Khamenei’s office issues a series of interviews with members of the “JCPOA Monitoring Council” discussing Khamenei’s guidelines.

The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf The interviews were held in the context of Khamenei’s last speech, and are clearly meant to show that the regime is in full consensus with Khamenei’s line of thought — the kind of “rallying around the flag” rhetoric Tehran has taken many times in 2003-05 (per Rouhani’s memoirs)

https://twitter.com/carmiomer/status/1347682604724744192

Quick #Iran Elections thought: 9 months before the ballots, newspapers are filled with an increasing number of IRGC-related hardliners who may run (e.g. Ghalibaf, Dehghan, Ghasemi, Fattah etc.). Yet so far no strong candidate on the other side of the political map has emerged
1/4 Indeed #Iran’s pendulum politics seem to shift to the hardline side. Traditional conservatives & reformists will have hard choices to take if they want to counter this trend. They would prob have to reach a compromise/ZOPA candidate if they want to win elections
2/4

Thread 👇
Whatever shape the Snapback clash may take, Iran’s reaction is becoming clearer. Instead of playing hardball, it embraced a cautious approach of disregarding the US threat & exploiting the crisis for political gains

My latest @WashInstitute washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
1/10 Over the past few months, Tehran has warned that reimposing UN sanctions might push it to take harsh steps in response. Yet more recent statements indicate that the regime is poised to follow its frequent pattern of taking a more calculated nuclear approach in the end.
2/10

A few thoughts re @iaeaorg decision and the potential for "dynamics of escalation".
Iran had always had blind-spots in assessing how others would react to its actions. The 2005 nuclear crisis and the storming of the UK embassy in 2012 are great example of strategic fallacies 1/5 Decision makers in Iran likely see today's events as part of a broader US attempt to extend the arms embargo. The regime has a dilemma - it doesn't want to risk an escalation at its current situation (Covid, Economy, Protests), yet wants to deter US from pursuing this path 2/5

Since 2012, Tehran has suggested it may need to produce nuclear-fueled ships and submarines because sanctions have forced its navy to look for alternative fuel sources. 4/6 navies in the world that possess nuclear propulsion reactors use high enriched Uranium 1/4

https://twitter.com/CarmiOmer/status/1251107265291194369

In 2018, Tehran reemphasized the project in the wake of US pressures, taking a step forward by alerting the IAEA of its decision “to construct naval nuclear propulsion in the future.” Iran told the agency that no facility will be involved in the project for the next 5 years 2/4

Thread👇:
How does the #Coronavirus outbreak in Iran affects the regime's attention to its nuclear program? What can we learn from Iran's dull nuclear holiday, and how should the Intl. community deter Iran from any cheater?

Read my latest @WashInstitute washin.st/34yh2MH Iran's Nuclear holiday is an opp for the regime to unveil (exaggerated) advancements in its nuke program. In light of #Coronavirus the festival was postponed this year, a decision that was probably influenced by the high infection rate among top officials
washin.st/34yh2MH

Every year, Iran’s Supreme Leader delivers a speech on the first day of the new Persian year. Normally held before masses of worshippers in the holy city of Mashhad, the Nowruz address has become a litmus test for his thoughts.
Thread 👇@WashInstitute washin.st/2QDX7Gr This year, the speech was somewhat grim given the ongoing #coronavirus outbreak. Khamenei gave his remarks by television, in a secluded room with no live audience (presumably from Tehran, where his office and residence are located).
@WashInstitute washin.st/2QDX7Gr

The slogan Khamenei gave for the new Persian year of 1399 is the year of "Surge in Production".
90% of the new years' slogans over the last decade were related to the Iranian resistance economy and its endurance in the face of sanctions: 👇 Yearly Nowruz Slogans, 16-20:
2020 - Surge in Production
2019 - Boosting Production
2018 - Support for Iranian Products
2017 - Economy of Resistance: Production and Employment
2016 - Economy of Resistance: Action and Implementation

Tasnim outlet presents: the best pictures of Soleimani Tasnim outlet presents: the best pictures of Soleimani

#Soleimani in his 1st interview: "The [2006 Lebanon] war had some apparent and some hidden causes.. Later, we concluded that prior to this war, a swift ambush was supposed to be conducted [by Israel] to overturn Hezbollah" #Soleimani: "The principle root lied in the Zionist Regime’s seeking advantage from the military presence of the U.S. in the region; from Saddam’s fall; from the initial victory of the U.S. in Afghanistan; and the fear that the U.S. had created in the region"

#Nasrallah: "there were people suggesting that Iran had ordered us to enter Syria, but this is not true. We decided to enter Syria because we felt seriously threatened by the situation in Syria and Lebanon" #Nasrallah: "He [Khamenei] said that this was a plot for overthrowing Syria, and it targeted its status with relation to the Resistance and Iran; because after they finish with Syria, they would attack Lebanon, Iraq and Iran"

#Nasrallah: "after 9/11, [US] had to go to Afghanistan, because their project included encircling Iran and isolating it. US troops based in Pakistan, their forces were deployed to Afghanistan and then Iraq to complete the encircling of Iran." #Nasrallah: "the first [US] goal was to expand [its] direct military presence, and then to overthrow the countries, to destroy the resistance groups, to establish an Arab-Israeli peace, and to form a single Arab-Israeli front led by Washington to attack #Iran and overthrow it"

#Nasrallah: “the Leader has a deep insight and understanding of the future. I believe that his accurate perception of the future is part of his unique abilities, derived from his deep faith in, submission to, and relationship with God, rather than having an only rational aspect”

https://twitter.com/CarmiOmer/status/1176238182066728961

#Nasrallah: “we thought that the #Israeli-#Syrian negotiations would result in an agreement (#Rabin-#Assad). We went to see the Leader.. While all Iranian officials believed that the talks were over, he said: "..I tell you this will not happen, and there will be no peace treaty”

#Nasrallah: “#Khomeini introduced Imam #Khamenei, the president, and said: ‘He is my representative’.. the relationship between him and Hezbollah began from the very early hours of the foundation [of Hezbollah]. we were always in contact with him and met with him frequently”

https://twitter.com/CarmiOmer/status/1175862562644201473

#Nasrallah: “After watching the testaments [of Hezbollah’s suicide bombers] Imam Khomeini said: ‘These are young [chivalrous] people. All of them were young.’ He then said: ‘These are the true mystics.’ The fact is that the Imam was strongly affected by the testaments.”

#G7Summit apperead to be a success of mediation efforts when #Trump expressed readiness to meet Rouhani “if the circumstances were correct”. Yet a day later, #Rouhani & #Zarif took a step back, and #Khamenei's website forbade Negotiations with the #US washin.st/2NMOatP
1/10 What happened? One option is that #Khamenei wasn't fully aware that #Zarif’s G7 overture would turn into a high-profile effort to resume talks, and decided to block it. He has already done so to Ahmadinejad in 09', when he negotiated over the TRR deal washin.st/2NMOatP
2/10

First response by #Iran’s Supreme Leader?

Today’s editorial of “Khat Hezbollah”, the weekly magazine published by #Khamenei’s office is an open letter to #Rouhani, #Zarif and Iran’s diplomats, under the slogan “Negotiations with the US are definitely out of the question”
1/4 The op-ed clearly asserts that while some in #Iran believe that the only option to solve its problems is negotiating and think that the country's national interests are negotiable, this is not the case.
2/4

As I estimated tonight @WashInstitute piece about #Iran's potential steps washin.st/2VUhany, Iran is laying a roadmap for #EU to follow. 1st is accumulating excess nuclear material (heavy water, Uranium 3.67%). If by 60 days #EU won't take action, more steps to follow 1/7 Iran's demands are not tangible or doable, and put #EU in direct conflict with #US sanctions: fully implement sanctions relief (prob ref to INSTEX) and agree a solution for the excess nuclear material (#Iran's Majles national security commission chief hinted this on Friday) 2/7

Iranian outlets claim #Iran will use its right under article 26 of the #JCPOA to "decrease some of its commitments and resume a number of its nuclear activities that have been ceased under the JCPOA".
Here are 7 steps the Islamic regime could take:

tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/0… 1/9 #1 - Accumulating more than 300kg of 3.67% enriched uranium. In an interview w @CrisisGroup in 18', an unnamed Iranian diplomat stated that if #Iran “had retaliated against the slow relief of sanctions w over-production of uranium,” then Europe would have been more proactive 2/9

I disagree with @ColinPClarke piece for @ForeignPolicy “IRGC Are Ready to Strike Back”.
As I wrote @WashInstitute, #Iran has repeatedly avoided precipitous responses to sanctions, and will be more risk-averse due to its flood crisis and fears of escalation
foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/11/the… #Iran’s remarks included a wrinkle: its response would be “reciprocal,” suggesting that any retaliation would be proportional to #US move. Jafari clarified that reaction would be based on the policies of the regime—Tehran’s traditional code for that refraining from harsh measures

Yesterday, Rouhani ordered the AEOI to install 20 advanced IR-6 centrifuges in Natanz, in a clear message to #US and #Europe. Although AEOI officials claimed it is in the framework of #JCPOA, the truth is more complex.
Read my analysis for @WashInstitute washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… #AEOI's Kamalvandi explained that “having done a 10-centrifuge cascade successfully, when you go after a 20-centrifuge cascade, technically you’re preparing for industrial production.” He then clarified that #Iran will stay at 20 IR6s until 2024, then mass produce them.

While a worst case scenario approach is an important tool in strategic planning, one should remember that #Iran will probably be cautious than before in retaliating to the #US #IRGC_FTO decision
1/6 First, #Tehran is focused on the floods and is under harsh criticism from its public. As senior #IRGC officials were threatened by an angry mob this week, #Soleimani himself had to announce a 1-month tour in the flooded provinces. This is no time for a conflict with the #US 2/6