Thread by @Afghan_Policy

UN Report Part III - ISKP in Afghanistan

The report covers recent developments regarding the group and its present status but does not offer a detailed assessment of the group structure, current leadership, support-base and future prospects.

https://twitter.com/Afghan_Policy/status/1268658696050970625

LEADERSHIP WOES:

ISKP sustained heavy defeats for several years & has struggled to expand their presence. Since 2018, it lost ground in Nangarhar which prompted IS-Central to replace Abu Omar Khorasani with Mawlawi Aslam Farooqi.

A previous report highlights that this changed happened during a visit by a delegation of ISIL-Central.

undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/…

The leadership changes spelled an ill-omen for the group.

Soon after that, ISKP was dislodged from Nangarhar. As group collapsed, large numbers either surrendered to Kabul, while Pakistani militants returned to Orakzai and the foreign militants slipped to Kunar province.

Farooqi was captured by ANDSF in Kandahar. The report raises Qs as to his motives for being in Kandahar but doesn't offer any possible reasons. I could not find any public info on exactly where he was captured...

I assume either close to Kandahar city where there are small pockets of local Salafis or close to Pakistan border where he might have old Pakistani connections. The former seems more likely.

Although the report doesn't mention this – shortly after this arrest – Abu Omar Khorasani was also captured inside Kabul. What he was doing in Kabul and what it reveals about ISKP's urban connections is something not yet explored.

abc.net.au/news/2020-05-1…

Despite the loss of Nangarhar, the group retains a significant presence in Kunar where it can regroup and reorganize in areas relatively safe from aerial bombardments and ground offenses by ANDSF or the Taliban.

While the report doesn't identify who might succeed Farooqi as the head of ISKP, it offers three possible contenders.

Despite the loss of physical territory ISKP has significant support cells in Nangarhar and Kabul cities.

These clandestine cells continue to target soft targets, especially minority groups such as Hazaras or Sikhs. Although Hazara are ISKP's favored target, no particular group or individual is safe as the recent death of Dr Niazi shows.

HAQQANI NETWORK – ISKP NEXUS

The report cautiously endorses the claims by some 'Member-States' that ISKP lacked the ability to carry such attacks in Kabul by itself and the fact they did, demonstrated that they received support from the Haqqani Network.

The Report cites below evidence to support such a claim. I argue that such 'intercepts' are of significant value but need to be incorporated within overall picture.

For example, I have seen 'intercepts' published on social media where the Taliban members discuss...

...the death of their leaders (such as the death of Mullah Zakir in a bomb blast last year or the death of Maulawi Yaqoub in Peshawar). Most of these events later turn out to be untrue. Therefore such evidence needs to be weighed against mitigating factors before being endorsed.

This paragraphs seems full of paradoxes. Y would TB help defeat ISKP to show US it can be a reliable CT partner and get the US-TB agreement signed to then help ISKP launch attacks that undermine the same agreement? Y HQ sent top commanders to fight ISKP while accommodating them?

This is an even stranger claim with report linking HQ Network to several attacks in Pakistan including the Peshawar school attack!

It runs counter to the narration of Pakistan's role in supporting this group.

Seems like report just throws together disparate claims provided by diverse sources.

Or that HQ Network has become a red herring for all sophisticated attacks in the region.

ISKP SUPPORTBASE:

The report completely ignored the support base that ISKP has in the country and why it enables it to carry out such attacks.

It does however acknowledge that ISKP continues to enjoy a robust 'online' support across the country.

Looking at the history of ISKP's rise in AFG, it is clear that the group enjoyed widespread support amongst young urban militants. The reason for this was two-fold:

1) the group's Salafist credentials and the concentration of Salafism or quasi-Salafism (i.e. Ikhwanism) in the urban centres of AFG;

2) an alternative option for many frustrated urban militants who militated against TB due to the latters' rural and traditionalist ideology.

@Borhan covers some of this very well in his latest report.

Here are some extracts regarding the urban support base of ISKP in Kabul.

The groups urban support base, particularly in Kabul, enables it to occupy 'online space' & gives it a very potent ability to target soft targets in urban centres including Kabul. In many ways, it is far better placed than HQ Network to launch such attacks.

FINAL THOUGHTS ON REPORT:

Overall it is a very good report that draws an accurate picture of militant landscape of AFG.

However, the report's desire to incorporate every single piece of evidence without reconciling first vitiates against the overall credibility of the report.