1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
4) Here is the thread that started after the fall of Soledar and focused on types of Russian offensives, use of artillery and ammunition scarcity, Russian scarcity of armoured vehicles and on the issue of Transnistria.
5) Here is the thread 🧵 on the strategy of #RussiaUkraineWar that involves a short focus on the latest Russian C2 and tactics, crowdsourcing, aviation, cluster munitions and fortifications.
6) Here is the fifth thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early spring. Spring would be an interesting time as both sides claimed to go for a possible offensive.
7) From now on, you can find my interactive map for the #RussiaUkraineWar. You can find some strategic, tactical notes and other issues that covered in my threads. (Not available in mobile+map is not precise since its goal is not showing exact positions)
8) Communication continue as a challenging issue for #Russia. Russia tries to improve the communication structure of its elite troops like VDV and Naval Infantry. Advanced systems like Andromeda and other digital systems failed to deliver in this war.
9) #Russia's Assault Detachment tactics extremely requires working communications and this problem persists. Moscow also suffers from friendly fire incidents and failed threat assessment before the operations as they wittnessed in Vuhledar.
10) #Russia tries to implement its dispersed command and control understanding. But they still face grave problems in both technical and strategic aspect. Use of different units with different C2 stru.(Wagner, DNR/LNR, VDV, NI, BARS) excarbate this further
11) Primary 🇷🇺 comm. capabilities were focused on earlier generational tech 'radios'. These radios are vulnerable to exploitation due to lacks in COMSEC/TRANSEC and could made them manipulable. Furthermore, 🇺🇦 COMINT also mine datas from these radios. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
12) #Russia use Chinese made unencrypted Bao Feng radios to communicate problems further worse. These radios were provided by crowdsourcing. Russian soldiers also use mobile phones which are unencrypted and emmit signals that reveal their positions.
13) In some places like #Kreminna, #Russia use older military taxaphones to connect defensive positions within the woods via cords. This is safer and sustainable but natural conditions and static requirement for a box phone creates problems.
14) In the latest weeks, #Ukraine conducted increased strikes against Russian Electronic Warfare units. This would impact Russian counter-communication efforts with decreased capacity in jamming, spoofing and intercepting comms.
15) 🇺🇦 hackers also targeted 🇷🇺 GPS system GLONASS via use of some breaches in the code. VDV's novel techs like Andromeda and other digital comms use this system. The extent of 🇺🇦 breach of the systems unknown since further attack on it could led to a escalaton with the West.
16) Comms plays an important role in both horizontally and vertically. The main strength of the military came from the notion of 'control' and than 'command'. This requires a high degree of situational awareness among the soldiers and commanders. #Russia still faces hardships.
17) #Russia was well aware of these problems since they suffered communication failures in 2008 Georgia and in 2014 Dombass. They even created a doctrine of Reflexive Control (RC) which is almost a bionic Commander who has a sense of both his military capacity and his enemy.
18) RC settled full control of comms and denying and manipualting enemy comms as its basic point. But continued failures showed that 🇷🇺 problems in comm technology is much more chronic and tied with industry and R&D. Sanctions, lack of know-how and talent loss are the main issues
19) Interesting article by CSIS on #Ukraine’s Air Defences. Munitions scarcity is a clear danger for Ukraine but West can increase the production of ammunition for certain ADs. But the West’s scarcirty of SHORADs (partic. US) and mid-range ADs is a problem csis.org/analysis/will-…
20) But as this is the part of intel leak #Ukraine’s AD munition stocks are still sufficient to blow a huge damage to the Russian Air Force. RAF has a pilot shortage, problem with spare parts and maintainance and need its air power against NATO and for nuclear deterrence.
21) Chief of #NATO underlined that #Ukraine, now, received 98% of promised combat vehicles. Which confirms the fact that Western supplied armour is ready for a counter-offensive. It is just a matter of planning, training and decision of Kyiv and Command. militarytimes.com/news/your-mili…
22) Russia continues to prepare fortified positions for upcoming counter-offensive of #Ukraine. Russian forces are also concerning about any attack by #Enerhodar and #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. #Russia fortified the roofs of reactor buildings.
23) Fortification and turning of NPPs to a war zone are problematic in the laws of AC. But use of infantry weapons did not directly threaten the safety of the reactors. But use of artillery and other disruptive weapons that can threaten plant's generators+electricity is risky.
24) NPP's are protected in Law of Armed Conflict. But there are no 'strict' laws that outlaws militarizations of them. In some cases, if a party is not signatory they can use NPPs as military facilities or attack them or if NPP has significant oper. value and direct impact on war
25) For example if a state tried to occupy a NPP and have some malicious plans to exploit it, a state could conduct a mil. op. against it. Without this two it is unethical to attack a NPP for civilian use. A party could defend a NPP with sprecial weapons if it ensure its safety.
26) Reactors are usually safe within hard concrete rooms. But NPPs have two side parts. The first one is; 1) Pools and storages for storing spended fuel bars and 2) Electricity and Water Pomping stations that helps in cooling-down of the reactor cores. blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy…
27) What could be down for safety than? An operator should check subcritacality, core cooling, heat sink, integrity, containment and inventory. Subcriticality is not important for ZPP as it is currently not operational but even if it is shutted down core cooling continues.
28) A NPP could be cooled down in 3 ways: by removal of fuel from the core, by refuelling mode and lastly a practice of cold shutdown (most appropriate way). According to Russia and IAEA, ZPP is now in a cold shutdown but still requires electricity+water. reuters.com/world/europe/z…
29) In any case of electricity and water supply loss, plant workers have 4 hours to restore them before a critical boiling point in steam generators, total collapse of the system 48 hours. Cooling the reactor with secondary water requirement is 1.9kg/s with a 1.57 bar pressure.
1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
A thread 🧵 about the issue between Transnistria (supported by #Russia) and #Moldova under the shadow of the war in #Ukraine. I see the probability of any military move by Ukraine with Moldova as pretty average. But even if this will happen or not, there is a significant reality.
Transnistria is an isolated region where Russia can only supply by from air or by sea. Putin's abrupt war in Ukraine supplied Ukraine HARPOONs that protect the shores of Transnistria and NASAMs and other ADSs which Russian logisitical aircrafts proven as vulnerable.
In frontal assaults Russia used highly trained Naval Infantry and VDV troops for regular infantry missions. These moves hampered Russian communication and expeditionary capacity in Transnistria and some why Putin decided to revoke and violate Moldovan sovereignty.
There is an increased disruptive activity in self-proclaimed and Russian-supported #Transnistria and #Moldova. Lets see what happened, what happens now and how it could evolve in military and political terms in near future. Also we have to asses it with the war in #Ukraine.
1) Transnistria was a region within the Moldovan SSR which was heavily Russified during the Soviet Union. After the independence in 1991, tensions between pro-Russian population and Moldovan Government was escalated against a suspicion of possible unification with Romania.
2) Moldova lacked a serious military power in 1992 when a short-war break between pro-Government forces of volunteers and pro-Russian volunteers with Russian military. War freezed in a year and eight months which brought us another frozen conflict in post-Soviet world.
Here is the new and third thread 🧵 for the Strategic Assessment of Russo-Ukrainian War that started after the fell of Soledar and defense of Bakhmut. This is the fourth thread on overall strategic assessment of war. #Svatove#Kreminna#Vuhledar#Ukraine#Russia#Soledar
1) Please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
My concern here (even if you may don’t like this) is whether Ukrainian losses are sustainable or not. It is highly related with my lack of accurate info about the battleground numbers. But it is still hard to make this calculation with out stabilizing the front in Donetsk.
New equipments are on the way and it would require a self assessment for a renewed counter offense. Most of the Western allies expect this via maneuver but be cautious. If there is an unstable front maneuver is hard to achieve. Front stabilization requires more deep strike capab.
Russian losses in these stupid human wave attacks were also immense and unsustainable. But Russia still has this autocratic side where human life is less valued. Human life cost assessment by Ukraine is a must to reorganize its defence and offense balance.