Following the weekend's IPEF Supply Chain Agreement announcement, we published a new report focused on #semiconductors and supply chain resiliency. We identify IPEF as the best vehicle for enacting the friendshoring agenda and provide 8 recommendations. csis.org/analysis/secur…
1⃣ Establish trusted trading partner standards for future cooperation.
IPEF’s diverse membership makes it challenging to develop trusted partner models for chips cooperation, but laying the foundation for greater export control coordination is a key step.
2⃣ Accept that trusted partnership relationships are *reciprocal.*
Developing secure, resilient supply chains in the semiconductor sector is not simply a matter of reshoring. Partnerships rely on all the parties to support and reinforce mutually agreed-upon outcomes.
3⃣ Leverage IPEF’s diverse member base to expand information sharing.
The #Detroit ministerial seems to have institutionalized information-sharing via the Supply Chain Agreement. That's great, and hopefully it produces real change.
4⃣ Advance trade facilitation efforts.
IPEF partners want to participate more fully in the supply chain reshuffle. The US should help partners identify what economic role they can play and how to pursue policy changes that make #trade and #investment more attractive and viable.
5⃣ Leverage complementary features of industrial policy and trade tools to increase efficiencies and reduce costs.
The US can't rely solely on domestic production. Trade tools, including tariff concessions, can play an important role in deepening partnerships with allies.
6⃣ Reform immigration rules to attract foreign talent.
The ability to bring in and retain high-skilled employees is crucial to developing a resilient #semiconductor supply chain, given the need for well-trained specialists in multiple domains.
7⃣ Collaborate on attracting foreign investors during supply chain reshuffles.
IPEF can service as a vehicle to provide partners with the right consultation space to make economies more attractive to foreign investors as they divest from economies of concern.
8⃣ Ensure transparency in policymaking and implementation.
Partner govs interviewed for this paper expressed dissatisfaction with the level of transparency available during the DOC's deployment of chips funding & expressed confusion over export controls. Clarity is helpful!
Some concluding thoughts: export control cooperation is key. It's also important to make sure that industrial policy, trade policy (including U.S. concessions!), and national security policy talk to each other, all in closer consultation with allies.
Squaring the circle on chips fund deployments and the administration’s IPEF strategy offers long-term strategic benefits and could add significant credibility to the administration's friend-shoring agenda. This is an opportunity for tangible outcomes, and we should not waste it!
Also, check out @Gregory_C_Allen's companion piece, which is a data rich deep-dive that maps semiconductor supply chains throughout the Indo-Pacific. csis.org/analysis/mappi…
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The G7 Communiqué is out. It covers a range of topics: trade, climate change, science and technology, artificial intelligence, anti-corruption, and so much more. This short thread 🧵 focuses mostly on the trade/tech/econ security themes. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
On artificial intelligence, the G7 recognizes the possible benefits but clear drawbacks of #generative AI. They will thus establish the *Hiroshima AI process,* a G7 working group, in cooperation with the OECD and GPAI, for discussions on generative AI later this year.
The trade section offers unequivocal support for the WTO right off the bat, celebrating positive outcomes from MC12 (ie, fisheries) and anticipates progress in other areas like the #JSI ahead of MC13. Unclear where the Biden administration views its relationship evolving re: WTO.
A couple of reactions to the Jake Sullivan speech in a quick thread. There is not a lot of *news* in this speech, but it nevertheless underscores a pretty profound shift in the U.S. approach towards capitalism, which it thinks should fundamentally change. brookings.edu/events/the-bid…
As Sullivan describes it, we're moving away from the clear "Parthenon" structure of the post-WWII global economy and towards something that looks very different, more in the style of Frank Gehry. (Queue the global trade architecture jokes.)
He also argued that the traditional approach to trade is based on "over-simplified assumptions." In light of digitization and climate change, that is absolutely true, and we do need urgent change. That doesn't mean, though, that we should ignore allies' desires to trade more.
Heading into the third ministerial meeting of the TTC, is the United States really leveraging trade and industrial policy to "hoover up" EU industry? A 🧵
The US passed the Inflation Reduction Act in Aug 2022, providing $368 billion in climate change funding. The size of this package, heralded as the largest single climate in spend in history, is indeed historic. But it has also invited pushback from allies (ROK, EU, others).
Spending this much on climate isn't necessarily new. In its 2014-2020 budget, the EU spent $232.8 billion on climate. Under the EU recovery fund, spending on climate change will amount to roughly $45 billion/year, resulting in calls for the fund to be institutionalized.