1. While I agree with this piece in principle - in that African jihadis do not necessarily pose a threat to the US homeland and current US CT efforts haven’t really worked - it still gets the local branches and affiliates of AQ and IS very wrong. stripes.com/opinion/2024-0… 2. This implies that just because these groups focus on the “local” they aren’t really “global.” And worse, directly states that these affiliations to AQ or IS are nominal and based more around money. Not only does this deny these groups agency over their own identity, it’s wrong

It’s more sinister than this. Many conflicts, particularly in Africa, don’t really have clear cut “good guy” vs “bad guy” that can be easily translated to quick newsy sound bites. It’s many times “somewhat bad but generally fine guy” vs “bad guy” vs “grey guy.”

https://twitter.com/sfrantzman/status/1771665182118354975

So many news agencies don’t even try to bother to cover these issues because it doesn’t create a neat packagable story that will cater to short attention spans.

1. Though ISCAP (aka the ADF) continues to commit heinous acts of violence, here is one definite way we can see that the joint UG/DRC Operation Shujaa is negatively impacting the group: its propaganda output has been dramatically reduced. #DRC #Uganda. 2. Though Shujaa started in 2021, that year recorded ISCAP’s highest propaganda output with 279 photos and 4 videos released by IS’ central media apparatus. Compare that with 2019-2020, where those two years combined accounted for only 42 photos and 3 videos. Stark increase.

1. There has seemingly been a sustained ISCAP (aka ADF) push to attack inside #Uganda since September. Since that month, there have been 5 foiled bomb plots, two successful IEDs in #Kampala, and three attacks in the west that have killed 6 people. 2. And just today, the UPDF reported another clash with an ISCAP unit still inside Uganda, this time in Kibale National Park - which is quite far inside UG territory for a unit originating in the DRC to penetrate. independent.co.ug/updf-kills-two…

Latest @LongWarJournal: Shabaab’s Mahad Karate repeats a very common refrain from Al-Qaeda that many of its operatives were present during the infamous 1993 Black Hawk Down battle in Mogadishu longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/… This includes: Abu Muhammad al-Masri (responsible for 1998 embassy bombings and killed in Tehran in 2020), Abdulaziz al-Muqrin and Yusuf al-Ayeri (both helped found the networks that would later create AQAP), and Abu Hassan al-Sa’idi (ideologue and suicide bomber)

1. Somali media is awash with reports that the UAE recently conducted an airstrike against Shabaab in central #Somalia, though this is so far unconfirmed. If true, it would mark the Emirates' first air strike (and perhaps first military op) in the country. 2. UAE has long supported elements of the Somali military with funding, supplies, and training as part of the wider Gulf competition against Qatar (who is also involved in Somalia). UAE boosted security ties with Somalia just earlier this year. hornobserver.com/articles/1997/…

1. New UN report on AQ and IS is out, here are the most interesting tidbits in my opinion: Like this paragraph saying that several member states noted IS-#Somalia's Al-Karrar office sending $25k a month to IS-Khorasan via crypto documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/… 2. Obligatory mention that everyone's least surprising candidate to succeed Zawahiri is indeed Sayf al-Adl and AQ's silence is meant to protect the Taliban

1. Latest @LongWarJournal: Here I provide more detail, background, and analysis on a recent book written by veteran al Qaeda member Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani, in which he calls for jihad in his native Sudan. Previous thread on this here:

https://twitter.com/caleb_weiss7/status/1584616161278578688

https://twitter.com/LongWarJournal/status/1585658346895540231

2. Abu Hudhayfah has a long and interesting history with AQ. He first joined the organization in Sudan, followed them to Afghanistan, and later took part in a failed Bin Laden-ordered attack on a US airbase in Saudi Arabia in late 2001.

1. Flew under the radar but Abu Hudhayfah al-Sudani (senior AQAP leader and veteran AQ figure) released an 83 page book last week, providing guidelines and acting as a rule book for the establishment of a new unified jihadist group in #Sudan. Interesting bits summarized here: 2. Unsurprisingly, Al-Sudani frames the timing as ripe for jihad in Sudan following the 2020 constitutional agreement making the country a secular state. He argues that the mujahideen in Sudan must unite to form a "fighting vanguard" and it is up to them to fight for Shari'a

I have nothing major to add to today's great opining about the future of AQ, but I will say that it is disheartening to see this field fall into many of the same confirmation biases, groupthink, or other generalized consensus errors that happened after the death of bin Laden. Many of the same arguments, or assessments of AQ, or its future therein, are being recycled today or being neatly repackaged as "new." But yet many of those arguments, analyses, or assessments turned out to be false - we can do better. We have to do better.

1. Starting a running thread here documenting jihadist eulogies or laments now being released for Ayman al-Zawahiri: 2. Here is Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi, the emir of Jaysh al-Ummah, a pro-al Qaeda group in Gaza #Palestine. Abu Hafs wishes for Zawahiri the highest level of 'paradise.'

Well, one we need to define what "core AQ' even means. It has always been imprecisely defined and never took into consideration individuals who would be considered "core" but not based in AfPak (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Anas al-Libi, Khalid al-Suri, Jehad Mostafa, the Iran guys...etc)

https://twitter.com/ToreRHamming/status/1550012777581912064

And two, if we do take those guys into consideration, it would be clear that AQ's general command - which imo would be the "core" and not one singular nucleus in AfPak - has been geographically dispersed for quite some time. Nasir al-Wuhayshi being the GM as case in point.

This is the first Islamic State claim against African Union troops in #Somalia since Sept. 2018 and first in #Mogadishu since Oct. 2016 - though there does not appear to be any local corroboration for an IED targeting @ATMIS_Somalia today To put in context, the Sept. 2018 claim against Ethiopian troops allegedly took place outside of Bosaso which was more than likely false. And the Oct. 2016 claim was against an unspecified AMISOM member (though likely Ugandan given the location) which was also never corroborated

1. Pleased to finally share Team Bridgeway’s latest article @CTCWP on the ADF, this time looking at how last year, 2021, was the most transformative year for the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province. #Congo #Uganda ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-thr… 2. Namely, 2021 saw the group transform in 7 major ways: surging in propaganda, producing beheading videos, beginning suicide operations, public outreach and da’wah, deepening foreign recruitment, exporting its terror abroad, and more frequent clashes with rival armed groups.

1. This is a very good @CrisisGroup report on the overall dynamics of the conflict in eastern #Congo and insanely informative, but its brief description of the ADF leaves a lot to be desired. crisisgroup.org/africa/great-l… 2. For instance, talking about “factions” within the group adds unnecessary detail. While there is indeed an anti-IS splinter faction, it likely has less than 30 people, has not conducted an attack (as of May 2022), and one of its top leaders was arrested earlier this year.

1. Pleased to share my new long-form report @CTCWP providing a history and explainer of how and why al-Qaeda in northwestern Africa went from an Algerian-focused franchise to now threatening several littoral West African states. ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-imperial… 2. Basically, if you were to tell someone from 2006 that Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat now threatens Benin or Ivory Coast, they'd be properly perplexed. This report sets out to explain exactly this dynamic to this hypothetical time-traveler.

1. Since June, the ADF / Islamic State Central Africa Province has mounted a sustained offensive in southern #Irumu #Ituri #DRC pushing further north towards Komanda. This represents a significant shift and expansion of its traditional AO in #Beni territory of #NorthKivu. 2. While most of its efforts are along RN4 between Eringeti and Komanda, it has also mounted a significant targeted campaign near Boga and Tshabi, also in southern #Ituri, killing and kidnapping nearly 100 people in this same timeframe. All of this data is available @KivuSecurity

1. Jihadists in #Syria are reporting that Abu Saloh, the founder and former emir of the Uzbek group Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (now part of HTS), was arrested by HTS' internal security yesterday after he reportedly defected to Jabhat Ansar al Din. 2. Abu Saloh left his position as emir of KTJ sometime last year, opting for more behind the scenes work and preaching. He founded the group in late 2014. Which I covered back in the day: thelineofsteel.weebly.com/news/katibat-a…