The transformation of the U.S. into a commodity exporter is (nearly) complete.
Looked at the real net exports data for q2 more closely, and the entire q2 exports surprise came from ag ('beans) and oil
Q2 is obviously an extreme case, and the jump in ag exports is magnified by the BEA's annualization process.
But it reflects a broader story, since the end of 2012, ag and petrol exports have contributed more to US growth than manufactured exports
If you exclude ag, the non-oil goods deficit has continued to deteriorate under Trump, tho the deterioration is now from rising imports and modest export growth, while the deterioration in late 14/15 was from a fall in non-petrol goods exports
And I looked at the available data for q3 -- e.g. real trade numbers for July and August. July ag exports were still strong, so barring a big fall in September, they will be flat. Petrol exports will be down slightly. The big swing will be in the non ag, non petrol deficit
So right now I expect a large drag from trade in q3, primarily on the manufacturing side (exports below their q2 average so far in q3, imports up).
the big fall off in ag exports may come in q4, as lots of farmers are storing their 'beans
This thread has a bit of traction, so adding one more, slightly complicated, chart. Shows the net contribution (e.g. fall in imports + rise in exports) from oil v the cumulative contribution of non ag, non petrol goods imports and exports (basically a manufacturing proxy)
Gap between the two lines is net manufacturing exports. idea is to capture the increase in oil production that that has gone into reducing imports along side the rise in exports (energy has a lot of 2 way trade, strangely).
Fairly clear, I think, that the dollar's 2014/15 appreciation has led to a shift in the composition of US traded goods output toward commodities
(the change in the services balance in this period isn't significant)
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China released its preliminary current account surplus data for q3 last week. Even with the unusual surge in imports in September (which was reversed in October) the surplus was about $50b higher than in 2019 (over $90b v $40b)
The trailing 4q sum rose to ~ $200b
But the $200b trailing 4q sum includes (obviously) a very weak q1, and a q4 that was no doubt influenced by trade war uncertainties. The Oct trade data hints that the rise in the surplus will be sustained in q4, which will pull the surplus into the $250-300b range for the year.
The current (s. adjusted) quarterly surplus (recognizing q2 may be a bit high and q3 a bit low) is ~ $90-100b. So broadly speaking, in dollar terms the surplus should rise to its pre-trade war highs and as a share of GDP it should rise to well over 2% of China's GDP
My vote is for Bloomberg. Has been a while since I did a chart that included gold (I have started looking at gold and fx reserves separately). But do think I was among the pioneers of substracting swaps from reported net reserves in a time series ...
China's October trade surplus, annualized, was around $700b. The surplus typically doesn't hit its seasonal peak until December either. The trailing 12m sum of monthly surpluses is sure to soon top $500b, and is on a trajectory that takes it back to its $600b peak
2/x
Mechanically, the October surplus stemmed from a fall in imports from the usually high (no doubt inflated by Huawei's chip stockpiling) levels of September.
But the bigger story is that exports have remained relatively strong even as the global economy has been weak
The Council on Foreign Relations' graphics team has put together some good charts to support my recent piece warning about a loss of momentum in the global recovery.
Plotting output relative to its 2019 average immediately puts the q3 recovery into context.
A look at the (still incomplete) data for a broader set of countries also highlights just how much of an outlier China's reportedly near complete recovery really is
A plot of (estimated) monthly US output highlights how the pace of the recovery slowed over the course of the third quarter (as the large initial stimulus was not sustained).
The chart also shows how services led this particular downturn
The WSJ (Cezary Podkul and Megumi Fujikawa) on the search for global yield from Japan's financial institutions -- through the lens of Nochu's (Japan's financial cooperative for fishers and farmers) purchases of US CLOs
The accounting here is interesting as it illustrates the role of tax centers in a range of capital flows, and illustrates the difference between gross and new flows too.
The Fed started categorizing US managed. Caymans domiciled CLOs as "foreign" in 17 and 18
The IMF's metric (without adjustments) suggested that Turkey had a slightly stronger reserve position that China going into 2020. Which is absurd.
(and yes, I do read the details of the IMF's ESR!)
The reason is simple: measures of reserve need based on broad money (m2) imply that countries with big domestic deposit bases (China, Korea and the like) need a ton of reserves, while countries with small banking systems (like Argentina) need far fewer