It’s a new collective understanding of the EU integration process, beyond full membership.
This can no longer be based on a ‘set menu’ but must move to ‘à la carte’ approach.
A thread 🧵
1. Ever since the central eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the process has been neglected, with the EU pretending to negotiate accession & candidate countries pretending to reform.
2. This has damaged the credibility of the enlargement process which has proven incapable of offering a credible accession prospect.
This has in turn confirmed the sceptics’ belief that enlargement is doomed as candidates not ready.
3. The accession process is no longer merit-based and is stuck on a all or nothing approach: the set menu.
It’s an all or nothing approach that dominates our collective understanding of the EU.
4. The challenge now is rethink the enlargement process by moving away from the still dominant paradigm of full membership (the set menu) towards a new understanding of a gradual, not necessarily cumulative process (Europe à la carte) in which each country decides to commit to one possible manifestations of EU integration.
5. The EPC offers a good opportunity to test this idea among a diverse group of countries, many of which can’t aspire to full membership but have a role to play in an enlarged EU plus project.
How much appetite do they have for what still looks 2nd or 3rd tier membership?
6. The informal #EUCO provides the same opportunity vis-à-vis EU-27 to verify their appetite to move to an EU à la carte. This may lead to an internal membership reset.
In the absence of exclusion clause, it’s up to each MS to reconsider its commitments to which Europe
7. Stop obsessing with full membership and be open to alternative, parallel and non cumulative forms of belonging to the EU.
This is and should be the value proposition for the new europe to be crafted in #Granada
8. This new collective understanding of EU integration may lead not only for prospect members to choose the degree of integration most suitable to their needs and political realities, but also for current (or past like the UK) members to reconsider their commitment to the EU.
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The ‘group of twelve’ - a Franco-German initiative - offers a credible and uniquely pragmatic approach to EU institutional reform.
Here’s why & how 🧵
2. Rather than getting trapped into endless discussions on the nature of the EU, the group offers a set of realistic reforms addressing the EU democracy crisis, which it soberly acknowledges in its multifaceted nature:
- common values (eg rule of law)
- lack of EU responsiveness to citizens’ demand & cross border challenges
- enlargement
3. The prospect of the enlargement of the EU offers the only window of opportunity for institutional reform: neither the present nor the future’s Union can’t work unless its institutional & political setting are adjusted to both new internal (eg vetoes) and external (eg Ukrainian grain) realities
2. The von der Leyen presidency will go into history as an ‘accidental’ commission.
After being accidentally picked as Commission president, her entire time in office has been largely shaped by a succession of accidents, with Covid-19 hitting before the von der Leyen's commission had spent its first 100 days in office to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its many consequences on EU energy, food and security policies.
3. @vonderleyen can claim the success of a good part of her administration, which has included the finalization of #Brexit, the fight against the pandemic and the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the energy crisis unleashed by Moscow.
Yet these events overshadowed her agenda which remains largely incomplete and unlikely to be delivered.
4. Von der Leyen’s presidency has essentially been a permanent "crisis management commission" which was directed not only by events but also by what the EU-27 leaders have been deciding within the European Council.
If her supposed main accomplishment was the Green New Deal, the sudden U-turn by vdl's party - the EPP - and part of the liberals on that major package do threaten its full adoption today.
Today the EU Parliament will ask EU leaders to block the Hungarian presidency of the Council.
Regardless of whether this will ever happen, the mere fact of contemplating such a possibility may be highly consequential for the Union's democratic future
Here's why 🧵
2. For a long time, the possibility of suspending the rotating presidency of the Council of one of its Member State remained confined to academic speculation.
3. The rotating presidency of the Council is a legacy of the past, from the time that institution representing all EU governments had no permanent President. Yet not having been scrapped, the presidency gives its holder the power to set the EU agenda
1. Despite not being expressly foreseen, the possibility of postponing the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the Union may reveal as one of the most effective approaches to make Hungary abide by its rule of law obligations #EUCO#RuleOfLaw
2. Considering that the Hungarian Presidency is set to kick in right after the next EU Parliament elections at the time of the top appointments, the case for postponement or suspension of the presidency is set to acquire some political momentum. The following Presidency will be… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The EU Parliament set to prevent Hungary to hold the presidency of the Council, given its well established departure from the EU foundational values and ‘rules of the game’
We may expect the EU Parliament asking - through as resolution - #EUCO to rearrange modalities of the Hungarian presidency, or ongoing troika (Belgium+Spain) to alter the conditions of their internal arrangements…
Towards a depotentiated semester or postponed one?
Is Roberta Metsola’s plan to reform EU ethics system good enough?
I’ve examined each of the 14 proposals below 🧵
They’re so marginal and reactive to #Qatargate that they won’t structurally change a system set not to work by design
1. Today MEPs aren’t subject to any post-mandate restriction, yet they receive a transitional allowance to reintegrate the job force (non-sense). Now while they won’t be able to lobby the EU post-mandate, they remain free to have side jobs during the mandate. Absurd!
2. Now MEPs’ sanctions are rare and invisible to the electorate. Now they might become visible enabling greater public scrutiny. Yet depending on where/how that info will be provided this reform will attain its declared goal. Positive, overdue reform but will it work?