While the links between Russia and the far-right riots in the UK remain hypothetical, the connection between a number of Russian stakeholders and Tommy Robinson (real name: Stephen Yaxley-Lennon) is well established. Let me review them in this thread. 1/17
Robinson appeared in the Kremlin-controlled Russian-language media sphere around summer 2019. His first Russian media contact was Edvard Chesnokov, a correspondent working at the foreign affairs desk of the Russian pro-regime tabloid Komsomolsksaya pravda. 2/17
At that time, the convicted criminal Robinson had, again, troubles with the British justice, and Chesnokov used Robinson’s case to attack the UK, a country that plays a major role in deterring Russian aggression against the West. Following Robinson’s own propaganda, Chesnokov presented Robinson as a victim of state repressions for his opposition to “migrant criminality”. 3/17
Chesnokov even contacted the Russian MFA to have them voice their position on Robinson’s problems with the British law: . The Russian MFA parroted Robinson’s propaganda stating that “persecution of citizens for their beliefs was unacceptable” as if Robinson was persecuted for his beliefs. 4/17kp.ru/daily/26999.7/…
Interestingly, as he noted European support for Robinson, Chesnokov mentioned German politician Petr Bystron of the German far-right “Alternative for Germany” who called on Berlin to grant political asylum to Robinson. In 2024, it was revealed that Bystron had been bribed by Russia to represent its interests in the European Parliament and German Bundestag. 5/17
But although Chesnokov officially introduced Robinson in the Russian media sphere in 2019, Robinson had been covertly promoted by the Russians as early as 2018. During one of Robinson’s imprisonments, a network of “about 600 Twitter accounts, believed to be directly tied to the Russian government or closely aligned with its propaganda [...] tweeted prolifically in Robinson’s defence”. 6/17theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/d…
Fast forward to February 2020: Robinson is on the visit to Moscow. He took part in a conference organised by Russian ultranationalist Mikhail Svetov, who also conducted an interview with Robinson for Svetov’s own media project. When asked about the reasons of his Russian visit, Robinson replied that felt he was “silenced in the UK” and that he was seeking a platform in Russia. 7/17
At that time, Robinson was banned from all major social networks including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and Snapchat. (The only platform that still tolerated him then was Telegram, but now Robinson is back on X) 8/17
There was an intense Russian media coverage of Robinson’s visit. He was interviewed for Vechernyaya Moskva, the FAN website (linked to now late Yevgeny Prigozhin), Tsargrad TV (linked to Russian businessman Konstantin Malofeev) and RT, among others. 9/17
His interviews featured a set of recurring disinformation narratives: the US was supporting Islamist terrorists; Russia was unlikely behind the poisoning of the Skripals in the UK; Putin is a strong leader; the EU destabilised Ukraine, while Angela Merkel planned a NATO-led invasion of Ukraine. 10/17
But the main media event involving Robinson was his press conference at Chesnokov’s newspaper Komsomolskaya pravda. The press conference was moderated by Alexander Malkevich who, in December 2018, was sanctioned by the US for his attempts to target Americans with online disinformation through the website “USA Really” linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. 11/17
But there was perhaps something else during Robinson’s trip to Russia. British far-right activist Andrew Edge said that Robinson “had called him soon after he left prison [...] to ask about bank accounts in Russia”. Furthermore, Edge said that Robinson “later told him he had opened an account during his Russian tour”. Chesnokov “confirmed that Mr. Robinson had discussed the possibility of opening bank accounts. But he said that as far as he knew Mr. Robinson did not actually do it” 12/17nytimes.com/2021/04/23/wor…
In 2021, Robinson recorded a video in support of the Russian pro-regime party “For Truth” founded by the Russian ultranationalist author Zakhar Prilepin. 13/17
Prilepin’s deputy responsible for the party finances was Alexander Babakov, who had been for many years tasked by Moscow to recruit and engage with Western politicians for the Kremlin’s various causes. In particular, Babakov was essential in Marine Le Pen’s negotiations with the Russian officials about a €9 million loan to the National Front that the party obtained from the First Czech-Russian Bank in September 2014. 14/17
Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Robinson began parroting Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda amplifying Moscow’s conspiracy theories about US biological laboratories in Ukraine, arguing that the West was supporting neo-Nazis in Ukraine, and even alleging that Ukraine was intentionally bombing its own civilians to blame Russia 15/17hopenothate.org.uk/2022/03/17/tom…
In December 2022, after the revelations of the Russian genocidal plans in Ukraine became too obvious, Robinson organised a miniscule protest by the Ukrainian Embassy in London protesting against the UK’s support for Ukraine. Robinson’s fringe protest was dutifully covered by Chesnokov in Komsomolskaya pravda. 16/17
I have not seen any compelling evidence that Russia was involved in instigating riots in the UK beyond amplifying far-right online messaging linked to the riots, but Russian connections of Tommy Robinson, one of the main figures behind the developments in the UK, are simply impossible to ignore. 17/17
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Nigel Farage's claims that the West allegedly provoked the Russian invasion of Ukraine are not coming out of nowhere, and the context behind this picture from a few years ago helps understand his claims. Left: Farage, right: Nadia Borodi (Sass). 1/10
Borodi is originally from Ukraine, and together with her partner Oleh Voloshyn they operated an agent network in Europe on behalf of Ukrainian pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk. Left: Borodi, right: Voloshyn. 2/10
While still in Ukraine, and when Ukraine still tolerated (mistakenly) agents of Russian influence, both promoted pro-Kremlin politics, and actively used European politicians for their objectives. Here's Borodi with Nicolas Bay of the French National Front/Rally. 3/10
Ukrainian athlete Olga Kharlan refused to shake her Russian opponent Anna Smirnova’s hand after winning the bout at the Fencing World Championships, and was disqualified by the International Fencing Federation @FIE_fencing. 1/7
The International Fencing Federation (FIE) was, until recently, presided by a Russian Kremlin-linked businessman Alisher Usmanov, here in the right. 2/7
Usmanov was sanctioned by the EU following the Russian full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and dared to call the EU’s decision “unfair”. He suspended his position at the FIE. 3/7
The latest report on Russian non-Kremlin right-wing extremism suggests that the war and the Kremlin’s pro-war rhetoric have emboldened the Russian far right who had been in crisis for many years. 1/10sova-center.ru/racism-xenopho…
Right-wing extremists are deeply integrated into various civil society structures around the war: they help “refugees”, residents of the regions affected by the war, and the Russian military. 2/10
They also recruit volunteers for the Russian genocidal war and participate in it themselves. 3/10
Since the EU Ambassadors have finally agreed on the 11th package of sanctions against Russia, a Russian "academic" Sergey Karaganov is likely among a dozen of Russian propagandists who are sanctioned by the EU individually. Here's something that one needs to note. 1/7
Karaganov hit the news recently as he suggested to the Russian leadership to target several Western countries with nuclear weapons. 2/7
The knee-jerk reaction now would be to link Karaganov's "nuclear threats" to the sanctions against him, presenting them as the EU's punishment for the "threats". But that would be a mistake. 3/7
A general take on the Russian émigré opposition to the Putin regime, a thread. 1/7
If there's a window of opportunity of post-Putin Russia willing to improve relations with the West, the Russian émigré opposition will be one of several Russian groups of interests that will have a say on the Russia of the future. 2/7
Not the strongest, not the most authoritative group - just one of several. And as much as Ukraine needs to take part in shaping post-Putin Russia, at the moment it can only have some influence on shaping public views of the Russian émigré opposition. 3/7
Russian opposition activist Alexey #Navalny wrote a 15-point programme: meduza.io/feature/2023/0… With the exception of a few disputable arguments, the programme is quite decent and is a good foundation for further discussions with progressive pro-Western Russians. A thread ->
The most important point: Navalny unequivocally acknowledges the internationally recognised borders of #Ukraine (1991). Which clearly implies the need for restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty over #Crimea and all other currently occupied/annexed territories of Ukraine. 2/10
Navalny explicitly opposes #Russia's war against Ukraine, and - unlike many others in the so-called Russian "liberal camp" - does not seek to portray Russian people as victims of "the #Putin war" on a par with Ukrainians. 3/10