🧵The weeks leading up to the @NATO summit in Vilnius will arguably be among the most important since the end of the Cold War. Much of what happens will depend on how much territory #Ukraine will liberate before the summit, and if it will achieve a strategic breakthrough. 1/4
The results of the ongoing internal discussion in @NATO and in Washington about security guarantees for #Ukraine going forward, and most importantly, whether - and if so how and when - Ukraine will be brought into NATO will be the defining deliverables from Vilnius. 2/4
Another important signal will be from what country the new @NATO SecGen will be selected. I have argued he/she should come from one of the Eastern flank countries to bring the experience of facing the Russian threat directly across the border. We need this sense of purpose. 3/4
Another key decision will concern the scope of continued military and economic assistance to #Ukraine going forward. NATO allies have to show their determination not to waver in their support of Ukraine. #Russia will exploit any ambiguity, and #China is watching closely. 4/End
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🧵Today I had an exchange with a European colleague that made me think about where #EU may be in a decade. Will the EU become an integrated autonomous pole in the emerging global system, even becoming a competitor to the US as my colleague suggested? I think not. Here is why: 1/9
The #EU still lacks attributes of a nation-state (at its core, it's a treaty-based organization), and a number of current variables defy EU's further integration. The external threat Europe faces today in the wake of the war in #Ukraine will prioritize defense and security. 2/9
The relatively benign external environment in which the EU evolved prior to 2022 is over (terrorism and the Balkan wars were not existential threats). Another factor mitigating against further centralization will be economic growth (high in the East but low overall in Europe).3/9
🧵After the thread I posted here where I argued that rather than a new bipolarity the world is tracking for a period of protracted instability and conflict, where regional balancing will be key, I have been asked to explain my argument in more detail. So, a few key points: 1/10
First, we are in a period of considerable uncertainty about relative power distribution worldwide, especially when it comes to where the US and China are in relative terms. We can assess traditional power indices, but we still struggle to assess relative vulnerabilities. 2/10
Second, uncertainty about the relative power balance in the system encourages the key players to assume that we might have already entered a power-transition cycle, and to leverage this opportunity the principal powers become more prone to take risk, fueling conflict. 3/10
🧵A few thoughts as I head back to the Oslo airport after the @Equinor-@nupinytt political risk forum on long-term consequences of the war in #Ukraine. First, I am even more convinced that this is a system-transforming war. Countries close to Russia get it (Norway included).1/10
Second, regardless of whether the war in #Ukraine ends soon or lasts for years, we are only in an early stage of this systemic transformation that will gain speed as de-globalization accelerates. The process will test the relative strength and expose weaknesses of states. 2/10
Beyond the traditional indicators of economic and military power, weakness in several areas will play an outsize role, as states mobilize and prepare for intense confrontation, possibly war. One key area will be the overall societal cohesion and resilience of countries. 3/10
🧵As “de-risking” becomes the new buzzword for governments and corporations when it comes to our continued presence in the Chinese market, I’m increasingly convinced that we are looking for bandaids, rather than rethinking so-called “globalization” of the past three decades. 1/6
We have talked efficiency for decades, but never asked if this form of “globalization” is compatible with democratic governance. By ignoring the role of nations in the international system globalization’s advocates have lessened the accountability of elites in these matters. 2/6
For a time globalization lowered costs, but at what ultimate price?
No citizenry in a democracy would vote for what globalization brought them—their working-class communities gutted, their nat’l security endangered, and their country made dependent on an enemy foreign power 3/6
🧵As I follow the developments in #Ukraine and the internal debates among @NATO allies, we are clearly for a challenging way ahead in the next decade. Regardless of the final settlement in UKR, the West must pursue a military plus political strategy to stop RUS aggression. 1/7
Absent some dramatic change in Moscow (unlikely), #Russia will continue to pose a threat to Europe's security and stability for the foreseeable future. Hence, Western resolve will be key when it comes to rearmament, deterrence and -- if need be -- defense going forward. 2/7
@NATO needs to complete its transition from "out-of-area" to fighting a near-peer war. That means focusing on collective territorial defense. We need full implementation of the DDA concept, and most of all real investments in rebuilding our weapons and munitions stocks. 3/7
🧵This👇excellent piece by @bctallis and @JulianStoeckle made me think we should reflect on the larger question of what the emerging global disorder could look like in the coming decade. First, IMO the much touted concept of “multipolarity” is useless.1/7
To speak of multipolarity is to state the obvious but in a way take offers little analytical value. The key question is about what/who will structure the system thereby generating a modicum of stability. This is fundamentally a question about the distribution of hard power. 2/7
My work thus far has led me to conclude that rather than two “bounded orders” (US/Europe/democracies vs. China/Russia/dictatorships) we are facing a period of protracted instability, whereby regional power balances will be key to systemic stability/instability going forward. 3/7