▶️no idea when Brexit deal will arrive at European Parliament
▶️last point that Parliament can vote is first plenary session in March 19 because the second session would be too late
▶️negotiations have intensified but she hopes this isn't "a trick" (2)
▶️She had a meeting with @ukineu Sir Tim Barrow about the endgame
▶️political declaration on future relationship will not be legal text or legally binding
▶️views shifting towards political declaration being general because not enough time to negotiate the detail (3)
Aua, das tut weh: #Seehofers Demontage durch die Vertretung der Bundesregierung in Brüssel passt in einen Thread. 1/6
Seehofer versprach Großbritannien einen speziellen Deal in der Sicherheitspolitik post-#Brexit. Den wird es nicht geben — schrieb @GermanyintheEU an die @EU_Commission. Der kurze Brief im Wortlaut: 2/6
"Mit Schreiben vom 27. Juni hat sich Bundesminister Seehofer zur künftigen Zusammenarbeit..in Fragen der inneren Sicherheit geäußert. Ich möchte klarstellen, dass es sich hierbei um ein in der Bundesregierung nicht abgestimmtes Schreiben handelt." 3/6
1/7 Decision to expand Frontex mandate is not new. It basically resembles decision to establish EBCG & MFF proposal (€ 21bn for Frontex & Border Management Fund)
2/7 Idea of 'controlled centres' appears as continuation of hotspot system. Unclear how human rights safeguards & detention are handled. Also: EASO/EUAA lack mandate to process asylum claims. 'Rapid & secure' processing would have to be done by MS
Some thoughts on the idea of establishing refugee “reception centres” / “disembarkation platforms” outside the EU's borders, which will be discussed at #EUCO later this week.
While the concept has some merits, its implementation is fraught with problems. [THREAD, 1/ ]
The idea, in short, is to create centres outside the EU (e.g. Northern Africa, Balkans), where refugees can lodge their asylum claims & have them assessed by authorities. If asylum is granted, they can then travel on into EU safely. 2/
There are some attractive aspects to this model. Deaths would be reduced as refugees would no longer need to cross the Mediterranean (>3.100 deaths last year) to claim asylum. Smuggling business would go down & threat to Schengen zone would be reduced. 3/
So. The #Lifeline case has descended into another Aquarius case. Meanwhile, 16 leaders of EU Member States meet for an #EUCO informal meeting on #migrationEU.
Time for a brief recap of the role of #NGO-s doing #SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean? 👇
First: PERCEPTIONS MATTER. 📺🤔
Irregular sea arrivals to Italy are WAY down, and continue to be (-78% y-o-y), even as NGOs carried out over 40% of SAR operations in 2017 and 2018.
Still, 51% of Italians believe flows are as high or higher than last year's.👇
Second: DETERRENCE VS NGOs does not pay off (much).🚢⛔️📉
Over the last two weeks of the new goverment's "deterring measures", the decline in sea arrivals vs 2017 is broadly in line with the drop experienced since July 2017. With or without #Aquarius and #Lifeline arrivals. 👇
Some thoughts on the @dailytelegraph story: in the negotiations since the March #EUCO the UK has not put forward a formal paper. So, hard to see how there can be a “forensic annihilation” of something that hasn’t been commited to paper.
Acc to EU sources, the UK *has* been putting forward “reheated” versions of the August customs papers which were largely dismissed at the time as “magical thinking”. So in that sense, they would most likely be rejected again.
However, a definitive rejection of British proposals would not be a call that EU Task Force officials would have made on Wednesday. That kind of call is normally made by EU leaders following a recommendation by @MichelBarnier via the General Affairs Council.
First, sanctions. While it is far from clear whether the EU will currently back up the UK on sanctions ag Russia, it is equally clear that any sanctions put forward by the UK wd be far more effective if adopted at EU level /3