Yesterday, Rouhani ordered the AEOI to install 20 advanced IR-6 centrifuges in Natanz, in a clear message to #US and #Europe. Although AEOI officials claimed it is in the framework of #JCPOA, the truth is more complex.
Read my analysis for @WashInstitutewashingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
#AEOI's Kamalvandi explained that “having done a 10-centrifuge cascade successfully, when you go after a 20-centrifuge cascade, technically you’re preparing for industrial production.” He then clarified that #Iran will stay at 20 IR6s until 2024, then mass produce them.
#JCPOA allows #Iran to conduct limited R&D on advanced centrifuges so long as it doesn't accumulate enriched uranium, under its "enrichment R&D plan.” It allows it to test IR6 on single centrifuges and intermediate cascades, and to commence testing of up to 30 centrifuges in 2024
Yet the main text of the #JCPOA does not clearly define the cap on #Iran's R&D efforts before 2024. Those commitments are allegedly spelled out in the aforementioned R&D plan, a separate roadmap for advanced centrifuge development that Iran negotiated as part of the JCPOA process
The plan wasn't made public, but @AP reportedly obtained a copy in 2016. It's authenticity isn't clear, yet it echoes the AEOI's remarks. According to AP, the plan allows #Iran to test IR6 w uranium on intermediate cascades w “roughly 10 centrifuges, then roughly 20 centrifuges”
#European diplomats have already said they are reviewing if Tehran’s move is in line w #JCPOA. In any case, this incident illustrates the need to open the contents of the “enrichment R&D plan” for public review—a step that may deter #Iran from pushing #JCPOA’s boundaries further
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Khamenei’s office issues a series of interviews with members of the “JCPOA Monitoring Council” discussing Khamenei’s guidelines.
The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf
The interviews were held in the context of Khamenei’s last speech, and are clearly meant to show that the regime is in full consensus with Khamenei’s line of thought — the kind of “rallying around the flag” rhetoric Tehran has taken many times in 2003-05 (per Rouhani’s memoirs)
1 - The notion that Iran is in “no hurry” for the US to return to the JCPOA. Jalili & Velayati noted that if sanctions aren’t lifted, Iran won’t rush into a deal & Kharazi explained that Iran must first see how the Biden admin will act
Quick #Iran Elections thought: 9 months before the ballots, newspapers are filled with an increasing number of IRGC-related hardliners who may run (e.g. Ghalibaf, Dehghan, Ghasemi, Fattah etc.). Yet so far no strong candidate on the other side of the political map has emerged
1/4
Indeed #Iran’s pendulum politics seem to shift to the hardline side. Traditional conservatives & reformists will have hard choices to take if they want to counter this trend. They would prob have to reach a compromise/ZOPA candidate if they want to win elections
2/4
According to many, former Majles Speaker Ali #Larijani is an option. While his family’s power diminished over the last years (his brothers were removed from their positions), I wouldn’t disregard him. Remember that #Rouhani won elections after a decade in political wilderness
3/4
Thread 👇
Whatever shape the Snapback clash may take, Iran’s reaction is becoming clearer. Instead of playing hardball, it embraced a cautious approach of disregarding the US threat & exploiting the crisis for political gains
Over the past few months, Tehran has warned that reimposing UN sanctions might push it to take harsh steps in response. Yet more recent statements indicate that the regime is poised to follow its frequent pattern of taking a more calculated nuclear approach in the end.
2/10
The Majles National Security & FP Committee warned that if snapback is triggered, AEOI should immediately “return all nuclear activity to the level before JCPOA”. The statement then echoed the same steps Iran threatened to take in the past (increasing # & % of enrichment)
3/10
A few thoughts re @iaeaorg decision and the potential for "dynamics of escalation".
Iran had always had blind-spots in assessing how others would react to its actions. The 2005 nuclear crisis and the storming of the UK embassy in 2012 are great example of strategic fallacies 1/5
Decision makers in Iran likely see today's events as part of a broader US attempt to extend the arms embargo. The regime has a dilemma - it doesn't want to risk an escalation at its current situation (Covid, Economy, Protests), yet wants to deter US from pursuing this path 2/5
Now comes the tricky part - does the strategic planners in Tehran believe that there is an equilibrium in which Iran reacts in a "proportionate" way, holding true to its implicit threats to hinder the cooperation with the IAEA, but still doesn't risk broader escalation? 3/5
Since 2012, Tehran has suggested it may need to produce nuclear-fueled ships and submarines because sanctions have forced its navy to look for alternative fuel sources. 4/6 navies in the world that possess nuclear propulsion reactors use high enriched Uranium 1/4
In 2018, Tehran reemphasized the project in the wake of US pressures, taking a step forward by alerting the IAEA of its decision “to construct naval nuclear propulsion in the future.” Iran told the agency that no facility will be involved in the project for the next 5 years 2/4
Yet Tehran uses this project from time to time to threaten the West, hoping to deter it from increasing pressures. Only last week did the AEOI spox announced an advancement in the project, without shading more light on this subject. Yesterday the navy chief joined the choir 3/4
Thread👇:
How does the #Coronavirus outbreak in Iran affects the regime's attention to its nuclear program? What can we learn from Iran's dull nuclear holiday, and how should the Intl. community deter Iran from any cheater?
Iran's Nuclear holiday is an opp for the regime to unveil (exaggerated) advancements in its nuke program. In light of #Coronavirus the festival was postponed this year, a decision that was probably influenced by the high infection rate among top officials washin.st/34yh2MH
The AEOI announced “122 nuke achievements” (to be unveiled later this year), but the leadership doesn't seem to be focused on the nuke program. Rouhani didn't issue a statement re the holiday, and Khamenei didn't reference the program in his Nowruz speech washin.st/34yh2MH