#EU_Enlargement: The EU is offering support to the new candidate states like Moldova. However, it is curious how the information about the support is communicated. Here are some short remarks:⤵️
1) The lowering of the roaming tariffs is a right step, but this is a spillover effect from the recent decision adopted for the Western Balkans. In other words, the measure is not exceptional and it can be replicated to other⤵️
small countries in the Wider Europe (not to Ukraine for now); 2) The EU speaks about increasing the amount of financial aid. However, it has already transferred or pledged more than 1 billion euro last year. So, out of 1.6 billion euros mentioned today 1.2 billion euros⤵️
or around this sum was deliverers/promised. Notably, the opposition forces are wondering if the EU is aware how the money is spent before giving new aid; 3) Energy projects and the rehabilitation of the railways is done based on the loans mentioned above. The offered money is⤵️
directed for projects in the energy field, transportation etc.; 4) The EU is investing in Moldova’s security, which is also important for Ukraine and the EU itself. However, the news about the CSFP civilian mission has been mentioned multiple times as a consumed event.⤵️
The EU Commission is trying to recycle the news about the new mission with the occasion of the ECP summit in Chisinau. Again the EU’s assistance has been essential for the political stability of Moldova and without it the govt (PAS-Sandu) would have been in serious troubles.⤵️
It is also important to unpack the EU’s assistance in order to understand the rationale of the communication that Brussels implies to amplify the public approval of the EU and the govt Sandu-PAS (through continuous transfer of external legitimacy).
5) Last but not least, although the EU emphasizes that meritocracy is what counts during the pre-accession dialogue, von der Leyen promises a sort of “accelerated progress” to Moldova (whatever it could mean). Ukraine and Georgia will surely pay attention to such promises.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
#EU: The European Political Community summit in Moldova is kicking off. This is a geopolitical event and the Russian aggression against Ukraine contributed to the mobilization of European leaders to join it. Read more about the nature and functions of EPC in our latest article👇
I am opening a thread on this event: 1) Zelensky was in Odessa and from there he can travel to Chisinau by train. Many international journalists are waiting at the main train station in Moldova’s capital; 2) Erdogan is not coming and Turkey will be underrepresented.⤵️
3) Trains from Chisinau run to Bulboaca (35 km) to Mimi Castle to cover the summit.
#Moldova_EU: The decision of the EU Council to sanction a list of 5 persons (including fugitive oligarchs and a Russian cleptocrat), considered destabilizing the country (in favor of Russia), is coming into force. The Moldovan govt has advocated for this decision. ⤵️
However, it seems that the scope of the EU sanctions is partly misinterpreted. The Moldovan president claims that the sanctions make it possible to confiscate the assets of the sanctioned politicians, some of whom are fugitive oligarchs. This is not exactly how ⤵️
individual EU sanctions work: 1) the sanctions regime allows for visa bans and asset freezes; 2) financial transactions for sanctioned persons are prohibited; 3) sanctions do not provide for confiscation in any way (unless this ⤵️
#Georgia: PM Garibashvili basically excused Russia's aggression against Ukraine with Kyiv's intention to join NATO and warned the EU not to ignore Georgia's candidate status because serios costs could follow. A few observations:⤵️
1) The ruling party in Georgia is deliberately antagonizing relations with Western & Ukrainian decision makers alike; 2) The discourse used by Garibashvili replicates what China, India and the actors of the Global South are operating based on distorted Russian interpretations;⤵️
3) The govt is well aware of how toxic any association with Russia is; thus, the use of Russian disinformation talking points is deliberate because it is too repetitive to be accidental or made of cognitive dissonance; 4) The govt tries to⤵️
#Armenia_Azerbaijan: Power politics dominates Azerbaijan's position in both peace deal and Nagorno-Karabakh separatist region future status:⤵️
1) Aliyev offers amnesty to Nagorno-Karabakh de facto administration, but only if it dissolves bodies that govern the unrecognized region; 2) Baku says that it could use military force to take control if it wanted to, but it shows patience;⤵️
3) Aliyev is clearly not interested in any kind of special status for Nagorno-Karabakh and instead demands full surrender and radical revision of the status-quo; 4) Russian peacekeeping forces, but even more so reputational costs and int sanctions are the⤵️
#Moldova: The ruling party announced that it will initiate a withdrawal from the CIS because it did not help resolve the Transnistrian conflict or guard against energy pressure from Russia. This contradicts previous statements by the ruling party on the gradual exit from⤵️
certain CIS agreements that may conflict with the future process of accession to the EU. From an economic point of view, trade with Russia has been falling in the last decade. In energy terms, Moldova now has alternative routes.⤵️
The high costs will have been offset by further integration with the EU: loss of the FTA with the CIS and the visa-free regime. These two policies will lose the liberalized character with the CIS region and Russia.⤵️
#Russia_Sanctions: The G7 and the EU are considering sanctioning the importation of Russian gas pipelines and partly also the oil pipeline (Druzhba northern branch) to prevent EU states from changing their position in the future. This seems a kind of self-sanction based on⤵️
the logic that the EU has found enough alternative sources, including large volumes of LNG from the US. An exemption will be needed for the import of Russian pipeline gas through Ukraine (daily up to 43 mcm).