China's October trade surplus, annualized, was around $700b. The surplus typically doesn't hit its seasonal peak until December either. The trailing 12m sum of monthly surpluses is sure to soon top $500b, and is on a trajectory that takes it back to its $600b peak
2/x
Mechanically, the October surplus stemmed from a fall in imports from the usually high (no doubt inflated by Huawei's chip stockpiling) levels of September.
But the bigger story is that exports have remained relatively strong even as the global economy has been weak
3/x
That export strength also is no longer just a function of PPE exports -- the main PPE export category in fact has been sliding over the last few months. But overall export growth has remained strong (+10% or so y/y in USD terms)
4/x
Equally striking, China's export boom has in part been driven by the US -- in the Chinese data (and the distinction here is important), exports to the US are back at their pre-trade war levels
5/x
in y/y terms, China's exports to the US are up over 20% ... admittedly off a low 2019 base, but the tariffs are largely still in place.
6/x
China's reported imports from the US are pretty much where they would normally be this time of year before the trade war (with a good harvest likely making up in part for Boeing weakness). No big windfall though
7/x
The most interesting story though, to me at least, is the huge gap between the Chinese data (on exports to the US) and the US data (on imports from China)
The gap is now close to 20 percentage points
8/x
The trailing 12m sum of China's exports (trailing 12m sums move slowly, like the Alaska vote count) is now larger than the trailing 12m sum of US imports from China.
THAT SHOULD NOT HAPPEN
in the past, for known reasons, US imports were always higher than Chinese exports
China's reported bilateral surplus with the US is also poised to exceed the reported US deficit with China this year.
Again, this should not be the case. US deficit is typically larger than the Chinese surplus
And in the global data for China, a rising surplus with the US (together with a big swing in China's trade balance with the commodity exporters) is driving the increase in China's overall surplus
11/x
The most obvious explanation for this "structural" shift is tariff avoidance -- as there is no doubt that the relative position of the red line (China's reported exports) and blue line (US reported imports) have shifted over the last 2 plus years.
12/x
But the result is the biggest divergence between the US and Chinese data in years. China is on track to perhaps report its biggest surplus with the US ever (even with tariffs and the pandemic)
(if you forecast out 20% y.y growth in China's exports in Nov and December)
13/x
While in the normally more reliable US data (as the US data used to capture through trade via HK better), the US trade deficit with China remains well below its previous peak levels
14/x
Would be great if more people started looking into this gap seriously -- tis one of the bigger data gaps to have opened up, and the US-China trade relationship is of obvious importance
15/x
But there should be no doubt that China's surplus in goods is back at all time highs.
And with less tourism, that translates into a big current account surplus (now ~$100b a quarter/ $400b a year if annualized) too
16/16
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China released its preliminary current account surplus data for q3 last week. Even with the unusual surge in imports in September (which was reversed in October) the surplus was about $50b higher than in 2019 (over $90b v $40b)
The trailing 4q sum rose to ~ $200b
But the $200b trailing 4q sum includes (obviously) a very weak q1, and a q4 that was no doubt influenced by trade war uncertainties. The Oct trade data hints that the rise in the surplus will be sustained in q4, which will pull the surplus into the $250-300b range for the year.
The current (s. adjusted) quarterly surplus (recognizing q2 may be a bit high and q3 a bit low) is ~ $90-100b. So broadly speaking, in dollar terms the surplus should rise to its pre-trade war highs and as a share of GDP it should rise to well over 2% of China's GDP
My vote is for Bloomberg. Has been a while since I did a chart that included gold (I have started looking at gold and fx reserves separately). But do think I was among the pioneers of substracting swaps from reported net reserves in a time series ...
The Council on Foreign Relations' graphics team has put together some good charts to support my recent piece warning about a loss of momentum in the global recovery.
Plotting output relative to its 2019 average immediately puts the q3 recovery into context.
A look at the (still incomplete) data for a broader set of countries also highlights just how much of an outlier China's reportedly near complete recovery really is
A plot of (estimated) monthly US output highlights how the pace of the recovery slowed over the course of the third quarter (as the large initial stimulus was not sustained).
The chart also shows how services led this particular downturn
The WSJ (Cezary Podkul and Megumi Fujikawa) on the search for global yield from Japan's financial institutions -- through the lens of Nochu's (Japan's financial cooperative for fishers and farmers) purchases of US CLOs
The accounting here is interesting as it illustrates the role of tax centers in a range of capital flows, and illustrates the difference between gross and new flows too.
The Fed started categorizing US managed. Caymans domiciled CLOs as "foreign" in 17 and 18
The IMF's metric (without adjustments) suggested that Turkey had a slightly stronger reserve position that China going into 2020. Which is absurd.
(and yes, I do read the details of the IMF's ESR!)
The reason is simple: measures of reserve need based on broad money (m2) imply that countries with big domestic deposit bases (China, Korea and the like) need a ton of reserves, while countries with small banking systems (like Argentina) need far fewer
A bit more on global debt issues, spurred by the @petersgoodman article.
As noted in the NYT, debt service deferral cannot be the only way to help low income countries, as not all low income countries are highly indebted.
Yet some countries really do have too much debt
1/x
As the chart above shows, African countries borrowed heavily between 2010 and 2019 -- so external debt, net of reserves, rose from around $100b to over $400b ...
That's a problem now, as exports (needed to repay external debt) are down. External debt is now 2x exports
2/x
And since most of the new debt has come from Chinese policy banks and the bond market not traditional bilateral lenders or the MDBs, it carries a fairly high (for Africa) interest rate. Interest payments are rising faster than total debt