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Based on the experience gained so far, JAK Div had circulated these 'Commandments' to the Commanding Officers leading from the front in J&K.
Dare I say, nothing much has changed even to this day!
(Source: Official History, 1947-48 Ops)
Based on the experience gained so far, JAK Div had circulated these 'Commandments' to the Commanding Officers leading from the front in J&K.
Dare I say, nothing much has changed even to this day!
(Source: Official History, 1947-48 Ops)
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Meanwhile, events in a different battlefield - The United Naitons - were shaping up quite differently, with Noel-Baker doing his best to twist the verdict in Pakistan's favour.
Meanwhile, events in a different battlefield - The United Naitons - were shaping up quite differently, with Noel-Baker doing his best to twist the verdict in Pakistan's favour.
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As early as 1 Feb, Patrick Gordon-Walker, the junior minister in the Commonwealth Relations Office, had warned that the 'Indians will be mortally offended if we put forward the idea (of admitting Pakistani troops into Kashmir) publicly' & had urged a more ..
As early as 1 Feb, Patrick Gordon-Walker, the junior minister in the Commonwealth Relations Office, had warned that the 'Indians will be mortally offended if we put forward the idea (of admitting Pakistani troops into Kashmir) publicly' & had urged a more ..
#2dayIn1948
.. balanced approach in which the first step would be to call on the Pathan raiders to withdraw from Kashmir.
Eventually, India's strong reaction to Noel-Baker's one sided approach at the UN gave grounds for concern about its consequences for Indo-British relations.
.. balanced approach in which the first step would be to call on the Pathan raiders to withdraw from Kashmir.
Eventually, India's strong reaction to Noel-Baker's one sided approach at the UN gave grounds for concern about its consequences for Indo-British relations.
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Nehru originally suspected that the Western bias was the result of USA's search for military & economic concessions in Pakistan, but after Ayyangar's briefing about the moves in New York, he realised that Noel-Baker was the 'villain of the piece in spite of his ..
Nehru originally suspected that the Western bias was the result of USA's search for military & economic concessions in Pakistan, but after Ayyangar's briefing about the moves in New York, he realised that Noel-Baker was the 'villain of the piece in spite of his ..
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.. pious professions'.
Nehru complained angrily to Attlee that Noel-Baker had, in a conversation with Sheikh Abdullah, dismissed as untrue the charge that Pakistan had assisted the raiders.
.. pious professions'.
Nehru complained angrily to Attlee that Noel-Baker had, in a conversation with Sheikh Abdullah, dismissed as untrue the charge that Pakistan had assisted the raiders.
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'You will forgive me if I say frankly,' he cabled, 'that the attitude revealed by this conversation cannot but prejudice continuance of friendly relations between India and the UK.'
'You will forgive me if I say frankly,' he cabled, 'that the attitude revealed by this conversation cannot but prejudice continuance of friendly relations between India and the UK.'
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Though Noel-Baker denied the charge, Attlee was left in no doubt that his minister's initiatives in New York were casting a long shadow on Indo-UK relations.
Though Noel-Baker denied the charge, Attlee was left in no doubt that his minister's initiatives in New York were casting a long shadow on Indo-UK relations.
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This was further reinforced by a strong message from Mountbatten, calling for a more even-handed approach which would not permanently alienate either dominion. 'Everybody here is now convinced that power politics and not impartiality ..
This was further reinforced by a strong message from Mountbatten, calling for a more even-handed approach which would not permanently alienate either dominion. 'Everybody here is now convinced that power politics and not impartiality ..
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.. are governing the attitude of the Security Council,' he reported. Despite his own efforts to dispel the belief, 'Indian leaders counter this by saying that the Anglo-US block apparently attaches so high a value on the maintenance of Muslim ..
.. are governing the attitude of the Security Council,' he reported. Despite his own efforts to dispel the belief, 'Indian leaders counter this by saying that the Anglo-US block apparently attaches so high a value on the maintenance of Muslim ..
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.. solidarity in the Middle East that they are even prepared to pay the price of driving India out of the Commonwealth into the arms of Russia.'
.. solidarity in the Middle East that they are even prepared to pay the price of driving India out of the Commonwealth into the arms of Russia.'
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Mountbatten warned that if the USSR were to come to India's rescue by exercising a veto in the Security Council, she 'would appear throughout the country as the saviour of India against the machinations of the US & UK.'
Mountbatten warned that if the USSR were to come to India's rescue by exercising a veto in the Security Council, she 'would appear throughout the country as the saviour of India against the machinations of the US & UK.'
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Bajpai, the Secretary General in the External Affairs Ministry, played on the Soviet factor with characteristic skill. He told Gordon-Walker that he did not want to appear to be using a threat - and indeed India was in no position to do so - but the ..
Bajpai, the Secretary General in the External Affairs Ministry, played on the Soviet factor with characteristic skill. He told Gordon-Walker that he did not want to appear to be using a threat - and indeed India was in no position to do so - but the ..
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.. fact was that Indian policy was at a watershed between the East and the West; there would be a powerful popular pro-Russian sentiment if the Soviets at a critical moment were to cast a veto in India's favour.
.. fact was that Indian policy was at a watershed between the East and the West; there would be a powerful popular pro-Russian sentiment if the Soviets at a critical moment were to cast a veto in India's favour.
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Gordon-Walker warned his minister that though India was 'fundamentally anti-Russian,' the 'danger of a reaction against us in favour of Russia shouldn't be lightly dismissed.'
Gordon-Walker warned his minister that though India was 'fundamentally anti-Russian,' the 'danger of a reaction against us in favour of Russia shouldn't be lightly dismissed.'
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Ministers who had a long standing interest in the subcontinent were deeply concerned about the line taken by Noel-Baker in New York. Among these were Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer & Viscount Addison, the Lord Privy Seal.
Ministers who had a long standing interest in the subcontinent were deeply concerned about the line taken by Noel-Baker in New York. Among these were Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer & Viscount Addison, the Lord Privy Seal.
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PM Attlee shared many of their misgivings and in mid Feb he instructed his Secretary for Commonwealth to return to London for discussions.
PM Attlee shared many of their misgivings and in mid Feb he instructed his Secretary for Commonwealth to return to London for discussions.
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On 27 Feb, the Commonwealth Affairs Committee of the British Cabinet discussed the Kashmir issue for the first time. There was a wide divergence of views and during the next six days the Committee held three more meetings on the subject.
On 27 Feb, the Commonwealth Affairs Committee of the British Cabinet discussed the Kashmir issue for the first time. There was a wide divergence of views and during the next six days the Committee held three more meetings on the subject.
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Defending his initiatives, Noel-Baker maintained that the Security Council offered the best means for obtaining a settlement. As usual, he made light of India's objections to his proposals, claiming that there were new signs of a more accommodating temper on ..
Defending his initiatives, Noel-Baker maintained that the Security Council offered the best means for obtaining a settlement. As usual, he made light of India's objections to his proposals, claiming that there were new signs of a more accommodating temper on ..
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.. India's part as a result of the Security Council debate.
This contention was vigorously challenged.
Gordon- Walker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in his own ministry, who had recently returned from an extended tour of the ..
.. India's part as a result of the Security Council debate.
This contention was vigorously challenged.
Gordon- Walker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in his own ministry, who had recently returned from an extended tour of the ..
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.. subcontinent, reported the disappointment & bitterness which Security Council discussions had produced in India. He said that Grady, the American Ambassador in New Delhi, had spread the report that the American delegation would have adopted a more sympathetic ..
.. subcontinent, reported the disappointment & bitterness which Security Council discussions had produced in India. He said that Grady, the American Ambassador in New Delhi, had spread the report that the American delegation would have adopted a more sympathetic ..
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.. attitude to India, had it not been for pressure exerted by British delegates. Gordon-Walker favoured a 'completely neutral attitude' on part of UK; any deviation from which, he said, might drive out either India or Pakistan from the Commonwealth.
.. attitude to India, had it not been for pressure exerted by British delegates. Gordon-Walker favoured a 'completely neutral attitude' on part of UK; any deviation from which, he said, might drive out either India or Pakistan from the Commonwealth.
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There was general support to this contention. Under the Committee's direction, following formula was drawn up:-
1. Pakistan was to take all possible steps to secure withdrawal of the raiders & prevent new infiltration from its territory. She should ..
There was general support to this contention. Under the Committee's direction, following formula was drawn up:-
1. Pakistan was to take all possible steps to secure withdrawal of the raiders & prevent new infiltration from its territory. She should ..
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.. also ensure that no help was given to those fighting in Kashmir.
2. After cessation of fighting, India would withdraw her forces from Poonch, Mirpur & Muzaffarabad, including the garrison in Poonch Town (Some 'neutral' chutzpah, this!). Indian ..
.. also ensure that no help was given to those fighting in Kashmir.
2. After cessation of fighting, India would withdraw her forces from Poonch, Mirpur & Muzaffarabad, including the garrison in Poonch Town (Some 'neutral' chutzpah, this!). Indian ..
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.. forces in Jammu & Kashmir would thereafter, be reduced & confined to their garrisons.
3. The Abdullah Govt was to stay in office but would invite representatives of other parties to join them in the normal administration of the State. For law & ..
.. forces in Jammu & Kashmir would thereafter, be reduced & confined to their garrisons.
3. The Abdullah Govt was to stay in office but would invite representatives of other parties to join them in the normal administration of the State. For law & ..
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.. order & eventual plebiscite, they would rely on local personnel in each district.
4. The UN Commission was to be invited to appoint liaison officers to report on the implementation of the truce. The State Govt was to delegate to the Commission all ..
.. order & eventual plebiscite, they would rely on local personnel in each district.
4. The UN Commission was to be invited to appoint liaison officers to report on the implementation of the truce. The State Govt was to delegate to the Commission all ..
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.. powers required for holding the plebiscite.
5. An Advisory Council (composed of equal members of Indian & Pak nominees) was to be set up to advise the Commission.
.. powers required for holding the plebiscite.
5. An Advisory Council (composed of equal members of Indian & Pak nominees) was to be set up to advise the Commission.
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This, in a nutshell, was the 'NEUTRAL' solution by UK - Calling on India to withdraw from areas already under its control despite the legally valid accession of the State, for no apparent reason but to ensure Pak lines of communication to Muzaffarabad weren't broken!
This, in a nutshell, was the 'NEUTRAL' solution by UK - Calling on India to withdraw from areas already under its control despite the legally valid accession of the State, for no apparent reason but to ensure Pak lines of communication to Muzaffarabad weren't broken!
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The withdrawal from Mirpur & Muzaffarabad by India was moot too since these were already under Pakistani control. Poonch garrison in Indian hands meant an implicit threat to Kotli / Mirpur, through which their routes to Muzaffarabad passed; hence the call to withdraw.
The withdrawal from Mirpur & Muzaffarabad by India was moot too since these were already under Pakistani control. Poonch garrison in Indian hands meant an implicit threat to Kotli / Mirpur, through which their routes to Muzaffarabad passed; hence the call to withdraw.
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THIS, folks, was the state of 'NEUTRALITY' offered by the British Foreign Office, after a CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DECISION to be neutral!
THIS, folks, was the state of 'NEUTRALITY' offered by the British Foreign Office, after a CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DECISION to be neutral!
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However, even this was sought to be scuttled by Noel-Baker who attempted to shift the discussion to a different track. He observed that the difficulty in the Committee's proposals lay in the fact that it envisaged exclusive reliance on impartial ..
However, even this was sought to be scuttled by Noel-Baker who attempted to shift the discussion to a different track. He observed that the difficulty in the Committee's proposals lay in the fact that it envisaged exclusive reliance on impartial ..
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.. local forces for law and order. These forces were not capable of carrying out the task. for this reason, he preferred to employ regular forces from both India & Pakistan. He said that US proposals sought to overcome this difficulty, while in ..
.. local forces for law and order. These forces were not capable of carrying out the task. for this reason, he preferred to employ regular forces from both India & Pakistan. He said that US proposals sought to overcome this difficulty, while in ..
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.. other respects they bore a close resemblance to the Committee's proposals. He admitted that the US doubted whether India would agree to the induction of Pak troops in Kashmir, adding that their proposals specifically required agreement of both ..
.. other respects they bore a close resemblance to the Committee's proposals. He admitted that the US doubted whether India would agree to the induction of Pak troops in Kashmir, adding that their proposals specifically required agreement of both ..
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.. countries for employment of Indian / Pak forces.
Noel-Baker's attempt to secure Cabinet support for the 'American' proposals, which, in fact, reflected the concessions he had been able to extract from US, proved unsuccessful.
.. countries for employment of Indian / Pak forces.
Noel-Baker's attempt to secure Cabinet support for the 'American' proposals, which, in fact, reflected the concessions he had been able to extract from US, proved unsuccessful.
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The general view of the ministers was that India would react strongly to the suggestion that Pak troops be brought into Kashmir & would reject any proposal incorporating the idea. At least one minister expressed his views with great force.
The general view of the ministers was that India would react strongly to the suggestion that Pak troops be brought into Kashmir & would reject any proposal incorporating the idea. At least one minister expressed his views with great force.
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In the impersonal language of Cabinet minutes, it was recorded as under:-
Quote, 'The view was expressed that the US proposals.. Would be wholly unacceptable to the Govt of India & that the relations between His Majesty's Govt & the Govt of India would be seriously ..
In the impersonal language of Cabinet minutes, it was recorded as under:-
Quote, 'The view was expressed that the US proposals.. Would be wholly unacceptable to the Govt of India & that the relations between His Majesty's Govt & the Govt of India would be seriously ..
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.. prejudiced if the former were to support them. The US document made no mention of the undoubted fact that the tribesmen had passed thru Pakistan territory before entering Kashmir, or of the failure of the Pakistan Govt to prevent this; it provided ..
.. prejudiced if the former were to support them. The US document made no mention of the undoubted fact that the tribesmen had passed thru Pakistan territory before entering Kashmir, or of the failure of the Pakistan Govt to prevent this; it provided ..
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.. for a UN administration to be superimposed on the administration in Kashmir; it mentioned the possibility that Pakistan troops may be permitted to enter Kashmir; and it was suggested that the Indian troops should be placed under the command ..
.. for a UN administration to be superimposed on the administration in Kashmir; it mentioned the possibility that Pakistan troops may be permitted to enter Kashmir; and it was suggested that the Indian troops should be placed under the command ..
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.. of the Plebiscite Marshall. These were the sort of terms which might be imposed on a DEFEATED COUNTRY.' Unquote.
.. of the Plebiscite Marshall. These were the sort of terms which might be imposed on a DEFEATED COUNTRY.' Unquote.
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Yet there were reservations in the Committee about its own proposals. Tentative soundings in London with Mohd. Ali & HM Patel raised doubts about the acceptability of the proposed package to the two govts. It was finally agreed that the British ..
Yet there were reservations in the Committee about its own proposals. Tentative soundings in London with Mohd. Ali & HM Patel raised doubts about the acceptability of the proposed package to the two govts. It was finally agreed that the British ..
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.. delegation at the UN should undertake informal & exploratory discussions on the basis of the Committee's proposals to ascertain whether they offered a basis for an agreed settlement. The delegation was instructed to support any proposal for ..
.. delegation at the UN should undertake informal & exploratory discussions on the basis of the Committee's proposals to ascertain whether they offered a basis for an agreed settlement. The delegation was instructed to support any proposal for ..
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.. an interim resolution calling for the withdrawal of the raiders & requiring Pakistan to prevent further infiltration & stop assistance to the raiders.
But there was a catch .. these decisions required a major reversal of Noel-Baker's policy so far!
.. an interim resolution calling for the withdrawal of the raiders & requiring Pakistan to prevent further infiltration & stop assistance to the raiders.
But there was a catch .. these decisions required a major reversal of Noel-Baker's policy so far!
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The extent of shift was reflected in British Cabinet's instructions concerning the US draft. The UK delegation was asked to inform the US that the draft wasn't acceptable since:-
(a) it contained no language to show that the Indian complaint against ..
The extent of shift was reflected in British Cabinet's instructions concerning the US draft. The UK delegation was asked to inform the US that the draft wasn't acceptable since:-
(a) it contained no language to show that the Indian complaint against ..
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.. Pakistan had been taken into account;
(b) it would take administration out of the hands of the State Govt & reconstitute it under instructions from Security Council;
(c) it envisaged the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir; and
(d) it would ..
.. Pakistan had been taken into account;
(b) it would take administration out of the hands of the State Govt & reconstitute it under instructions from Security Council;
(c) it envisaged the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir; and
(d) it would ..
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.. place Indian troops under the virtual control of the UN Plebiscite Marshal.
.. place Indian troops under the virtual control of the UN Plebiscite Marshal.
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Ironically, the US position on all these points had largely evolved under Noel-Baker's influence.
Indeed, the Americans themselves had questioned the propriety of bringing in Pakistani forces into territory that was legally Indian.
Ironically, the US position on all these points had largely evolved under Noel-Baker's influence.
Indeed, the Americans themselves had questioned the propriety of bringing in Pakistani forces into territory that was legally Indian.
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They had reluctantly agreed to include a formula which would allow the same, provided India agreed & had made it clear that this was the furthest they would go to accommodate the British.
They had reluctantly agreed to include a formula which would allow the same, provided India agreed & had made it clear that this was the furthest they would go to accommodate the British.
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If the UK delegation was to faithfully carry out the Cabinet's decision it would have to admit to the Americans that Noel-Baker's earlier initiatives had not been authorised by London!
If the UK delegation was to faithfully carry out the Cabinet's decision it would have to admit to the Americans that Noel-Baker's earlier initiatives had not been authorised by London!
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Meanwhile in the Kupwara sector, unconcerned with the machinations in powerful world capitals, one company of 1 Sikh was established at Khairpur forward of Bakihakar area.
Meanwhile in the Kupwara sector, unconcerned with the machinations in powerful world capitals, one company of 1 Sikh was established at Khairpur forward of Bakihakar area.
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With summers fast approaching, the entire front North of Pir Panjal, which had stayed dormant, due to snow, was to soon open up with fierce fights recommencing all over and more, new battlefields opening up.
With summers fast approaching, the entire front North of Pir Panjal, which had stayed dormant, due to snow, was to soon open up with fierce fights recommencing all over and more, new battlefields opening up.
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The United Nations Security Council had resumed discussion of the Kashmir issue on 10 March in circumstances which favoured pursuit of the new British plan. The Presidency of the Council had passed from Canada to China, which had showed itself to be more favourably ..
The United Nations Security Council had resumed discussion of the Kashmir issue on 10 March in circumstances which favoured pursuit of the new British plan. The Presidency of the Council had passed from Canada to China, which had showed itself to be more favourably ..
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.. inclined to the Indian case than any other delegation. On 18 March, the Council President, Ambassador Tsiang Ting-fu, presented a new three-part draft resolution.
The first part dealt with restoration of peace & order, calling upon Pakistan ..
.. inclined to the Indian case than any other delegation. On 18 March, the Council President, Ambassador Tsiang Ting-fu, presented a new three-part draft resolution.
The first part dealt with restoration of peace & order, calling upon Pakistan ..
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.. to try to secure the withdrawal of the raiders & to prevent any further intrusions.
Second part dealt with conditions for a fair plebiscite. It called on India to set up a Plebiscite Administration. The officials of this body would be nominated by ..
.. to try to secure the withdrawal of the raiders & to prevent any further intrusions.
Second part dealt with conditions for a fair plebiscite. It called on India to set up a Plebiscite Administration. The officials of this body would be nominated by ..
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.. the UN Secy General but act as officers of the J&K Govt.
The final section envisaged an interim govt in the State, constituted on the basis of adequate representation of all major political groups and appointment of a high Indian official ..
.. the UN Secy General but act as officers of the J&K Govt.
The final section envisaged an interim govt in the State, constituted on the basis of adequate representation of all major political groups and appointment of a high Indian official ..
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.. to ensure fulfilment of the State Govt's obligations under the plan.
.. to ensure fulfilment of the State Govt's obligations under the plan.
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The Chinese proposal went a long way towards meeting Indian concerns. It accorded priority to restoration of peace and order, a priority that was missing in earlier proposals.
The Chinese proposal went a long way towards meeting Indian concerns. It accorded priority to restoration of peace and order, a priority that was missing in earlier proposals.
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It was also consistent with Indian's sovereignty in J&K; it didn't question her exclusive right to maintain forces in the State, nor did it impose the authority of a UN administration over the State Govt.
It did, indeed, envisage effective UN control ..
It was also consistent with Indian's sovereignty in J&K; it didn't question her exclusive right to maintain forces in the State, nor did it impose the authority of a UN administration over the State Govt.
It did, indeed, envisage effective UN control ..
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.. over the plebiscite administration & expansion of the State Govt to give adequate representation to all parties, but these arrangements were to be instituted under a legal formula which was consistent with Indian sovereignty.
.. over the plebiscite administration & expansion of the State Govt to give adequate representation to all parties, but these arrangements were to be instituted under a legal formula which was consistent with Indian sovereignty.
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For these reasons, the proposal was welcomed by India as 'worthy of serious consideration' and for the same reasons. rejected by Pakistan.
For these reasons, the proposal was welcomed by India as 'worthy of serious consideration' and for the same reasons. rejected by Pakistan.
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The US felt that the Chinese proposal offered a framework for a fair settlement though it was not prepared to vote for it in its original form. The State Department favoured amendments to provide more specific indication of the role of the ..
The US felt that the Chinese proposal offered a framework for a fair settlement though it was not prepared to vote for it in its original form. The State Department favoured amendments to provide more specific indication of the role of the ..
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.. UN Commission, confer upon the Plebiscite Director more powers to maintain law & order to the extent he considered this necessary for the purpose of the plebiscite, and to include provisions for the maintenance of law and order in areas from ..
.. UN Commission, confer upon the Plebiscite Director more powers to maintain law & order to the extent he considered this necessary for the purpose of the plebiscite, and to include provisions for the maintenance of law and order in areas from ..
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.. which the tribesmen & Indian forces were to withdraw. The State Dept didn't insist on a possible reference to induction of Pak forces - through withdrawing the concession they had made earlier to Noel-Baker.
The position of the US was thus very ..
.. which the tribesmen & Indian forces were to withdraw. The State Dept didn't insist on a possible reference to induction of Pak forces - through withdrawing the concession they had made earlier to Noel-Baker.
The position of the US was thus very ..
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.. close to that of the British Cabinet. It would hve been relatively simple for Noel-Baker to lend his support to the Chinese draft with a set of limited amendments to accommodate both the British & American viewpoints.
But the Secretary for ..
.. close to that of the British Cabinet. It would hve been relatively simple for Noel-Baker to lend his support to the Chinese draft with a set of limited amendments to accommodate both the British & American viewpoints.
But the Secretary for ..
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.. Commonwealth Relations made no serious effort to implement the Cabinet directive. He continued to press for far-reaching amendments to meet Pakistani demands. He pressed, for example, for removing Abdullah from office, a proposition which had ..
.. Commonwealth Relations made no serious effort to implement the Cabinet directive. He continued to press for far-reaching amendments to meet Pakistani demands. He pressed, for example, for removing Abdullah from office, a proposition which had ..
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.. no place in the Cabinet directive.
The procedure adopted by the Security Council was to hold semi-formal meetings of limited groups of members to consider amendments. The Chinese draft thus went through no less than THREE revisions within 12 days!
.. no place in the Cabinet directive.
The procedure adopted by the Security Council was to hold semi-formal meetings of limited groups of members to consider amendments. The Chinese draft thus went through no less than THREE revisions within 12 days!
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Nehru, who had received an assurance earlier in the month that new instructions had been issued to the British delegation, was greatly disturbed by the trend in New York. He concluded that there was 'unfortunately no reason to suppose that countries ..
Nehru, who had received an assurance earlier in the month that new instructions had been issued to the British delegation, was greatly disturbed by the trend in New York. He concluded that there was 'unfortunately no reason to suppose that countries ..
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.. such as the USA, Canada & Belgium will follow an independent policy. They will doubtless continue to play second fiddle to the UK & we must reckon with Mr Noel-Baker pursuing his unfriendly part whatever may be his instructions from London.'
.. such as the USA, Canada & Belgium will follow an independent policy. They will doubtless continue to play second fiddle to the UK & we must reckon with Mr Noel-Baker pursuing his unfriendly part whatever may be his instructions from London.'
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Krishna Menon conveyed to Attlee & Cripps his PM's strong feelings over the divergence between the instructions said to have been issued from London & policy actually followed by Noel-Baker in New York.
Attlee himself came to a similar conclusion ..
Krishna Menon conveyed to Attlee & Cripps his PM's strong feelings over the divergence between the instructions said to have been issued from London & policy actually followed by Noel-Baker in New York.
Attlee himself came to a similar conclusion ..
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.. about Noel-Baker's activities.
.. about Noel-Baker's activities.
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In the Handwara Sector, 'A' Company plus two platoons ex 'C' Company 7 Sikh attacked and captured Shulur & a permanent garrison was establish there. 25 Pounders moved from Kupwara to Pethahir a day prior helped in this operation.
In the Handwara Sector, 'A' Company plus two platoons ex 'C' Company 7 Sikh attacked and captured Shulur & a permanent garrison was establish there. 25 Pounders moved from Kupwara to Pethahir a day prior helped in this operation.
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Disposition of 7 Sikh now was as under:-
Shulur - 'A' Company + two platoons 'C' Company + one section 3-inch mortars.
Pethahir - 'B' Company + two 25 Pounders + Tactical HQ (with one defence platoon).
Kupwara - 'D' Company, one section 3-inch ..
Disposition of 7 Sikh now was as under:-
Shulur - 'A' Company + two platoons 'C' Company + one section 3-inch mortars.
Pethahir - 'B' Company + two 25 Pounders + Tactical HQ (with one defence platoon).
Kupwara - 'D' Company, one section 3-inch ..
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.. mortars & a detachment of engineers.
Wodhapur - One Platoon ex J&K State Forces.
Handwara Bridge - One Platoon ex 1 Sikh.
Handwara - Two Platoons, one section 3-inch mortars & a platoon of engineers.
Khairpur - One company ex 1Sikh & one section 3-inch mortar.
.. mortars & a detachment of engineers.
Wodhapur - One Platoon ex J&K State Forces.
Handwara Bridge - One Platoon ex 1 Sikh.
Handwara - Two Platoons, one section 3-inch mortars & a platoon of engineers.
Khairpur - One company ex 1Sikh & one section 3-inch mortar.
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Meanwhile, Skardu was fighting hard to beat off a determined enemy attack that was now in its 3rd day.
After an initial diversionary attak on No 6 picquet at 0300Hr on 28 March (which though diversionary, the enemy attacked in overwhelming ..
Meanwhile, Skardu was fighting hard to beat off a determined enemy attack that was now in its 3rd day.
After an initial diversionary attak on No 6 picquet at 0300Hr on 28 March (which though diversionary, the enemy attacked in overwhelming ..
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.. numbers, yet the picquet held on), swarms of raiders stormed Skardu garrison from all sides at 0500Hr, while their mortars and automatics threw a deluge of bombs & bullets at Thapa's little band.
Furious fighting raged throughout the day, but the ..
.. numbers, yet the picquet held on), swarms of raiders stormed Skardu garrison from all sides at 0500Hr, while their mortars and automatics threw a deluge of bombs & bullets at Thapa's little band.
Furious fighting raged throughout the day, but the ..
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.. stubborn defenders just refused to back down; or die!
The defences held firm, for the loss of two men killed & 4 wounded. The enemy had fired over 100 bombs from his 3-inch mortar that day.
However, two picquets, School & Raja, were cut off from the main ..
.. stubborn defenders just refused to back down; or die!
The defences held firm, for the loss of two men killed & 4 wounded. The enemy had fired over 100 bombs from his 3-inch mortar that day.
However, two picquets, School & Raja, were cut off from the main ..
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..position.
The bitter battle was in its 3rd day today & the two picquets, commanded by Capt Ajit Singh & Jemadar Piar Singh, hung on.
Capt Ajit Singh was wounded this day, but refused to leave his post. Men in both picquets went without food & water for several days.
..position.
The bitter battle was in its 3rd day today & the two picquets, commanded by Capt Ajit Singh & Jemadar Piar Singh, hung on.
Capt Ajit Singh was wounded this day, but refused to leave his post. Men in both picquets went without food & water for several days.
#2dayIn1948
Contact with main defences would eventually be re-established on night 3/4 April by means of 'runners' who managed to crawl thru to them, and gradually the hostiles gave up the attack.
Had these picquets been lost,entire defences of Skardu would have become untenable!
Contact with main defences would eventually be re-established on night 3/4 April by means of 'runners' who managed to crawl thru to them, and gradually the hostiles gave up the attack.
Had these picquets been lost,entire defences of Skardu would have become untenable!
#2dayIn1948
Map of Skardu Defences.
Do note School & Raja picquets in South.
Source: Official History of 47-48 Ops, MoD
Map of Skardu Defences.
Do note School & Raja picquets in South.
Source: Official History of 47-48 Ops, MoD
#2dayIn1948
However, reinforcements were already underway for Skardu. Even though the Indian army units were fully occupied in the bitter bitter fighting in Poonch & Uri sectors, all available troops of 5 J&K Infantry & 7 J&K Infantry, about one and a half ..
However, reinforcements were already underway for Skardu. Even though the Indian army units were fully occupied in the bitter bitter fighting in Poonch & Uri sectors, all available troops of 5 J&K Infantry & 7 J&K Infantry, about one and a half ..
#2dayIn1948
.. battalions, were mustered for relief of Skardu.
On this day, 7 Officers & 400 men of 5 Kashmir Infantry reached Srinagar from Jammu.
.. battalions, were mustered for relief of Skardu.
On this day, 7 Officers & 400 men of 5 Kashmir Infantry reached Srinagar from Jammu.
#2dayIn1948
Consequent to his doubts about Noel-Baker's intentions in the UN, in an extraordinary exchange of 'Top Secret & Personal' telegrams, Attlee took the Commonwealth Secretary to task.
On 01 Apr, he cabled:
'.. I am disturbed as to the extent to which the President's ..
Consequent to his doubts about Noel-Baker's intentions in the UN, in an extraordinary exchange of 'Top Secret & Personal' telegrams, Attlee took the Commonwealth Secretary to task.
On 01 Apr, he cabled:
'.. I am disturbed as to the extent to which the President's ..
#2dayIn1948
.. draft of 18th Mar has been amended. It appears to me that while India has made a very considerable advance, Pakistan has remained obdurate. Yet the last amended draft makes even more extensive demands on India. We have never authorized the new Article 5 involving..
.. draft of 18th Mar has been amended. It appears to me that while India has made a very considerable advance, Pakistan has remained obdurate. Yet the last amended draft makes even more extensive demands on India. We have never authorized the new Article 5 involving..
#2dayIn1948
.. the possible introduction of Pakistan troops into Kashmir. The proposal to set up parallel courts in Kashmir is also certain to be strongly resisted by India. Nor have we authorized the subordination of Indian troops to the Plebiscite authority for ..
.. the possible introduction of Pakistan troops into Kashmir. The proposal to set up parallel courts in Kashmir is also certain to be strongly resisted by India. Nor have we authorized the subordination of Indian troops to the Plebiscite authority for ..
#2dayIn1948
.. any purposes other than those directly concerned with the carrying out of the plebiscite ..
I am not therefore prepared for you to support the amended proposals of the President, to which I hope you have not committed yourself in any way.
Failing ..
.. any purposes other than those directly concerned with the carrying out of the plebiscite ..
I am not therefore prepared for you to support the amended proposals of the President, to which I hope you have not committed yourself in any way.
Failing ..
#2dayIn1948
.. agreement between India & Pakistan you should .. press for a shorter resolution omitting these contentious details but containing the preamble calling upon Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen from Kashmir & recommending the ..
.. agreement between India & Pakistan you should .. press for a shorter resolution omitting these contentious details but containing the preamble calling upon Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen from Kashmir & recommending the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. acceptance of a fair plebiscite & urging both sides to work for accommodation.' Unquote
Noel-Baker replied that the new Article 5 was proposed by Tsiang on his own initiative & supported by the US. Moreover, he claimed, Ayyangar had left him ..
.. acceptance of a fair plebiscite & urging both sides to work for accommodation.' Unquote
Noel-Baker replied that the new Article 5 was proposed by Tsiang on his own initiative & supported by the US. Moreover, he claimed, Ayyangar had left him ..
#2dayIn1948
.. with the impression that India might well accept it!
As regards parallel courts & subordination of the Indian Army to the plebiscite authority, these proposals were, in his view, consistent with his instructions.
This caused Attlee to administer ..
.. with the impression that India might well accept it!
As regards parallel courts & subordination of the Indian Army to the plebiscite authority, these proposals were, in his view, consistent with his instructions.
This caused Attlee to administer ..
#2dayIn1948
..an unambiguous rebuke:
Quote, 'I find it very hard to reconcile the view which you express as to the attitude of the Indian delegation to the amendment inserted in Tsiang's draft with the representations I have received through the High Commissioner from India here.
..an unambiguous rebuke:
Quote, 'I find it very hard to reconcile the view which you express as to the attitude of the Indian delegation to the amendment inserted in Tsiang's draft with the representations I have received through the High Commissioner from India here.
#2dayIn1948
From statements made to me it would appear that the Indian delegation have expressed to their govt concern at the extent to which you seem to be supporting these increased demands on India.. It appears to me that you ..
From statements made to me it would appear that the Indian delegation have expressed to their govt concern at the extent to which you seem to be supporting these increased demands on India.. It appears to me that you ..
#2dayIn1948
.. give a very wide interpretation to the heads of agreement when it is a question of pressing increased demands on India, but you do not appear to take a line against proposals put forward by your UN colleagues although they were not such as in our ..
.. give a very wide interpretation to the heads of agreement when it is a question of pressing increased demands on India, but you do not appear to take a line against proposals put forward by your UN colleagues although they were not such as in our ..
#2dayIn1948
.. opinion India should be asked to accept.
It appears to me, and I know that Addison & Cripps share my view, that all the concessions are being asked from India, while Pakistan concedes little or nothing. The attitude still remains to be that ..
.. opinion India should be asked to accept.
It appears to me, and I know that Addison & Cripps share my view, that all the concessions are being asked from India, while Pakistan concedes little or nothing. The attitude still remains to be that ..
#2dayIn1948
.. it is India which is at a fault whereas the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan'
Unquote
.. it is India which is at a fault whereas the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
Noel-Baker now took refuge in the argument that it was not possible for him to change course at this stage!
He wrote, 'Since the other members of the Council know .. our plan for a fair plebiscite in February when the Indian delegation ..
Noel-Baker now took refuge in the argument that it was not possible for him to change course at this stage!
He wrote, 'Since the other members of the Council know .. our plan for a fair plebiscite in February when the Indian delegation ..
#2dayIn1948
.. withdrew, how can I convince them now that Pakistan would be making no concessions by accepting Tsiang's draft of March 30?
After what has passed, I would be unable to push through the alternative of a short resolution limited to reproving Pakistan and ..
.. withdrew, how can I convince them now that Pakistan would be making no concessions by accepting Tsiang's draft of March 30?
After what has passed, I would be unable to push through the alternative of a short resolution limited to reproving Pakistan and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. exhorting the parties to arrange a fair plebiscite.'
Attlee resignedly accepted the fait accompli. 'We accept your view as things have gone, revised Chinese draft may be accepted as basis for Council's action,' he cabled.
This was however ..
.. exhorting the parties to arrange a fair plebiscite.'
Attlee resignedly accepted the fait accompli. 'We accept your view as things have gone, revised Chinese draft may be accepted as basis for Council's action,' he cabled.
This was however ..
#2dayIn1948
.. conditional to the draft being modified in some significant respects. The language of the resolution should make it clear that Pakistani troops could not be brought into Kashmir without India's consent. Furthermore, J&K State Troops & police ..
.. conditional to the draft being modified in some significant respects. The language of the resolution should make it clear that Pakistani troops could not be brought into Kashmir without India's consent. Furthermore, J&K State Troops & police ..
#2dayIn1948
.. would function under the plebiscite authority only to the extent required for purposes of the plebiscite.
.. would function under the plebiscite authority only to the extent required for purposes of the plebiscite.
#2dayIn1948
In addition to the Noel-Baker shenanigans, unknown to New Delhi, other channels too, were working furiously to shape the outcome of the conflict.
In addition to the Noel-Baker shenanigans, unknown to New Delhi, other channels too, were working furiously to shape the outcome of the conflict.
#2dayIn1948
On 13 Feb, British High Commissioner, Sir Terence Shone, had had an 'entirely off the record' talk with the new C-in-C, Gen Bucher.
The High Commissioner wished to ascertain India's military intentions in the Poonch sector. As was happening with Noel-Baker ..
On 13 Feb, British High Commissioner, Sir Terence Shone, had had an 'entirely off the record' talk with the new C-in-C, Gen Bucher.
The High Commissioner wished to ascertain India's military intentions in the Poonch sector. As was happening with Noel-Baker ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in New York, the British were particularly solicitous about Pakistan's interest in Poonch & Mirpur areas of Jammu province.
An Indian presence along the boundary in this sector would deprive Pakistan of defensive depth in the Rawalpindi area, her ..
.. in New York, the British were particularly solicitous about Pakistan's interest in Poonch & Mirpur areas of Jammu province.
An Indian presence along the boundary in this sector would deprive Pakistan of defensive depth in the Rawalpindi area, her ..
#2dayIn1948
.. principal military centre, as also lines of communication to Muzaffarabad.
The British also shared Pakistani apprehension that control of the Mangla headworks would enable India to divert the waters of the Jhelum River from the irrigation system..
.. principal military centre, as also lines of communication to Muzaffarabad.
The British also shared Pakistani apprehension that control of the Mangla headworks would enable India to divert the waters of the Jhelum River from the irrigation system..
#2dayIn1948
.. of West Punjab, thereby wreaking havoc to Pakistan's economy. Finally, the British were were also inclined to accept Karachi's view that Indian military ops in Poonch & Mirpur areas would result in an exodus of refugees, placing a heavy ..
.. of West Punjab, thereby wreaking havoc to Pakistan's economy. Finally, the British were were also inclined to accept Karachi's view that Indian military ops in Poonch & Mirpur areas would result in an exodus of refugees, placing a heavy ..
#2dayIn1948
..burden on the fragile Pakistan economy.
(Ironically, construction of Mangla Dam did exactly this & Britain ended up giving refuge to a large number of Mirpuris, whose current generation is causing havoc in the British society with their grooming gangs et al. Karma!)
..burden on the fragile Pakistan economy.
(Ironically, construction of Mangla Dam did exactly this & Britain ended up giving refuge to a large number of Mirpuris, whose current generation is causing havoc in the British society with their grooming gangs et al. Karma!)
#2dayIn1948
Shone must have had these factors in mind when he asked Bucher about his plans for ops in the area.
He reported to London that his conversation with the C-in-C left him with the impression that India (he presumably meant Bucher) had never seriously ..
Shone must have had these factors in mind when he asked Bucher about his plans for ops in the area.
He reported to London that his conversation with the C-in-C left him with the impression that India (he presumably meant Bucher) had never seriously ..
#2dayIn1948
.. considered the proposal of extending her control over the entire length of the Poonch border.
Bucher expressed the view that it would be almost impossible for India to hold the entire Western Poonch frontier with Pakistan in view of its length ..
.. considered the proposal of extending her control over the entire length of the Poonch border.
Bucher expressed the view that it would be almost impossible for India to hold the entire Western Poonch frontier with Pakistan in view of its length ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and No of troops required
Shone, however, cautioned London that, with Cariappa's assumption of East Punjab & Delhi Command, 'General Bucher may as time goes on be less and less informed of India's actual military plans in this area.'
A couple of ..
.. and No of troops required
Shone, however, cautioned London that, with Cariappa's assumption of East Punjab & Delhi Command, 'General Bucher may as time goes on be less and less informed of India's actual military plans in this area.'
A couple of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. days later there was another 'confidential talk' during which Bucher informed Shone that he had sounded Defence Secretary HM Patel about the Indian Govt's intentions. The C-in-C's assessment was that India would take no further military action ..
.. days later there was another 'confidential talk' during which Bucher informed Shone that he had sounded Defence Secretary HM Patel about the Indian Govt's intentions. The C-in-C's assessment was that India would take no further military action ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in Poonch area if she succeeded in extricating the large mass of Hindu & Sikh refugees from the town.
As events proved, Bucher's assessment proved inaccurate but it did shape his moves in March 1948.
.. in Poonch area if she succeeded in extricating the large mass of Hindu & Sikh refugees from the town.
As events proved, Bucher's assessment proved inaccurate but it did shape his moves in March 1948.
#2dayIn1948
In the meantime, far away from the high offices of London, New York and Delhi, the war was a very real life and death issue for thousands of troops on the frontlines.
In the meantime, far away from the high offices of London, New York and Delhi, the war was a very real life and death issue for thousands of troops on the frontlines.
#2dayIn1948
Enroute to reinforce Skardu (refer tweet below), another party comprising 1 Officer, 1VCO & 30 men was about to reach Kargil, with one more party of 3 VCOs & 30men 1 stage behind.
Enroute to reinforce Skardu (refer tweet below), another party comprising 1 Officer, 1VCO & 30 men was about to reach Kargil, with one more party of 3 VCOs & 30men 1 stage behind.
#2dayIn1948
In early 1948, the UK suddenly reduced India's oil supplies. Apart from an impact on the economy, the reduction had obvious implications for Indian capacity to carry out military ops. Nehru believed that the move was intended as a means of ..
In early 1948, the UK suddenly reduced India's oil supplies. Apart from an impact on the economy, the reduction had obvious implications for Indian capacity to carry out military ops. Nehru believed that the move was intended as a means of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. exercising pressure on India in the context of Kashmir ops & the goings on in the Security Council.
It was decided to send HM Patel & the Defence Financial Adviser, AK Chanda to London on an arms purchase mission & also seek a larger oil quota.
.. exercising pressure on India in the context of Kashmir ops & the goings on in the Security Council.
It was decided to send HM Patel & the Defence Financial Adviser, AK Chanda to London on an arms purchase mission & also seek a larger oil quota.
#2dayIn1948
Nehru accepted Mountbatten's suggestion that the C-in-C Gen Bucher be included in the delegation as he might be helpful in explaining the Kashmir situation to the authorities in Whitehall, esp to Gen Scoones, the Principal Staff Officer at the CRO.
Nehru accepted Mountbatten's suggestion that the C-in-C Gen Bucher be included in the delegation as he might be helpful in explaining the Kashmir situation to the authorities in Whitehall, esp to Gen Scoones, the Principal Staff Officer at the CRO.
#2dayIn1948
The delegation returned in March after obtaining restoration of the original oil quota. Bucher doubtless explained the Indian position to the authorities in Whitehall & it would be surprising if the latter, in turn, didn't appraise him of the British ..
The delegation returned in March after obtaining restoration of the original oil quota. Bucher doubtless explained the Indian position to the authorities in Whitehall & it would be surprising if the latter, in turn, didn't appraise him of the British ..
#2dayIn1948
.. point of view on the issue.
On his return from London, Bucher took an extraordinary step - Without the knowledge of Indian Govt, the Commander-in-Chief held secret negotiations with his Pakistani counterpart, Gen Gracey, in order to explore some ..
.. point of view on the issue.
On his return from London, Bucher took an extraordinary step - Without the knowledge of Indian Govt, the Commander-in-Chief held secret negotiations with his Pakistani counterpart, Gen Gracey, in order to explore some ..
#2dayIn1948
.. sort of a private and informal truce arrangement. Gracey's presence in New Delhi for a Joint Defence Council meeting on 19-20 March 1948 provided a convenient opportunity for these discussions.
.. sort of a private and informal truce arrangement. Gracey's presence in New Delhi for a Joint Defence Council meeting on 19-20 March 1948 provided a convenient opportunity for these discussions.
#2dayIn1948
With manpower building up for reinforcement of Kargil, Maj Coutts was ordered by 163 Brigade to make Kargil into a firm base defended by a company of troops, a detachment of mortars & a section of MMG. He was also instructed to move one company ..
With manpower building up for reinforcement of Kargil, Maj Coutts was ordered by 163 Brigade to make Kargil into a firm base defended by a company of troops, a detachment of mortars & a section of MMG. He was also instructed to move one company ..
#2dayIn1948
.. forward 2 Bagicha & another to Parkutta, converting each of these localities into defended bases.
As events would turn out, Maj Coutts would turn out to be incapable at best .. and a saboteur at worst .. when it came to implementing these orders.
.. forward 2 Bagicha & another to Parkutta, converting each of these localities into defended bases.
As events would turn out, Maj Coutts would turn out to be incapable at best .. and a saboteur at worst .. when it came to implementing these orders.
#2dayIn1948
Regardless, the first batch of 5 Kashmir Infantry had left Srinagar for Kargil 24 hours earlier. It comprised 1 Officer & 37 other ranks.
They carried with them a 3-inch mortar, a 2-inch mortar, 3 Bren Guns, 7 Sten Guns & plenty of ammo. Lt Col Sampuran Bachan ..
Regardless, the first batch of 5 Kashmir Infantry had left Srinagar for Kargil 24 hours earlier. It comprised 1 Officer & 37 other ranks.
They carried with them a 3-inch mortar, a 2-inch mortar, 3 Bren Guns, 7 Sten Guns & plenty of ammo. Lt Col Sampuran Bachan ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Singh, who had been the 2IC of 1 Sikh till the Bhatgiran disaster, was the commander of this column, which had been named the 'Sugar Column'.
Their instructions were to relieve Skardu, leave there majority of their troops to strengthen the garrison..
.. Singh, who had been the 2IC of 1 Sikh till the Bhatgiran disaster, was the commander of this column, which had been named the 'Sugar Column'.
Their instructions were to relieve Skardu, leave there majority of their troops to strengthen the garrison..
#2dayIn1948
.. and return with the civilians there. For this purpose, he was made the commander of all State Forces in Kargil-Skardu area.
.. and return with the civilians there. For this purpose, he was made the commander of all State Forces in Kargil-Skardu area.
#2dayIn1948
He was also informed that 2 companies of 7 Kashmir Infantry & a section of MMGs were already at Kargil under Maj Coutts & that a company of 7 Kashmir Infantry with a section of 3-inch mortars was just then reaching Kargil.
Maj Coutts was to act as ..
He was also informed that 2 companies of 7 Kashmir Infantry & a section of MMGs were already at Kargil under Maj Coutts & that a company of 7 Kashmir Infantry with a section of 3-inch mortars was just then reaching Kargil.
Maj Coutts was to act as ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Staff Officer to Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh.
Another batch of 5 Kashmir Infantry too had followed Lt Col Sampuran on 04 Apr 1948.
It consisted of 70 officers & men & carried two 2-inch mortarr, 6 Bren guns, 14 sten guns & plenty of ammo.
.. Staff Officer to Lt Col Sampuran Bachan Singh.
Another batch of 5 Kashmir Infantry too had followed Lt Col Sampuran on 04 Apr 1948.
It consisted of 70 officers & men & carried two 2-inch mortarr, 6 Bren guns, 14 sten guns & plenty of ammo.
#2dayIn1948
Since 1st April, own troops in Kupwara sector were carrying out normal patrolling, firming up their gains thus far. The engineers too were working on repairing the road and bridges between Kupwara & Shulur, most of which had been destroyed by ..
Since 1st April, own troops in Kupwara sector were carrying out normal patrolling, firming up their gains thus far. The engineers too were working on repairing the road and bridges between Kupwara & Shulur, most of which had been destroyed by ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the enemy during his withdrawal for Trehgam.
During this period, several enemy messages asking for reinforcements too were intercepted.
Eventually, this day in 1948, he was reinforced by approx 300 armed men, who came through Pharkian-ki-Gali
.. the enemy during his withdrawal for Trehgam.
During this period, several enemy messages asking for reinforcements too were intercepted.
Eventually, this day in 1948, he was reinforced by approx 300 armed men, who came through Pharkian-ki-Gali
#2dayIn1948
One day ago, on 06 Apr 48, Lt Gen Cariappa issued instructions to Maj Gen Kalwant Singh. His main tasks in order of priority were:-
1. If possible, to despatch by air one battalion to reinforce the garrison of Poonch; also to reinforce Skardu garrison ..
One day ago, on 06 Apr 48, Lt Gen Cariappa issued instructions to Maj Gen Kalwant Singh. His main tasks in order of priority were:-
1. If possible, to despatch by air one battalion to reinforce the garrison of Poonch; also to reinforce Skardu garrison ..
#2dayIn1948
.. so as to bring it to one complete battalion by 20 Apr 1948
2. To carry out 'Op Ranjit' for capture of Rajauri
3. To secure line of communication Naushera-Rajauri
4. To build up 1 additional brigade in Kashmir Valley
5. To plan for evacuation of refugees from Poonch
.. so as to bring it to one complete battalion by 20 Apr 1948
2. To carry out 'Op Ranjit' for capture of Rajauri
3. To secure line of communication Naushera-Rajauri
4. To build up 1 additional brigade in Kashmir Valley
5. To plan for evacuation of refugees from Poonch
#2dayIn1948
6. To plan for occupation of Domel, if possible by 15 May.
7. To establish firm bases at Leh, Kargil and Gurais.
6. To plan for occupation of Domel, if possible by 15 May.
7. To establish firm bases at Leh, Kargil and Gurais.
#2dayIn1948
The op for capture of Rajauri was given code name of 'Ranjit' (earlier called 'Mumtaz'). The 48km stretch of country which the Indian troops had to traverse to Rajauri was thickly wooded and well defended with enemy machine guns and mortars.
The op for capture of Rajauri was given code name of 'Ranjit' (earlier called 'Mumtaz'). The 48km stretch of country which the Indian troops had to traverse to Rajauri was thickly wooded and well defended with enemy machine guns and mortars.
#2dayIn1948
One enemy battalion with 3-inch mortars and LMGs was holding the high ground on either side of the road Naushera-Chingas. Enemy positions along the high ground West of the road were comparatively stronger than on the East.
One enemy battalion with 3-inch mortars and LMGs was holding the high ground on either side of the road Naushera-Chingas. Enemy positions along the high ground West of the road were comparatively stronger than on the East.
#2dayIn1948
The main enemy position East of the road was in the Mal area. West of the road, Barwali ridge was held in strength.
In this area, enemy positions were known to exist at Sardot, Daruni, Barwali Ridge & Ring Contour.
The main enemy position East of the road was in the Mal area. West of the road, Barwali ridge was held in strength.
In this area, enemy positions were known to exist at Sardot, Daruni, Barwali Ridge & Ring Contour.
#2dayIn1948
Further West, enemy was holding Pts. 3831 & 4622.
Further West, enemy was holding Pts. 3831 & 4622.
#2dayIn1948
A large proportion of the local population had turned hostile & was actively assisting him.
The enemy on this front consisted mainly of deserter units of the State Force, ex-soldiers & locals.
Approx 5000 Indian nationals were believed to be ..
A large proportion of the local population had turned hostile & was actively assisting him.
The enemy on this front consisted mainly of deserter units of the State Force, ex-soldiers & locals.
Approx 5000 Indian nationals were believed to be ..
#2dayIn1948
.. held captive by the enemy under the most oppressive conditions.
The road Naushera-Rajauri was a fair weather motorable road. Between Rajauri & Chingas it was reported to be in use by the enemy.
The sector from Nadpur to Chingas had not been used ..
.. held captive by the enemy under the most oppressive conditions.
The road Naushera-Rajauri was a fair weather motorable road. Between Rajauri & Chingas it was reported to be in use by the enemy.
The sector from Nadpur to Chingas had not been used ..
#2dayIn1948
.. since long and had been damaged by rain and landslides.
In addition, the enemy had blocked in this sector in four places by felling trees across the road & was also suspected to have laid mines.
.. since long and had been damaged by rain and landslides.
In addition, the enemy had blocked in this sector in four places by felling trees across the road & was also suspected to have laid mines.
#2dayIn1948
It was during this advance that a young officer from the Corps of Engineers, 2 Lt RR Rane, would earn his Param Vir Chakra, working near continuously for 72hrs plus, clearing the route.
It was during this advance that a young officer from the Corps of Engineers, 2 Lt RR Rane, would earn his Param Vir Chakra, working near continuously for 72hrs plus, clearing the route.
#2dayIn1948
Even as Indian Army was poised to capture Rajauri & thereafter Poonch in Apr 1948, its C-in-C was in secret negotiations with his Pak counterpart WITHOUT knowledge of Indian Govt!
I've covered the initial parleys earlier. (See quoted tweet)
Even as Indian Army was poised to capture Rajauri & thereafter Poonch in Apr 1948, its C-in-C was in secret negotiations with his Pak counterpart WITHOUT knowledge of Indian Govt!
I've covered the initial parleys earlier. (See quoted tweet)
#2dayIn1948
Even as the military situation was turning in India's favour, Gen Bucher began his secret discussions with Gen Gracey on 19 Mar 1948.
Bucher proposed to Gracey that they come to a secret understanding to maintain what would amount to a truce!
Even as the military situation was turning in India's favour, Gen Bucher began his secret discussions with Gen Gracey on 19 Mar 1948.
Bucher proposed to Gracey that they come to a secret understanding to maintain what would amount to a truce!
#2dayIn1948
The content of the discussions was conveyed to London in Top Secret telegrams from the British High Commissioners in Pakistan & India.
On 26 Mar, Graffey-Smith, the British High Commissioner in Karachi, reported to London that Gen Gracey had informed him that he ..
The content of the discussions was conveyed to London in Top Secret telegrams from the British High Commissioners in Pakistan & India.
On 26 Mar, Graffey-Smith, the British High Commissioner in Karachi, reported to London that Gen Gracey had informed him that he ..
#2dayIn1948
.. was carrying on negotiations with his counterpart in India, Gen Bucher. The High Commissioner cabled:
'These discussions at C-in-C level seem to have proceeded from Gen Bucher's indication to his opposite number in Pakistan that he had no wish to ..
.. was carrying on negotiations with his counterpart in India, Gen Bucher. The High Commissioner cabled:
'These discussions at C-in-C level seem to have proceeded from Gen Bucher's indication to his opposite number in Pakistan that he had no wish to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. pursue an offensive into what is effectively Azad Kashmir controlled territory, i.e. the Mirpur & Poonch sector.
Gen Gracey therefore proposed an agreement, with which Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, the Azad Kashmir leader, has willingly associated ..
.. pursue an offensive into what is effectively Azad Kashmir controlled territory, i.e. the Mirpur & Poonch sector.
Gen Gracey therefore proposed an agreement, with which Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, the Azad Kashmir leader, has willingly associated ..
#2dayIn1948
.. himself, under which the Azad Kashmir forces will give safe conduct to the Indian armed forces now beleaguered in Poonch, and to the considerable non-Muslim elements in the town, to withdraw to territory now controlled by the Indian Army.
.. himself, under which the Azad Kashmir forces will give safe conduct to the Indian armed forces now beleaguered in Poonch, and to the considerable non-Muslim elements in the town, to withdraw to territory now controlled by the Indian Army.
#2dayIn1948
In return, Gen Bucher appears to have undertaken-
1. that the forces withdrawing from Poonch should not damage the town before leaving it, and
2. that present irresponsible actions by Indian Air Force, which is causing intense resentment among the civilian ..
In return, Gen Bucher appears to have undertaken-
1. that the forces withdrawing from Poonch should not damage the town before leaving it, and
2. that present irresponsible actions by Indian Air Force, which is causing intense resentment among the civilian ..
#2dayIn1948
.. population, should cease forthwith. Shelling of Poonch by Azad forces is also to cease. Similar arrangements are under discussion for evacuation by Indian elements of Rajauri.
In addition to these arrangements, Gen Gracey claims to have ..
.. population, should cease forthwith. Shelling of Poonch by Azad forces is also to cease. Similar arrangements are under discussion for evacuation by Indian elements of Rajauri.
In addition to these arrangements, Gen Gracey claims to have ..
#2dayIn1948
.. discouraged the Azad forces from their present tactics of raiding behind the Indian front on the Uri sector.
The object of these arrangements is to reach a situation in which each side would remain in undisputed military occupation of what are ..
.. discouraged the Azad forces from their present tactics of raiding behind the Indian front on the Uri sector.
The object of these arrangements is to reach a situation in which each side would remain in undisputed military occupation of what are ..
#2dayIn1948
.. roughly their present positions and, more importantly, will remain there strictly on the defensive. An atmosphere of truce might then replace the present somewhat futile and certainly wasteful military offensive on both sides.
I understand from ..
.. roughly their present positions and, more importantly, will remain there strictly on the defensive. An atmosphere of truce might then replace the present somewhat futile and certainly wasteful military offensive on both sides.
I understand from ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Gen Gracey that some effect is already being given to these plans ..
An essential part of the process agreed by the two Commanders-in-Chief is that three battalions of the Pak Army should be employed in Kashmir, opposite the Indian forces at ..
.. Gen Gracey that some effect is already being given to these plans ..
An essential part of the process agreed by the two Commanders-in-Chief is that three battalions of the Pak Army should be employed in Kashmir, opposite the Indian forces at ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Jhangar, in or around Poonch & at Uri. Their role would be wholly defensive & primarily directed to preventing tribesmen from further offensive action .. Gen Gracey is emphatic that, whatever arrangements for a plebiscite might be made, it will ..
.. Jhangar, in or around Poonch & at Uri. Their role would be wholly defensive & primarily directed to preventing tribesmen from further offensive action .. Gen Gracey is emphatic that, whatever arrangements for a plebiscite might be made, it will ..
#2dayIn1948
.. be essential for some Pak Army troops to be employed in the Uri Sector ..
The Pakistani PM is aware of the exchanges I have above, but I understand, he feels unable at present to endorse them officially ...'
Unquote
.. be essential for some Pak Army troops to be employed in the Uri Sector ..
The Pakistani PM is aware of the exchanges I have above, but I understand, he feels unable at present to endorse them officially ...'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
As can be seen, the Generals had already planned how to end the conflict however for a minor detail - No one from Indian Govt or troops on ground had any clue!
As can be seen, the Generals had already planned how to end the conflict however for a minor detail - No one from Indian Govt or troops on ground had any clue!
#2dayIn1948
High Commissioner Shone in New Delhi was aware of the discussion between the two Commanders-in-Chief even before he received the Karachi telegram; but he had refrained from referring to them in his cable traffic, possibly due to sensitive nature.
High Commissioner Shone in New Delhi was aware of the discussion between the two Commanders-in-Chief even before he received the Karachi telegram; but he had refrained from referring to them in his cable traffic, possibly due to sensitive nature.
#2dayIn1948
His version of the exchanges was rather different. In response to the Karachi telegram, he wrote on 28 Mar 1948:
'I knew something of the correspondence which has taken place between the two Commanders-in-Chief because Gen Bucher asked me to see him ..
His version of the exchanges was rather different. In response to the Karachi telegram, he wrote on 28 Mar 1948:
'I knew something of the correspondence which has taken place between the two Commanders-in-Chief because Gen Bucher asked me to see him ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in private at his house on Sunday, 21st Mar, to say that he had received 2 confidential messages from Gen Gracey .. These messages which followed private talks between the Cs-in-C which took place at the time of the meeting of the Joint Defence ..
.. in private at his house on Sunday, 21st Mar, to say that he had received 2 confidential messages from Gen Gracey .. These messages which followed private talks between the Cs-in-C which took place at the time of the meeting of the Joint Defence ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Council held a few days previously had caused some perplexity to Bucher who had first shown them to Brockman, Private Secy to the Governor General. Brockman had suggested that Bucher should consult me privately in order to ascertain whether I ..
.. Council held a few days previously had caused some perplexity to Bucher who had first shown them to Brockman, Private Secy to the Governor General. Brockman had suggested that Bucher should consult me privately in order to ascertain whether I ..
#2dayIn1948
.. agreed that Bucher should immediately inform Pandit Nehru of receipt of the messages. I had no hesitation in endorsing this suggestion.
Bucher has given me the following information confidentially. In the first place Bucher made it quite clear to ..
.. agreed that Bucher should immediately inform Pandit Nehru of receipt of the messages. I had no hesitation in endorsing this suggestion.
Bucher has given me the following information confidentially. In the first place Bucher made it quite clear to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Gracey that India had no intention at present of pursuing an offensive into interior of Mirpur & Poonch. Bucher also has given no undertaking to Gracey to withdraw Indian troops from Poonch Town. The position will be that once civilians have ..
.. Gracey that India had no intention at present of pursuing an offensive into interior of Mirpur & Poonch. Bucher also has given no undertaking to Gracey to withdraw Indian troops from Poonch Town. The position will be that once civilians have ..
#2dayIn1948
.. gone, the commitment of the Indian Army will be less. Bucher cannot admit an irresponsible bombing by IAF but says that bombing has been restricted recently because of weather & other difficulties. Moreover, it is the Indian policy to maintain..
.. gone, the commitment of the Indian Army will be less. Bucher cannot admit an irresponsible bombing by IAF but says that bombing has been restricted recently because of weather & other difficulties. Moreover, it is the Indian policy to maintain..
#2dayIn1948
.. purely defensive military action while the Kashmir dispute is under discussion at Lake Success.
Bucher states categorically that India cannot agree to Pak troops entering Kashmir territory. Finally, Bucher does not adhere to Gracey's appreciation ..
.. purely defensive military action while the Kashmir dispute is under discussion at Lake Success.
Bucher states categorically that India cannot agree to Pak troops entering Kashmir territory. Finally, Bucher does not adhere to Gracey's appreciation ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that whatever arrangements for a plebiscite might be made it will be essential for some Pak troops to be employed in the Uri Sector.'
Unquote
.. that whatever arrangements for a plebiscite might be made it will be essential for some Pak troops to be employed in the Uri Sector.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
The accounts of the two High Commissioners differed in some respects but both cables suggest that Bucher conveyed that he would not launch an offensive into territory controlled by the so called 'Azad Kashmir' forces in Mirpur and Poonch areas.
The accounts of the two High Commissioners differed in some respects but both cables suggest that Bucher conveyed that he would not launch an offensive into territory controlled by the so called 'Azad Kashmir' forces in Mirpur and Poonch areas.
#2dayIn1948
He also indicated that he would contrive to withdraw Indian troops from Poonch town & from the environs of Rajauri if he was allowed to evacuate the besieged soldiers and civilians without interference. He had also offered to halt Indian bombing ops.
He also indicated that he would contrive to withdraw Indian troops from Poonch town & from the environs of Rajauri if he was allowed to evacuate the besieged soldiers and civilians without interference. He had also offered to halt Indian bombing ops.
#2dayIn1948
Gracey, on his part, was to stop further shelling of Poonch by 'Azad' forces, to provide 'safe conduct' to troops & civilians being evacuated to areas under Indian control, and to restrain 'Azad' forces from raiding behind Indian front in Uri.
Gracey, on his part, was to stop further shelling of Poonch by 'Azad' forces, to provide 'safe conduct' to troops & civilians being evacuated to areas under Indian control, and to restrain 'Azad' forces from raiding behind Indian front in Uri.
#2dayIn1948
He'd also insisted on three battalions of Pak Army being sent opposite Jhangar, Poonch & Uri.
Gracey seemed to have formed an impression that Bucher had accepted these but the latter's version differed.
Shone wrote that ..
He'd also insisted on three battalions of Pak Army being sent opposite Jhangar, Poonch & Uri.
Gracey seemed to have formed an impression that Bucher had accepted these but the latter's version differed.
Shone wrote that ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Bucher had explained that 'India cannot agree to Pak troops entering Kashmir territory' & that 'he (Bucher) doesn't adhere to Gracey's appreciation that it will be essential for some Pak troops to be employed in the Uri Sector'
What Gracey failed ..
.. Bucher had explained that 'India cannot agree to Pak troops entering Kashmir territory' & that 'he (Bucher) doesn't adhere to Gracey's appreciation that it will be essential for some Pak troops to be employed in the Uri Sector'
What Gracey failed ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to understand was the delicacy of Bucher's position. The C-in-C of the Indian Army was negotiating with the 'enemy' C-in-C behind the back of his own Govt & the offer he made clashed with Govt policy!
The GoI was determined to hold on to Poonch at any cost!!
.. to understand was the delicacy of Bucher's position. The C-in-C of the Indian Army was negotiating with the 'enemy' C-in-C behind the back of his own Govt & the offer he made clashed with Govt policy!
The GoI was determined to hold on to Poonch at any cost!!
#2dayIn1948
Besides, withdrawing Indian troops from Rajauri would be a tall order to get the Govt to agree to .. it was in this context that the elevation of Cariappa to his then rank proved fortuitous (More on that subsequently).
Bucher was, however ..
Besides, withdrawing Indian troops from Rajauri would be a tall order to get the Govt to agree to .. it was in this context that the elevation of Cariappa to his then rank proved fortuitous (More on that subsequently).
Bucher was, however ..
#2dayIn1948
.. hopeful of shaping India policy by doctoring his technical advice on military questions.
Gracey failed to understand that Bucher's proposals were in the nature of a private and informal understanding, and dutifully submitted the ..
.. hopeful of shaping India policy by doctoring his technical advice on military questions.
Gracey failed to understand that Bucher's proposals were in the nature of a private and informal understanding, and dutifully submitted the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. proposals to Pak authorities, thus raising them to a formal and official level.
Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan must have been delighted at the recognition of his 'Azad Kashmir Govt' implied in an agreement between the Cs-in-C permitting the presence ..
.. proposals to Pak authorities, thus raising them to a formal and official level.
Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan must have been delighted at the recognition of his 'Azad Kashmir Govt' implied in an agreement between the Cs-in-C permitting the presence ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of so called 'Azad Kashmir' forces in J&K state. Liaqat also gave his blessings to the initiative, salivating at an easy 'victory, no doubt, but refrained from openly endorsing it, no doubt because he suspected it would be unacceptable to Govt of India.
.. of so called 'Azad Kashmir' forces in J&K state. Liaqat also gave his blessings to the initiative, salivating at an easy 'victory, no doubt, but refrained from openly endorsing it, no doubt because he suspected it would be unacceptable to Govt of India.
#2dayIn1948
Gracey's formal proposals put Bucher in a serious quandary because of the difficulty of explaining their origins to the Indian Govt. Eventually he decided to reveal to the Indian authorities the contents of Gracey's cables,though in what form or with ..
Gracey's formal proposals put Bucher in a serious quandary because of the difficulty of explaining their origins to the Indian Govt. Eventually he decided to reveal to the Indian authorities the contents of Gracey's cables,though in what form or with ..
#2dayIn1948
The Govt, of course, rejected the proposals & instructed the C-in-C not to engage in such discussions in future. Bucher had no option but to inform his counterpart in Pakistan that India would 'revert to normal action after 31st March.'
The Govt, of course, rejected the proposals & instructed the C-in-C not to engage in such discussions in future. Bucher had no option but to inform his counterpart in Pakistan that India would 'revert to normal action after 31st March.'
#2dayIn1948
To Shone, he explained away the collapse of his scheme as:-
'.. negotiations had led to a position in which there was an implied understanding that offensive action would be held up by both sides pending discussions of ways & means of securing ..
To Shone, he explained away the collapse of his scheme as:-
'.. negotiations had led to a position in which there was an implied understanding that offensive action would be held up by both sides pending discussions of ways & means of securing ..
#2dayIn1948
.. evacuation of non Muslim refugees from certain areas, e.g. Poonch & Skardu. The shelling of Poonch had ceased but in other areas, the leader of Azad forces had been unable owing to faulty communications & because of the scattering of his forces to ..
.. evacuation of non Muslim refugees from certain areas, e.g. Poonch & Skardu. The shelling of Poonch had ceased but in other areas, the leader of Azad forces had been unable owing to faulty communications & because of the scattering of his forces to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. fulfill the agreement.'
Unquote
Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, however, put out a different account. He issued a press statement on 31 March to the effect that his 'Govt' was approached by India for a ceasefire order on 19-20 March & that an ..
.. fulfill the agreement.'
Unquote
Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, however, put out a different account. He issued a press statement on 31 March to the effect that his 'Govt' was approached by India for a ceasefire order on 19-20 March & that an ..
#2dayIn1948
.. agreement was finalized on 24 Mar, only to be cancelled the following day on orders of the Indian PM.
Thus ended another backdoor attempt to 'orchestrate' the war to suit British interests. The most intriguing feature of this episode concerned ..
.. agreement was finalized on 24 Mar, only to be cancelled the following day on orders of the Indian PM.
Thus ended another backdoor attempt to 'orchestrate' the war to suit British interests. The most intriguing feature of this episode concerned ..
#2dayIn1948
.. induction of regular Pak troops into J&K. It seems incredible that Bucher should have entertained such a proposal unless seen in light of Noel-Baker's shenanigans at the UN to secure a Pakistani military presence inside Kashmir. Towards the end..
.. induction of regular Pak troops into J&K. It seems incredible that Bucher should have entertained such a proposal unless seen in light of Noel-Baker's shenanigans at the UN to secure a Pakistani military presence inside Kashmir. Towards the end..
#2dayIn1948
.. of March, when Zafrulla Khan reverted in the Security Council to the question of employing Pakistani troops in connection with a plebiscite, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London speculated that his move might have been based on knowledge ..
.. of March, when Zafrulla Khan reverted in the Security Council to the question of employing Pakistani troops in connection with a plebiscite, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London speculated that his move might have been based on knowledge ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of the Bucher - Gracey exchanges.
.. of the Bucher - Gracey exchanges.
#2dayIn1948
For reasons best known to himself, Lt Gen Cariappa was distrustful of the British C-in-C & took an unusual, and fortuitous precaution to ensure success of Operations 'Kipper' & 'Vijay' capture of Kot & recapture of Jhangar respectively.
For reasons best known to himself, Lt Gen Cariappa was distrustful of the British C-in-C & took an unusual, and fortuitous precaution to ensure success of Operations 'Kipper' & 'Vijay' capture of Kot & recapture of Jhangar respectively.
#2dayIn1948
HE CHOSE TO KEEP THE ARMY HQ IN THE DARK ABOUT HIS OPERATIONAL PLANS!
In the words of his biographer, Brig Khanduri, 'Cariappa appeared to be fighting two enemies - Army HQ headed by Roy Bucher & the Pak Army headed by Messervy.'!
Thus, for a large ..
HE CHOSE TO KEEP THE ARMY HQ IN THE DARK ABOUT HIS OPERATIONAL PLANS!
In the words of his biographer, Brig Khanduri, 'Cariappa appeared to be fighting two enemies - Army HQ headed by Roy Bucher & the Pak Army headed by Messervy.'!
Thus, for a large ..
#2dayIn1948
.. part, Bucher & Gracey's 'plans' for a negotiated ceasefire came to a naught, though they would still be able to put a spoke or two, in the overall orchestration of the war.
.. part, Bucher & Gracey's 'plans' for a negotiated ceasefire came to a naught, though they would still be able to put a spoke or two, in the overall orchestration of the war.
#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, back on the battlefield, Maj Gen Kalwant Singh had tasked 19 Brigade for the task of capturing & holding Rajauri. For the task, the Brigade was given Central India Horse less two squadrons, 5 Jat & 2 platoons of 1563 Pioneer Company.
The plan was for the ..
Meanwhile, back on the battlefield, Maj Gen Kalwant Singh had tasked 19 Brigade for the task of capturing & holding Rajauri. For the task, the Brigade was given Central India Horse less two squadrons, 5 Jat & 2 platoons of 1563 Pioneer Company.
The plan was for the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Brigade to capture & hold Rajauri in two stages:
Stage 1. Capture Chingas
Stage 2. Capture Rajauri.
2 RajRif less two companies was to capture Mal Ring Contour..
.. Brigade to capture & hold Rajauri in two stages:
Stage 1. Capture Chingas
Stage 2. Capture Rajauri.
2 RajRif less two companies was to capture Mal Ring Contour..
#2dayIn1948
.. and establish a picquet on the right flank. In the centre, 4 Dogra was to advance from Nadpur South & attack Barwali Ridge, and then advance to Santogala Forest.
On the left flank, 2 Jat was to advance from Tanda area & secure Pt. 3931 & Pt. 4622.
.. and establish a picquet on the right flank. In the centre, 4 Dogra was to advance from Nadpur South & attack Barwali Ridge, and then advance to Santogala Forest.
On the left flank, 2 Jat was to advance from Tanda area & secure Pt. 3931 & Pt. 4622.
#2dayIn1948
1 Kumaon Rifles was then to pass through & attack Chingas.
However, there had lately been considerable enemy activity in Mirpur-Sadabad area, presenting a potential threat to own Southern flank. It was, therefore, necessary to have our defences ..
1 Kumaon Rifles was then to pass through & attack Chingas.
However, there had lately been considerable enemy activity in Mirpur-Sadabad area, presenting a potential threat to own Southern flank. It was, therefore, necessary to have our defences ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in Beri Pattan, Naushera & Jhangar secure to meet this threat.
50 Para Brigade at Jhangar was tasked to demonstrate North towards Kotli & this deception was to be coordinated with the northward drive from Naushera to Rajauri by 19 Brigade.
.. in Beri Pattan, Naushera & Jhangar secure to meet this threat.
50 Para Brigade at Jhangar was tasked to demonstrate North towards Kotli & this deception was to be coordinated with the northward drive from Naushera to Rajauri by 19 Brigade.
#2dayIn1948
80 Brigade was to carry out a diversionary op in area Dharamsal in Beri Pattan sector a day prior. Banamanus (Guerillas) were to operate in area Nali Dabi & Andrut on D-Day to kill enemy escaping to the West.
80 Brigade was to carry out a diversionary op in area Dharamsal in Beri Pattan sector a day prior. Banamanus (Guerillas) were to operate in area Nali Dabi & Andrut on D-Day to kill enemy escaping to the West.
#2dayIn1948
Commander 19 Brigade ordered 4 Dogra to capture Barwali Ridge, held by enemy in strength. Central India Horse was to be in support of the Dogras.
Two Squadrons of Central India Horse were to clear road Naushera - Chingas & occupy Chingas.
Commander 19 Brigade ordered 4 Dogra to capture Barwali Ridge, held by enemy in strength. Central India Horse was to be in support of the Dogras.
Two Squadrons of Central India Horse were to clear road Naushera - Chingas & occupy Chingas.
#2dayIn1948
The attack by 4 Dogra commenced at 1230Hr on 08 Apr, supported by tanks & artillery.
'B' Company advanced from the right and 'D' Company from left.
Enemy offered strong resistance, & used automatics & MMGs. His 3-inch mortars shelled the forming up..
The attack by 4 Dogra commenced at 1230Hr on 08 Apr, supported by tanks & artillery.
'B' Company advanced from the right and 'D' Company from left.
Enemy offered strong resistance, & used automatics & MMGs. His 3-inch mortars shelled the forming up..
#2dayIn1948
.. place and the start line of the Dogras. However, own boys still managed to capture the objective by 1530Hr. Enemy suffered heavy casualties & his counter attack was also repulsed. Indian casualties were 7 killed &20 wounded.
Enemy withdrew to Rani Forest.
.. place and the start line of the Dogras. However, own boys still managed to capture the objective by 1530Hr. Enemy suffered heavy casualties & his counter attack was also repulsed. Indian casualties were 7 killed &20 wounded.
Enemy withdrew to Rani Forest.
