Thread by @Jsincla43477730

This resource is a good popular level of William Lane Craig's defense regarding the philosophy of time. Why is this important? Because, (putting on my Feynman hat), the philosophy of time is the best place to attack Kalam.

amazon.com/Time-Eternity-…

At an academic level, the proper sources are these:

amazon.com/Tensed-Theory-…

amazon.com/Tenseless-Theo…

And this set of essays by advocates and critics both:

amazon.com/Relativity-Sim…

The issue is that of tensed vs. tenseless time. In 'tensed' time, there is a real objective present. Thus the 'absolute simultaneity' in one of the book titles. There are different view regarding the reality of the past and future. Usually, an advocate of a tensed theory . . .

. . . will argue the future doesn't exist. Most often, it is argued the past no longer exists. A presentist believes only in the reality of the present. A 'growing blocker' allows that the past still exists, but the future does not. A 'moving spotlighter' argues . . .

. . . that the past & future do exist, but there is still an objective present.

An advocate of a tenseless theory holds that there is no objective present. Simultaneity is relative. They generally defend before-after relations between temporally ordered events. But all things (events) exists tenselessly in a four dimensional block universe.

The primary argument of a tenseless theory over a tensed one comes from Einstein's special theory of relativity. Here is philosopher Craig Callender:

"The basic idea is as follows ... consider two inertial observers, A and B, traveling in opposite directions but . . ."

". . .intersecting at some event e, and some distant inertial observer C. Simply put, using the standard Einstein-Poincaré synchronization, A has a different hyperplane of simultaneity than B does. Hence A and B will disagree about what events on C's history . . ."

". . .are simultaneous with e. A will declare that event C1 is simultaneous with e whereas B will declare that event C2 is simultaneous with e. In typical terrestrial situations, C1 and C2 may be so close together that their difference is not subsequently noticeable . . ."

". . . to A or B. For Cs that are very far away (or for As and Bs with very high relative velocity with respect to one another), however, there can be great disagreement. Now take some event C3 such that C1<C3<C2. Since one's simultaneity hyperplane divides the world . . ."

". . .into the future and past—and on any tensed view this has ontological repercussions—C3 is in A's past but B's future. Furthermore, the so-called "principle of relativity" asserts that neither A nor B is privileged in any way. If the future is ontologically unlike the . . ."

". . . past or present (i.e. non-existent, indefinite, etc.), as the tensed theory demands, then A judges C3 ontologically different than B judges C3. But why should C3's ontological status be relative to one's state of motion?"

Craig, William Lane. Einstein, Relativity . . .

. . . and Absolute Simultaneity (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy) (Kindle Locations 1408-1414). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

In light of this, what does Callender believe a tensed theorist should defend? Again from the same article:

"In my opinion, by far the best way for the tenser to respond to Putnam et al. is to adopt the Lorentz 1915 interpretation of time dilation and . . ."

". . . Fitzgerald contraction. Lorentz attributed these effects (and hence the famous null results regarding an aether) to the Lorentz invariance of the dynamical laws governing matter and radiation, not to space-time structure. On this view, . . ."

". . . Lorentz invariance is not a space-time symmetry but a dynamical symmetry, and the special relativistic effects of dilation and contraction are not purely kinematical. The background space-time is Newtonian or neo-Newtonian, not Minkowskian. . . ."

". . . Both Newtonian and neo-Newtonian space-time include a global absolute simultaneity among their invariant structures (with Newtonian space-time singling out one of neo-Newtonian space-time's many preferred inertial frames as the rest frame). On this picture, . . ."

". . . there is no relativity of simultaneity and space-time is uniquely decomposable into space and time. Nonetheless, because matter and radiation transform between different frames via the Lorentz transformations, the theory is empirically adequate. . . ."

". . . Putnam's argument has no purchase here because Lorentz invariance has no repercussions for the structure of space and time. Moreover, the theory shouldn't be viewed as a desperate attempt to save absolute simultaneity in the face of the phenomena, but it should . . ."

". . . rather be viewed as a natural extension of the well-known Lorentz invariance of the free Maxwell equations."

Craig, William Lane. Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy) (Kindle Locations 1432-1433).

This is, in fact, the position that William Lane Craig takes. As Callender says, both views are empirically adequate. So how to prefer the tenseless view over the tensed one? Again Callender:

"The main concern about the Lorentzian theory is that dynamical symmetries do not mirror space-time symmetries on this view, or as Einstein said, "there are asymmetries in the theory not found in the phenomena" ... The matter fields are Lorentz invariant but the . . ."

". . . space-time is not. For this reason, all else being equal, one ought to prefer the Einstein-Minkowski interpretation to the Lorentzian interpretation. Positing otherwise unnecessary unobservable structure—absolute simultaneity—does violence to Ockham's razor. . . ."

". . . But is all else equal? If the case for tenses is elsewhere strong, that may tip the balance over to the Lorentzian interpretation. The Lorentzian picture is logically consistent and empirically adequate, after all. What are a few lost explanatory virtues . . ."

". . . in contrast to————(fill in the blank with whatever tenses explain)? ............. If quantum non-locality spoils the Lorentz invariance of Minkowski space-time, then this would override the explanatory deficit of the Lorentzian view."

I note for completeness, Callender attempts to undermine the argument that quantum non-locality is evidence in favor of the tensed view, while other essays in the volume argue the opposite.

So, it's an Occam's razor argument, NOT an argument about how the tensed view is disconfirmed by the special theory of relativity (STR). As Callender allows, however, there are reasons to prefer the tensed to the tenseless view.

For example, the tensed view is the only one on which evolution is a real objective part of nature as opposed to an illusion. On a tensed view, things really do endure over time and undergo real change over time. This view in philosophy is termed 'endurantism'.

On a tenseless theory of time, 'perdurantism' obtains. This has very strange impacts regarding the human person.

Here is William Lane Craig on the subject of perdurantism.

"The solution of the advocate of static time is typically to deny that things exist wholly at a time and to affirm instead that the three-dimensional objects that appear to us are in reality four-dimensional . . ."

". . . objects extended in time as well as space. The three-dimensional object we see is just a slice or part of a greater four-dimensional object. Things thus have three-dimensional spatio-temporal parts. For example, the Jimmy Carter we see is really just a part . . ."

". . . of the four-dimensional Jimmy Carter. Intrinsic change is understood as a four-dimensional object’s having three-dimensional parts with different properties. Thus, Jimmy Carter today is not the same man who once was president. For both of them are parts of the . . ."

". . . four-dimensional Carter, and they obviously are not the same part. Thus, the spatio-temporal parts of a four-dimensional object are not identical, since they are different parts, and so they can have different properties. But the overall four-dimensional object . . ."

". . . never undergoes intrinsic change. It just has parts with different properties. Just as a three-dimensional object can be round at one end and flat at another end, so a four-dimensional object can have parts which differ in their properties. Thus, . . ."

". . . neither four-dimensional objects nor their parts endure through time, since time is one of their dimensions. In order to characterize the way in which four-dimensional objects are extended in time, philosophers have said that such objects “perdure.” . . ."

". . . Accordingly, this solution to intrinsic change is called perdurantism"

Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time (p. 201). Crossway. Kindle Edition.

Argues Craig with respect to the view of the human person: "Perdurantism flies in the face of the phenomenology of personal consciousness. One of the strangest features of perdurantism is its account of persons and personal identity. On the perdurantist view, persons are . . ."

". . . not what we normally think them to be: self-conscious individuals who act and react with other things in space and time. Such individuals are, on the perdurantist view, just spatio-temporal parts or stages of persons, which are really four-dimensional objects. . . ."

". . . As such, persons are not self-conscious and have no intelligence, no volition, no emotions, no interactions, no agency, no moral responsibility, no aesthetic appreciation, virtually none of the properties we normally associate with persons. . . ."

". . . Persons, on this view, are four-dimensional objects which are changeless, non-conscious entities."

Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time (p. 205). Crossway. Kindle Edition.

Craig continues: "Now perhaps the perdurantist could revise his view such that we are in fact persons, and the four-dimensional object is a hyper-person or a meta-person or what have you. But such a revision would cause intractable problems for personal identity. . . ."

". . . Since spatio-temporal parts are themselves distinct objects, it follows that a meta-person is composed of a series of distinct persons! But am I seriously to believe that I at this second am not the same person as the one who was . . ."

". . .here a second ago, that my memories are really recalling some other person’s experiences, that my consciousness of personal continuity from one moment to the next is an illusion? It would seem crazy to believe such things. Consider once more the . . ."

". . . problem of intrinsic change. Perdurantism denies that any object goes through intrinsic change. But I have every reason to believe that there is at least one thing which endures through intrinsic change, namely, I myself. I existed a second ago, and despite the . . ."

". . . myriad changes which have taken place in me I still exist now. Endurantism, by taking tense seriously, permits the preservation of personal identity over time. But perdurantism forces us to say that I did not exist one second ago, nor shall I endure for another moment."

"Perdurantism is incompatible with moral responsibility, praise, and blame. Since a person is conceived to be a non-conscious, four-dimensional object, it becomes nonsensical to treat such an object as a moral agent. The perdurantist might try to avoid this unwelcome . . ."

". . . conclusion by insisting that the spatio-temporal parts or stages of persons are moral agents. But then it becomes impossible to hold one person-stage responsible for what another person-stage has done. How can one person-stage be blamed and punished for what an . . ."

". . . entirely distinct, different person-stage did? Why should I be punished for his crimes? By the same token, how can moral praise be given to a person-stage for what some other, no longer existent person-stage did? Why should I, who have done nothing, . . ."

". . . get the credit for the heroism of some other person-stage? Since moral responsibility is incompatible with perdurantism and we have more reason for affirming the former than the latter, we ought to reject perdurantism. This argument should carry special weight for . . ."

". . . the theist, for he affirms not only that people are responsible moral agents but also that God is just in holding them responsible and is Himself a virtuous agent who is to be praised for His gracious deeds."

Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity, pg 206

There are other arguments. For example, it seems to me that the 4-D block universe is much more vulnerable to a Humean critique of causation, whereby causes & laws of nature "supervene" on the arrangement of particles in the block. It has been argued that these . . .

. . . are mere "metaphysical window dressing" and thus should be eliminated on the basis of Occam's razor.

On the endurantist view, I can explain through cosmic evolution why the universe looks like it does. On the perdurantist view (sans arbitrary "causes" and "laws of nature"), explanation is difficult. If you keep them, by Occam's razor the tenseless view is not superior.

I also believe that a tenseless view of time wouldn't go far enough. Pure atemporalism should be the end state of this line of thinking. As philosopher Jenann Ismael has argued: "“The insight in [John Stuart] Bell's recommendation to Many Worlds theorists that they . . ."

". . . relinquish continuous trajectories [temporal histories of events], is that this kind of structure, internal to parts of time, places virtually no restrictions on the external relations between them. We can give a completely consistent description of a universe . . ."

". . . constituted by a set of time capsules, arranged in a [moving picture representation of still photos], containing internally consistent representations of their own histories but inconsistent with one another, and inconsistent, moreover, with the actual history, . . ."

". . . jointly constituted by the lot of them. But [physicist and atemporal advocate Julian] Barbour takes things one step further, and in a bold Leibnizian move, kicks away even the external relations between the time capsules [physical histories], so that there is not, . . ."

"in actuality, any history at all. In Barbour's picture, time capsules bear one another internal relations of similarity and accord, but there is no external dimensions in which they are collectively ordered. There are not really any genuinely external relations . . ."

". . .between time capsules, none that don't supervene on their internal properties."

(Time, Reality & Experience, editor Craig Callender, Remembrances, Mementos, and Time-Capsules, pg. 317-28, Cambridge University Press)

On an endurantist view, evolution makes the future out of the present. Thus histories, and laws of physics, and causation are real. Once this is given up, you could (should?) end up with Ismael's recommendation. But, so what? you might say. What is the cost?

Philosopher Richard Healey tells us:

"Here is the basic situation. Any theory of gravity, quantum or classical, is a physical theory. We have no reason to believe this, or any other physical theory, without evidence. The evidence for any physical theory is . . ."

". . . empirical: it consists, ultimately, in the results of observations and experiments. Whatever physical form these take, they must give rise to experiences in scientists who perform them if they are to serve their epistemic purpose. Such experiences will be events . . ."

". . . - at least mental if not also physical. For there to be such events, it must be possible to make sense of the idea that they occur in time - that the earlier mental state of an observer was a state of ignorance, while his or her later mental state was a state . . ."

". . .of knowledge (at least in a weak sense of that term). Moreover, at least in the typical case, a physical theory is confirmed by testing its predictions - statements made at an earlier time in ignorance of their truth-value and then checked by making . . ."

". . . observations at a later time. Both the formulation of a prediction and the performance of a subsequent observation to test it are acts - events of a particular kind involving different intentional states that the observer is in at different times. . . ."

" It follows that the testing of a prediction presupposes the possibility of change - in the mental state of an observer, if not also in the physical state of the world that he or she is observing.

All these points are blindingly obvious. But note what follows. . ."

"from them. There can be no reason whatever to accept any theory of gravity - quantum or classical - which entails that there can be no observers, or that observers can have no experiences, some occurring later that others, or that there can be no change in the . . ."

". . . mental states of observers, or that observers cannot perform different acts at different times. It follows that there can be no reason to accept any theory of gravity - quantum or classical -which entails that there is no time, or that there is no change. . . ."

". . .Now it is important to note that it does not follow that no such theory can be true. But any such theory would have the peculiar feature that, if true, there could be no reason to accept it. To borrow a term from Jeff Barrett, any such theory would be . . ."

". . . empirically incoherent. It follows that no argument that concludes that time, or at least change, is unreal, and which starts from the assumption that some theory of gravity - quantum or classical - is true, . . ."

". . . can have any empirical basis." Healey, Richard, pp. 293-316, Can Physics Coherently Deny the Reality of Time?, in Time, Reality & Experience, edited by Craig Callender, Cambridge University Press 2002.

Ismael argues that on the 4D block view, one never sees that the past and future even exist. Rather, all one sees is 'records' of a purported past within one's own time capsule. There isn't really a need to postulate a past once causation and laws-of-physics are optional . . .

and we come to terms with the fact that 'past' just is records of something we never see. On such a view, and the fact that a multiverse is the natural response to the "why does the universe look the way that it does" without laws and causes, one seems destined to end up . . .

. . . in the position of Barbour and (some) canonical quantum gravity theorists who posit one should embrace that temporal histories don't really exist. If so, the full consequences of rejecting endurantism seem to be those of empirical incoherence. . . .

We are back to the brain in a vat.

Hence I choose the tensed view of time, which as an adjunct is fully compatible with the truth of Kalam's conclusion.