#AEOI Director Ali Akbar Salehi continues his media campaign, commemorating 3 years for #JCPOA, and 40 years for the Islamic Revolution. Today he gave an interview to IRNA, emphasizing the need for a quick move by #Europe to keep the deal alive: irna.ir/fa/News/831894…
1/12 👇
#Salehi on Europe: "My guess is that Europe will not do anything to jeopardize its security. Therefore, I hope that the Europeans will promptly show compliance with their commitments"
2/12 👇
#Salehi on importing metal tubes similar to #Arak tubes: "It was part of our redundancy plan, and was not contrary to the JCPOA. #Iran didn't need to announce it at the time. I announced it last week to counter criticism regarding Arak. People should know the truth"
3/12 👇
#Salehi on the modernization of the Arak reactor: "Since the #US withdrawal of the deal, China has slowed down the progress of the project, fearing US sanctions. If they want to leave the project, we have other alternatives"
4/12 👇
#Salehi on leaving the JCPOA: "We can restart enriching to 20% ASAP, or increase the scale of the enrichment. We can increase the SWU quickly, since we have prepared the needed infrastructure to reach 190K SWU. We have prepared the assembly halls and the raw materials"
5/12 👇
#Salehi on leaving the JCPOA: "Some say that Iran has friends that can help it in such a situation. I say, if you have a friend, tell it to come and work with us now, and not after we withdraw the deal. Those who criticize us should show a solution for our problems"
6/12 👇
#Salehi on Iran's decision-making process: "The decisions taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran are based on study, analysis and intelligence, and not on feelings and emotions. In principle, very decisive decisions are taken on the basis of collective wisdom"
7/12 👇
#Salehi on the Tehran reactor: "we want to replace the TRR's 20% fuel with an upgraded design, which will add more than 20 more years to the reactor's lifetime, allowing Iran to produce more radioisotopes"
8/12 👇
#Salehi on nuclear naval propulsion project: "We don't have a cooperation with the military on this project. We are working on a peaceful project and announced it to the Agency. If all conditions are met, it will take us at least 15 years to complete the project"
9/12 👇
#Salehi on PMD "Washington and Israel are trying to open the issue, but they will not succeed. The #IAEA has repeatedly promised not to act under political pressure, and we hope it will stick to its promise".
10/12 👇
#Salehi on the #AtomicArchives: "Nowadays the technology is so advanced, that you can forge any document. Yet it does not mean that the documents are trustworthy. The IAEA is committed to verifying the nature of the alleged documents"
11/12 👇
#Salehi on missiles: "They claim that because of our missiles' range or payload, it is designed to carry nuclear warheads. Iran has decided not to design such missiles. This is an excuse for some Europeans. If this subject is closed, they will bring another excuse.
12/12 👇
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Khamenei’s office issues a series of interviews with members of the “JCPOA Monitoring Council” discussing Khamenei’s guidelines.
The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf
The interviews were held in the context of Khamenei’s last speech, and are clearly meant to show that the regime is in full consensus with Khamenei’s line of thought — the kind of “rallying around the flag” rhetoric Tehran has taken many times in 2003-05 (per Rouhani’s memoirs)
1 - The notion that Iran is in “no hurry” for the US to return to the JCPOA. Jalili & Velayati noted that if sanctions aren’t lifted, Iran won’t rush into a deal & Kharazi explained that Iran must first see how the Biden admin will act
Quick #Iran Elections thought: 9 months before the ballots, newspapers are filled with an increasing number of IRGC-related hardliners who may run (e.g. Ghalibaf, Dehghan, Ghasemi, Fattah etc.). Yet so far no strong candidate on the other side of the political map has emerged
1/4
Indeed #Iran’s pendulum politics seem to shift to the hardline side. Traditional conservatives & reformists will have hard choices to take if they want to counter this trend. They would prob have to reach a compromise/ZOPA candidate if they want to win elections
2/4
According to many, former Majles Speaker Ali #Larijani is an option. While his family’s power diminished over the last years (his brothers were removed from their positions), I wouldn’t disregard him. Remember that #Rouhani won elections after a decade in political wilderness
3/4
Thread 👇
Whatever shape the Snapback clash may take, Iran’s reaction is becoming clearer. Instead of playing hardball, it embraced a cautious approach of disregarding the US threat & exploiting the crisis for political gains
Over the past few months, Tehran has warned that reimposing UN sanctions might push it to take harsh steps in response. Yet more recent statements indicate that the regime is poised to follow its frequent pattern of taking a more calculated nuclear approach in the end.
2/10
The Majles National Security & FP Committee warned that if snapback is triggered, AEOI should immediately “return all nuclear activity to the level before JCPOA”. The statement then echoed the same steps Iran threatened to take in the past (increasing # & % of enrichment)
3/10
A few thoughts re @iaeaorg decision and the potential for "dynamics of escalation".
Iran had always had blind-spots in assessing how others would react to its actions. The 2005 nuclear crisis and the storming of the UK embassy in 2012 are great example of strategic fallacies 1/5
Decision makers in Iran likely see today's events as part of a broader US attempt to extend the arms embargo. The regime has a dilemma - it doesn't want to risk an escalation at its current situation (Covid, Economy, Protests), yet wants to deter US from pursuing this path 2/5
Now comes the tricky part - does the strategic planners in Tehran believe that there is an equilibrium in which Iran reacts in a "proportionate" way, holding true to its implicit threats to hinder the cooperation with the IAEA, but still doesn't risk broader escalation? 3/5
Since 2012, Tehran has suggested it may need to produce nuclear-fueled ships and submarines because sanctions have forced its navy to look for alternative fuel sources. 4/6 navies in the world that possess nuclear propulsion reactors use high enriched Uranium 1/4
In 2018, Tehran reemphasized the project in the wake of US pressures, taking a step forward by alerting the IAEA of its decision “to construct naval nuclear propulsion in the future.” Iran told the agency that no facility will be involved in the project for the next 5 years 2/4
Yet Tehran uses this project from time to time to threaten the West, hoping to deter it from increasing pressures. Only last week did the AEOI spox announced an advancement in the project, without shading more light on this subject. Yesterday the navy chief joined the choir 3/4
Thread👇:
How does the #Coronavirus outbreak in Iran affects the regime's attention to its nuclear program? What can we learn from Iran's dull nuclear holiday, and how should the Intl. community deter Iran from any cheater?
Iran's Nuclear holiday is an opp for the regime to unveil (exaggerated) advancements in its nuke program. In light of #Coronavirus the festival was postponed this year, a decision that was probably influenced by the high infection rate among top officials washin.st/34yh2MH
The AEOI announced “122 nuke achievements” (to be unveiled later this year), but the leadership doesn't seem to be focused on the nuke program. Rouhani didn't issue a statement re the holiday, and Khamenei didn't reference the program in his Nowruz speech washin.st/34yh2MH