What do we know?
What can we say about #Russia's role and cost-benefit assessment regarding this situation?
A 🧵
1) #Russia-#Hamas relations are active and go way back. Moscow only recently hosted a Hamas delegation
Russia's also been active in intra-Palestinian mediation, trying to carve out a niche for itself on the peace process. The Russian Academy of Sciences has played a role here /1
2) #Russia-#Iran relations have been expanding and changing qualitatively, with significant implications for:
3) Generally speaking, a modicum of instability in the Middle East and new crises suit #Russia, as they deflect Western attention/resources/bandwidth away from NATO's eastern flank and #Ukraine.
Iran's proxies causing havoc is not against Russian interest. /3
4) That said, I have not seen evidence of direct #Russian backing for #Hamas and this attack - planning, weapons, execution.
And to be clear: There was no need for Russian assistance. The Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas axis is *highly* capable. Let's not delude ourselves. /4
5) There are also several reasons why #Russia would be cautious about backing such a vile attack on Israel directly:
a) Chiefly, Moscow still hopes to keep Israel cautious on the #Ukraine war, ie Israel not giving lethal weapons to Kyiv;
b) Russia's relations with Israel.../5
..have been more rocky recently (esp. under Bennett & Lapid), but remain extensive: intel sharing, huge Russian diaspora in Israel (which predates the Ukraine war), extensive trade, deconfliction in Syria. Bibi and Putin have personal chemistry. /6
c) While Russia welcomes instability, I'm not sure it would be happy about an Iran-Israel war that would engulf #Lebanon - and probably #Syria.
Russia has naval/air bases in Syria that allow it to project power into the Eastern Med/MENA.
It wants quiet & for the US to leave /7
If there was a bigger war in the region, #Russia would not have the capacity and bandwidth to deal with it.
And Moscow doesn't need that kind of war - low-level instability suits its needs just fine. /8
One final thought: Notwithstanding its growing ties with Iran, its forging of an "axis of the sanctioned", Russia has continued to value its ties with #Israel and the Arab states.
I don't think #Russia wants to go "all in" with Iran. /9
However, the U.S. response to whatever will unfold in Israel in coming weeks - coming down hard on the side of Israel - *may* cause an even further Russian drift into Iran's orbit, given the geopolitical dimension here.
And that could have significant implications. /10
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The predominant take on this platform is that yesterday's events revealed #Putin's weakness & vulnerability. The beginning of the end of his regime.
I think that's premature.
After all, Putin came out on top & there is so much we don't know about what exactly went down. (1/4)
It's conceivable that the corrosion of his rule is in motion. And more importantly, that the process will continue.
But there's also the possibility that the immense dysfunctionality of the system we observed yday can prove quite durable & not become dangerous to #Putin. (2/4)
Much will surely depend on what happens in Russia's war against #Ukraine.
#Prigozhin's appeal partially stemmed from the fact that the war is not going well - he put his finger on the issues, unapologetically, openly. (3/4)
Last yr #UkraineWar became the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy
➡️7 trends
1 Full turn to non-West
2 China’s junior partner
3 Less leverage vis middle powers
4 Struggle in the neighbourhood
5 Russia MFA sidelined
6 Wagner normalized
7 End of compartmentalization
🧵
1. Full turn to the non-West:
Judging its break with the West to be total & irreversible, Russia's leadership has intensified its (pre-existing) turn to #MENA, #Africa, #LATAM, #Asia-Pacific.
Shunned & sanctioned, Russia needs to make up for losses wherever it can... (2/22)
Russia's push to expand engagement does resonate.
Last spring, #MENA states for instance refused to take the West’s side vs Russia - for complex reasons: docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA… (3/22)
At Conference of Disarmament in Geneva yday, #Russia slightly more conciliatory on #NewSTART:
-"Important" that treaty continues to operate
-This fact means its parties "share an understanding of the risks emanating from a situation of strategic uncertainty and unpredictability"
-#NewSTART "keeps a window of opportunity open" for continued dialogue on strategic stability, with a focus on developing a possible agreement to replace it.
-US-RUS understandings reached in Geneva (2021) "retain the potential for the resumption and development of a comprehensive and substantive dialogue on future arms control, incl. involving all key players."
/1 RUS embassy in Germany: The decision will bring “permanent escalation”, “battle tanks with German crosses will again be sent to the ‘eastern front’ which will inevitably lead to the deaths of not only Russian soldiers, but also the civilian population” aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25…
/2 Maria Zakharova on her Telegram account: the German decision confirms that this is a “pre-planned war” against #Russia