Thread by @ArveloaMert

Here is the sixth thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the late spring.Russia continues to focus on Dombass while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar

1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1567846098110222338?s=20

2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1592080338582380544?s=20

3) For the events between January to February and more issues like Wood Warfare, Riverine Warfare and etc. you can look to this thread.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1611482965539983360?s=20

4) Here is the thread that started after the fall of Soledar and focused on types of Russian offensives, use of artillery and ammunition scarcity, Russian scarcity of armoured vehicles and on the issue of Transnistria.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1620939041431486464?s=20

5) Here is the thread 🧵 on the strategy of #RussiaUkraineWar that involves a short focus on the latest Russian C2 and tactics, crowdsourcing, aviation, cluster munitions and fortifications.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1629888194308104194?s=20

6) Here is the fifth thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early spring. Spring would be an interesting time as both sides claimed to go for a possible offensive.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1639187797469966337?s=20

7) From now on, you can find my interactive map for the #RussiaUkraineWar. You can find some strategic, tactical notes and other issues that covered in my threads. (Not available in mobile+map is not precise since its goal is not showing exact positions)

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1650969599465103367?s=20

8) Communication continue as a challenging issue for #Russia. Russia tries to improve the communication structure of its elite troops like VDV and Naval Infantry. Advanced systems like Andromeda and other digital systems failed to deliver in this war.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1651316628016214016?s=20

9) #Russia's Assault Detachment tactics extremely requires working communications and this problem persists. Moscow also suffers from friendly fire incidents and failed threat assessment before the operations as they wittnessed in Vuhledar.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1629888282757562370?s=20

10) #Russia tries to implement its dispersed command and control understanding. But they still face grave problems in both technical and strategic aspect. Use of different units with different C2 stru.(Wagner, DNR/LNR, VDV, NI, BARS) excarbate this further

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1629888260452253696?s=20

11) Primary 🇷🇺 comm. capabilities were focused on earlier generational tech 'radios'. These radios are vulnerable to exploitation due to lacks in COMSEC/TRANSEC and could made them manipulable. Furthermore, 🇺🇦 COMINT also mine datas from these radios.
rusi.org/explore-our-re…

12) #Russia use Chinese made unencrypted Bao Feng radios to communicate problems further worse. These radios were provided by crowdsourcing. Russian soldiers also use mobile phones which are unencrypted and emmit signals that reveal their positions.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1523192344522207232?s=20

13) In some places like #Kreminna, #Russia use older military taxaphones to connect defensive positions within the woods via cords. This is safer and sustainable but natural conditions and static requirement for a box phone creates problems.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1642438440451989505?s=20

14) In the latest weeks, #Ukraine conducted increased strikes against Russian Electronic Warfare units. This would impact Russian counter-communication efforts with decreased capacity in jamming, spoofing and intercepting comms.

https://twitter.com/ArveloaMert/status/1649203013708312578?s=20

15) 🇺🇦 hackers also targeted 🇷🇺 GPS system GLONASS via use of some breaches in the code. VDV's novel techs like Andromeda and other digital comms use this system. The extent of 🇺🇦 breach of the systems unknown since further attack on it could led to a escalaton with the West.

16) Comms plays an important role in both horizontally and vertically. The main strength of the military came from the notion of 'control' and than 'command'. This requires a high degree of situational awareness among the soldiers and commanders. #Russia still faces hardships.

17) #Russia was well aware of these problems since they suffered communication failures in 2008 Georgia and in 2014 Dombass. They even created a doctrine of Reflexive Control (RC) which is almost a bionic Commander who has a sense of both his military capacity and his enemy.

https://twitter.com/arveloamert/status/1629888267716796418

18) RC settled full control of comms and denying and manipualting enemy comms as its basic point. But continued failures showed that 🇷🇺 problems in comm technology is much more chronic and tied with industry and R&D. Sanctions, lack of know-how and talent loss are the main issues

19) Interesting article by CSIS on #Ukraine’s Air Defences. Munitions scarcity is a clear danger for Ukraine but West can increase the production of ammunition for certain ADs. But the West’s scarcirty of SHORADs (partic. US) and mid-range ADs is a problem
csis.org/analysis/will-…

20) But as this is the part of intel leak #Ukraine’s AD munition stocks are still sufficient to blow a huge damage to the Russian Air Force. RAF has a pilot shortage, problem with spare parts and maintainance and need its air power against NATO and for nuclear deterrence.

21) Chief of #NATO underlined that #Ukraine, now, received 98% of promised combat vehicles. Which confirms the fact that Western supplied armour is ready for a counter-offensive. It is just a matter of planning, training and decision of Kyiv and Command.
militarytimes.com/news/your-mili…

22) Russia continues to prepare fortified positions for upcoming counter-offensive of #Ukraine. Russian forces are also concerning about any attack by #Enerhodar and #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. #Russia fortified the roofs of reactor buildings.

https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1651456287408832512?s=20

23) Fortification and turning of NPPs to a war zone are problematic in the laws of AC. But use of infantry weapons did not directly threaten the safety of the reactors. But use of artillery and other disruptive weapons that can threaten plant's generators+electricity is risky.

24) NPP's are protected in Law of Armed Conflict. But there are no 'strict' laws that outlaws militarizations of them. In some cases, if a party is not signatory they can use NPPs as military facilities or attack them or if NPP has significant oper. value and direct impact on war

25) For example if a state tried to occupy a NPP and have some malicious plans to exploit it, a state could conduct a mil. op. against it. Without this two it is unethical to attack a NPP for civilian use. A party could defend a NPP with sprecial weapons if it ensure its safety.

26) Reactors are usually safe within hard concrete rooms. But NPPs have two side parts. The first one is; 1) Pools and storages for storing spended fuel bars and 2) Electricity and Water Pomping stations that helps in cooling-down of the reactor cores.
blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy…

27) What could be down for safety than? An operator should check subcritacality, core cooling, heat sink, integrity, containment and inventory. Subcriticality is not important for ZPP as it is currently not operational but even if it is shutted down core cooling continues.

28) A NPP could be cooled down in 3 ways: by removal of fuel from the core, by refuelling mode and lastly a practice of cold shutdown (most appropriate way). According to Russia and IAEA, ZPP is now in a cold shutdown but still requires electricity+water.
reuters.com/world/europe/z…

29) In any case of electricity and water supply loss, plant workers have 4 hours to restore them before a critical boiling point in steam generators, total collapse of the system 48 hours. Cooling the reactor with secondary water requirement is 1.9kg/s with a 1.57 bar pressure.

@threadreaderapp unroll please.