest sign of how Turkey’s decision to retain strong trade ties with Russia has tarnished relations between the two Nato allies.

The US, EU and other western partners have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Turkey has eschewed the curbs and increased trade with the country since the war broke out.

The US is particularly worried that Turkey has become a key hub through which western-made electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, are making their way to Russian missiles and drones in contravention of export controls. Machine tools are another significant area of concern.

I argue that if the US is prepared to warn turkey and threaten sanctions for trading with Russia - a wider view and equal threat of sanctions should be applied to European countries. If you think that is controversial, here is why:

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Next 👉 European countries are complicit too

European countries are complicit in the growth of Turkey being a russian trading hub - and they know it!

Not every country in the Caucuses has followed the sanctions circumvention supply chain scam - one exception as an example is Azerbaijan. Their main export markets are Russia, and another group of countries is Central Asia, Caucuses, Belarus, and the UAE. Azerbaijans exports have not spiked or boomed since the invasion and remain comparatively low and moderate, at circa $70 million.

This only represents a handful of dozens of countries that have all seen exponential exports. And this is only one of potentially hundreds of satellite hubs for Russian trade.

One of the largest trading hubs is of course Turkey. The amount of goods and services passing through Turkey is simply staggering. European and G7 nations are masking their sales to Russia through trading hubs such as Turkey.

For example - one of the smallest export EU countries, The Netherlands. Let’s compare what they were trading 2 years ago with a look at their current export destinations:

👉 Dutch exports to Russia were at circa $300 million Euros and after Russia’s latest war on Ukraine this has levelled out to $100 million.

👉 Simultaneously they increased their exports to Turkey from a low of €250 million to a current level in excess of $450 million.

Turkey is a middle man in the supply chain. Yes it enjoys a substantial revenue stream for being the trading hub - but I argue, the players simplicity in the trade begin at manufacturer level. They need to be regulated to ensure they are also not benefiting for knowingly selling to known parallel market exporters and importers.

They are all driven by greed and a need to maintain or increase their global sales, and in doing so they are feeding their products directly to the parallel market and providing russia with both sanctioned and un-sanctioned products, many of which are dual use with commercial and military applications.

Many products are not sanctioned, but lets be clear - any products or services that find their way into russia, support the federal budget in tax revenues to fund the war - and the availability of Western goods and Services, normalises russian consumer expectations and consumer activity - in spite of their genocidal and illegal war being waged in Ukraine.

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Next 👉 The effects of US sanctions threats

The effects of US sanctions threats:

Biden’s decree last year authorized the U.S. to impose sanctions on any bank that helped Russia evade sanctions on the import of items essential for the defense sector. Up to now, no such sanction has been introduced, but just the possibility has been enough to seriously worry many financial institutions.

The U.S. is making strenuous efforts to ensure it is taken seriously: U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen has spent months touring the world – from China to Germany – to issue warnings about financing Russian imports.

As a result, Russian companies have faced serious problems making payments to foreign banks. Turkish banks have demanded additional checks, in and in Hong Kong there are stricter rules for working with Russian clients.

In China, things are especially tricky. In some cases, it is taking six months to process payments through Chinese banks, sources told Reuters last month, and the more closely the goods in question look like potential military components, the more extensive the checks and delays.

The threat of sanctions have also complicated payments in Chinese yuan – which the Kremlin had been relying on as a way of mitigating the effects of sanctions, and reducing risks.

The first four months of 2024 saw total Russian imports fall 10.3% year-on-year to $20.9 billion, according to Central Bank data.

As well as payment difficulties, other reasons for this trend, according to the bank, could be high interest rates, accumulated inventories and the weakness of the ruble.

Which industries are affected?

Deliveries of electronics, equipment and components to Russia are in decline. In particular, there’s less Turkish machinery and Chinese equipment reaching Russia.

In the first three months of 2024 there was a 57% year-on-year fall in imports of “machinery, equipment, vehicles, instruments and apparatus” from Kazakhstan. There were similar falls from Hong Kong (32%) and Serbia (almost 50%), according to The Bell’s calculations.

Why the world should care

Some observers believe there is a risk of blowback from secondary sanctions that could affect markets that have nothing to do with Russia. But it is clear these sanctions are pushing Russia further into isolation, and will cause productivity issues over the long term.

“Recent events show that sanctions can be an effective instrument if they are properly applied and observed,” said Heli Simola, senior economist at the Bank of Finland’s Institute of Developing Economies. “However, it’s obvious that compliance must be constantly monitored and improved as Russia keeps trying to find new workarounds.”

What lies behind this parallel market and russian trading hub activity?

In recent years, in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, global economic sanctions have targeted Russian entities and individuals, aiming to curb their activities and financial reach to pressure their government to de-escalate war efforts.

These sanctions were accompanied by decisions by private companies to suspend their activities partially or completely in Russia.

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Next 👉 The parallel import program authorised by Putin

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