🧵It appears that as of now we have no consensus in @NATO to bring #Ukraine into the alliance, with the conversation having shifted to debating a formula that would provide assurances and support to Ukraine short of membership. These half measures will help, but not enough. 1/8
I won’t go into those proposals, as in my view none offers a clear path forward that Ukraine needs to rebuild after the war. Moscow banks that that the West will not stand up for what it preaches, and that it will push #Ukraine to a settlement that will cede UKR territory. 2/8
We continue to re-debate why #Russia invaded #Ukraine instead of focusing on how to defeat the invasion. And most of all, while govt documents and analytical pieces talk of a new era of great power competition, I have yet to see a clear articulation of what victory look like.3/8
We need to articulate what the end state in Europe looks like—not in terms of broad statements about “preserving the rules-based order” but in concrete terms that speak to geopolitics, alliances and power realignment. And how to ensure this outcome isn’t contested yet again. 4/8
As democracies debate the relative merits/demerits of bringing #Ukraine into @NATO, the focus is predominantly on risks, with little appreciation of positive contributions Ukraine would make to European and transatlantic security and defense. 5/8
#Ukraine has the largest armed forces in #Europe. It is battle-tested and it has demonstrated that, if properly equipped, it is capable of stopping the Russian invasion. Its projected peacetime strength of 300K would be a powerful addition to NATO’s deterrent capabilities .6/8
We need to bring into the conversation what #Ukraine can offer the alliance, rather than focusing predominantly on Russia’s reaction. It is time to articulate the architecture of European security post war that would provide the requisite stability to the Continent. 7/8
#Ukraine in @NATO would be transformative for European security. With Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, and with #Poland completing its massive rearmament program, the alliance would have means to deter #Russia regardless of how Moscow’s internal politics evolves. 7/End
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🧵It’s fair to say that @NATO’s military leaders have provided our political leadership with the best military advice on how to implement the DDA concept. It’s now up to politicians to step up and make it happen. What happens in Vilnius will define Transatlantic security. 1/5
This is a moment in history where we either invest what’s needed now, or we will be required to pay orders of magnitude more later when the security environment has deteriorated even more. It’s not just about strategic myopia manifest in some @NATO countries or disbelief. 2/5
It’s about the inability (unwillingness?) to recognize how radically the world has changed. For 30 years democracies have been fed bromides about the “peace dividend,” the “end of history,” “globalization” and “complex interdependence.” Our societies have become disarmed. 3/5
🧵The weeks leading up to the @NATO summit in Vilnius will arguably be among the most important since the end of the Cold War. Much of what happens will depend on how much territory #Ukraine will liberate before the summit, and if it will achieve a strategic breakthrough. 1/4
The results of the ongoing internal discussion in @NATO and in Washington about security guarantees for #Ukraine going forward, and most importantly, whether - and if so how and when - Ukraine will be brought into NATO will be the defining deliverables from Vilnius. 2/4
Another important signal will be from what country the new @NATO SecGen will be selected. I have argued he/she should come from one of the Eastern flank countries to bring the experience of facing the Russian threat directly across the border. We need this sense of purpose. 3/4
🧵Today I had an exchange with a European colleague that made me think about where #EU may be in a decade. Will the EU become an integrated autonomous pole in the emerging global system, even becoming a competitor to the US as my colleague suggested? I think not. Here is why: 1/9
The #EU still lacks attributes of a nation-state (at its core, it's a treaty-based organization), and a number of current variables defy EU's further integration. The external threat Europe faces today in the wake of the war in #Ukraine will prioritize defense and security. 2/9
The relatively benign external environment in which the EU evolved prior to 2022 is over (terrorism and the Balkan wars were not existential threats). Another factor mitigating against further centralization will be economic growth (high in the East but low overall in Europe).3/9
🧵After the thread I posted here where I argued that rather than a new bipolarity the world is tracking for a period of protracted instability and conflict, where regional balancing will be key, I have been asked to explain my argument in more detail. So, a few key points: 1/10
First, we are in a period of considerable uncertainty about relative power distribution worldwide, especially when it comes to where the US and China are in relative terms. We can assess traditional power indices, but we still struggle to assess relative vulnerabilities. 2/10
Second, uncertainty about the relative power balance in the system encourages the key players to assume that we might have already entered a power-transition cycle, and to leverage this opportunity the principal powers become more prone to take risk, fueling conflict. 3/10
🧵A few thoughts as I head back to the Oslo airport after the @Equinor-@nupinytt political risk forum on long-term consequences of the war in #Ukraine. First, I am even more convinced that this is a system-transforming war. Countries close to Russia get it (Norway included).1/10
Second, regardless of whether the war in #Ukraine ends soon or lasts for years, we are only in an early stage of this systemic transformation that will gain speed as de-globalization accelerates. The process will test the relative strength and expose weaknesses of states. 2/10
Beyond the traditional indicators of economic and military power, weakness in several areas will play an outsize role, as states mobilize and prepare for intense confrontation, possibly war. One key area will be the overall societal cohesion and resilience of countries. 3/10
🧵As “de-risking” becomes the new buzzword for governments and corporations when it comes to our continued presence in the Chinese market, I’m increasingly convinced that we are looking for bandaids, rather than rethinking so-called “globalization” of the past three decades. 1/6
We have talked efficiency for decades, but never asked if this form of “globalization” is compatible with democratic governance. By ignoring the role of nations in the international system globalization’s advocates have lessened the accountability of elites in these matters. 2/6
For a time globalization lowered costs, but at what ultimate price?
No citizenry in a democracy would vote for what globalization brought them—their working-class communities gutted, their nat’l security endangered, and their country made dependent on an enemy foreign power 3/6