Thread by @marydudziak

1/ Very early in the morning of 6/25/50 near the 38th parallel in Korea, at about 10 pm 6/24 in the US, 14-year-old Kim Yeh Soon heard shelling. She thought it was training. Then she saw tanks and thought "the earth was going to fall apart." A thread.
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2/ The Korean War began 70 years ago tonight. This thread will last its first few days, as civilians fled, soldiers advanced, and Harry Truman took the US to war without thinking seriously about whether a war declaration was required.

3/ Tweets will appear over time. I will not answer replies to protect the thread. Please start a separate thread to discuss. This is from a chapter of my book-in-progress.

4/ Conflict at the 38th parallel was not new, but for Kim Yeh Soon & other civilians, it was shocking & terrifying. An endless line of soldiers and military equipment passed through her village. "They came like a swarm of bees."

5/ Reporter Jack James sent the first news to the US at 9:50 am Korea time. N Korea had attacked along the entire border, tanks crossed, 20 small boats landed on SK east coast. News was preliminary, fragmentary.

6/ US Ambassador to Republic of Korea John Muccio cabled the State Dept soon after. Border towns had fallen, conditions were bleak. It was an "all out attack."

7/ 13-year-old Park Doosung was cooking when NK soldiers flooded her village, urging them to evacuate b/c war was coming. Planes dropped fire from the sky & her house of straw began to burn. They fled to a small cave in the mountains.

8/ Upon hearing initial news, Sec of State Dean Acheson phoned President Truman, who was at his Missouri home. He recommended a UN Security Council meeting. HST agreed, if Acheson thought it was warranted.

9/ Meanwhile US officials gathered at the State Dept. working through the night. By midnight they began drafting a UNSC resolution. The decision to do this "was just automatic" & not debated, the Asst Sec for UN Affairs later recalled.

10/ There was a woman in the room. One of the two drafters was Ruth Bacon, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. She played a key role through this period, but is hard to find in the archives.

11/ At the border, SK soldiers did not have combat aircraft or antitank weapons. They threw bombs out windows of trainer planes, and strapped bombs to selves in suicide attacks on NK heavy weapons. These efforts could not stop the advance.

12/ To be picked up again on the morning of June 25 in the US.

13/ In the meantime, here's my take on the legacy of the war. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/0…

14/ June 25, 1950: The morning looked very different in DC and Independence, MO. At 6:46 am Washington time, news rec’d that the N Koreans were attacking by air, strafing Kimpo and Seoul airports, & later that 3000 NK troops landed on the east coast of SK. #KoreanWar

15/ Pres. Truman attended to his farm, visited w/ his brother, and checked out the milking machines. By mid-day DC time, Pres. Rhee abandoned Seoul. Civilian refugees flooded south. myrecordjournal.com/getattachment/…

Korea was headline news in US newspapers.
#KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years
trbimg.com/img-5b2a93e4/t…

17/ At noon 6/26, Sec State Acheson arrived in DC, met w/ State & Defense officials. At 2:45 pm, the U.N. Security Council convened. Then Acheson phoned Truman & they agreed he should return to DC. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

18/ On the turn to the UNSC, Glenn Paige wrote: “there is no evidence that they considered any other alternative…including that of doing nothing.” The meeting was not a walk in the park for the US, but a resolution was passed. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

19/ It called upon U.N. member states “to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years dag.un.org/handle/11176/8…

20/ UNSC members rejected US effort to label NK action “an act of aggression” constituting “breach of the peace.” Some thought it was a fight between Koreans and “in the nature of a civil war.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

21/ While the UNSC was meeting, Senators Elbert D. Thomas (D) & H. Alexander Smith (R) met w/ the Dep Assist Sec for the Far East. They wanted to see the UNSC draft, but it wasn’t available. It appears that no Members of Congress could review it until after it passed. #KoreanWar

22/ Thomas thought the conflict was a civil war, not an act of aggression & that the Sen Foreign Relations Comm should have been consulted. Both senators said, in effect: “Of course you are not thinking of putting U.S. troops in Korea.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

23/ Let me reemphasize this point.

“Of course you are not thinking of putting U.S. troops in Korea.”

It was less than 24 hrs after the war began. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

24/ Thread will continue later…
My emphasis: how/why did Truman choose to bypass Congress & what were the consequences.
There are many other crucial #KoreanWar issues, esp impacts on civilians. @sandrahpark has a great thread:

https://twitter.com/sandrahpark/status/1275921797012238339

#KoreanWar70Years

25/ The evening of June 25, Truman met with key advisors for a solemn dinner & meeting. They assumed Stalin was behind the NK offensive & agreed on the need to “draw the line somewhere.” Archival sources would later show NK initiative & Soviet & Chinese initial reluctance.

26/ Truman’s advisors favored reliance on air and naval power, and some opposed using ground troops. Possible use of atomic bombs was discussed to knock out Soviet Far East bases. Some urged both the need for speed & desire not to go beyond essential decisions. #KoreanWar

27/ Pres Truman approved sending arms, equipment & a survey group to Korea & a fleet to Japan & directed Air Force to develop plans to eliminate Soviet Far East air bases. “We are working entirely for the United Nations,” he emphasized, even though UNSC had not authorized force.

28/ In Korea, it was not long before DPRK tanks and fighter planes overwhelmed underequipped ROK troops south of the 38th Parallel. South Koreans had no effective antitank weapons & tanks rolled through their defense. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

29/ Gen Douglas MacArthur thought South Korean “casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight.” Even though their weapons could not stop heavy tanks, he thought more should have died to demonstrate they were trying.

30/ In case you can't tell, that quote made me mad.
Thread will continue later. Keep a eye on the relationship between Truman's actions and the authority he had at the time issued orders.

31/ Monday, June 26, 1950: in U.S. morning papers, the news was not yet alarming. NYT headline: “U.N. Calls for Cease Fire in Korea,” validating Dean Rusk’s idea that early Security Council action could aid the way Korea news was reported. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

32/ In contrast at State Dept the picture was grim: 9:31 a.m. telegram from Amb to SK Muccio reporting “rapid deterioration and disintegration.” He was “immediately starting evacuation of all females toward south.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

33/ Sec State Acheson reached out to key members of Congress whose support would be helpful. In spite of troubling news, he told them that the situation in Korea was under control. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

34/ Sen. Wiley asked whether U.S. policy remained sending aid only, and no U.S. forces. This matter was before the President, Acheson told him & no American troops had yet been committed. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

35/ President Truman explained the crisis to the American people in a public statement late that morning. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years trumanlibrary.gov/library/public…

66/ The U.N. Security Council had acted speedily to order North Korea to withdraw, Truman explained & he had consulted with the Secs of State & Defense & Joint Chiefs of Staff. #KoreanWar70Years #KoreanWar

37/ Truman emphasized: “Those responsible for this act of aggression must realize how seriously the Govt of the US views such threats to the peace of the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that support the UN Charter.”

38/ “In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the US will vigorously support the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

39/ Note: UNSC Res 82 did not call for use of force, but for cessation of hostilities & NK withdrawal. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years
unscr.com/en/resolutions…

40/ Truman reminded me of Woodrow Wilson in early 1917 when faced w/ German sub warfare. WW sought to assure the world of American resolve, while maintaining complete ambiguity about what concrete actions he had in mind. #KoreanWar #WWI

41/ Crucial difference: Wilson’s ambiguity reflected his own uncertainty. Upon its resolution, he asked Congress to declare war on Germany. Truman, in contrast, was obfuscatory & failed to see Congress as an essential constitutional partner. #KoreanWar #WWI

42/ Congress debated the crisis on 6/26. Sen William F. Knowland (R/CA) emphasized urgency: Seoul could fall even as they debated & UNSC action was only the beginning. If SK lost”there is little chance of stopping communism anywhere on the continent of Asia.” #KoreanWar

43/ Sen TomConnally, Chair For Rel Comm: “Some Senators speak as if they wanted to declare war tomorrow.” Members of Congress “want to know what’s in the wind before we go popping off.” Senate should wait till facts were in. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

44/ Tweeps: my chapter draft has lots of links to sources, but discovered today some links are broken.😥Presidential remarks & UN docs easy to find online. Congressional debates in full in Congressional Record. congress.gov/congressional-… (haven't used this online version)

45/ Evening of 6/26/50: As conditions in Korea worsened, Truman again met with key advisors. An urgent focus: need to protect Americans evacuating from Seoul. The meeting quickly went beyond these defensive measures, however. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

46/ Acheson: it was time for Navy & Air Force to have an “all-out order” that would “waive restrictions on their operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces.” This help the South Koreans, pummeled by tanks and columns of DPRK soldiers.

47/ Truman agreed to this broadening of the use military force.
Reminder: keep an eye on the relationship between HST's decisions, and the authority he had at the time.
#KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

48/ Truman also approved Acheson’s recommendations to send the Seventh Fleet to Formosa (now Taiwan), increase American troops in the Philippines, and send a military mission to Indochina to prop up the French colonial regime. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years #ColdWar

49/ Only after Truman agreed to military action did Acheson mention basing it on the UNSC resolution “if it was considered useful.” But the UNSC had not authorized the use of force & members had pressed the importance of not acting beyond the preliminary evidence. #KoreanWar

50/ What about Congress???
Acheson proposed that Truman might want to talk to members of the House & Senate to “tell them what had been decided.” But the decision to go to war required more than consultation. It required an affirmative vote in both houses of Congress. #KoreanWar

51/ Truman raised the question of whether the National Guard should be mobilized, which would require asking Congress for funding.
“I don’t want to go to war,” he said, even as his actions set war in motion. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

52/ After the meeting, Truman gave General MacArthur the go ahead to use the Navy & Air Force to “offer fullest possible support to South Korean Forces.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

“All restrictions which have previously prevented the full utilization of the U.S. Far East Air Forces to support and assist the defense of the South Korean territory are lifted for operations below the 38th Parallel.” Military targets were “cleared for attack.” #KoreanWar

54/ The stated purpose was to support ROK forces in keeping with the UNSC Resolution, even though the Security Council would not authorize the use of armed force until it passed a second resolution the next day. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

55/Truman’s decision to use force was thought at the time to be momentous. Though he'd decided to drop 2 atomic bombs in WWII, he thought Korea was the “toughest decision” of his presidency. Yet he went forward without deep consultation with Congress or even his full Cabinet.

56/ A record of this consequential meeting is here: history.state.gov/historicaldocu…
@TrumanLibrary has an excellent online collection via: trumanlibrary.gov/library/online…
but the precise link is dead.😥#KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

57/ The story is not yet over... It's only late in the evening at the end of the second full day.
But no worries -- this thread will come to an end in a day or two.

58/ On 6/27/50, Truman informed Congress of the decision to use military force in Korea by meeting w/ a small group of leaders. What he did not do: address Congress as a whole to convince them of the mission's importance, or to ask for a supporting vote. #KoreanWar

59/ Truman said he based his action on the UNSC Resolution. A Senator questioned whether is was actually “in support” of it, since the 6/25 resolution was limited.
(Reader: this might seem down in the weeds, but it's important!) #KoreanWar

60/ Sec State Acheson explained that if a 2nd UNSC resolution that authorized force was not passed that day “we would go right ahead – without interruption – and supply assistance to Korea under the terms of the Security Council resolution of Sunday.” #KoreanWar

61/ In fact, the military order had already been issued. With UNSC members cautious on 6/25 about not going beyond the evidence, I think it's fair to say that Truman went beyond their intent & was generally cavalier w/ both Congress & the UNSC. #KoreanWar

62/ The House of Representatives cheered Truman's actions, but Senators questioned it. Had the president “arrogated to himself the authority of declaring war?” asked Sen James P. Dem (R) Missouri. #KoreanWar

63/ The UN Security Council met the afternoon of 6/27/50. The historic nature of them meeting was clear, as 1200 observers packed into the assembly room & another 5000 were turned away. #KoreanWar #UNSC

64/ Warren Austin, U.S. Amb to the UN, proposed a resolution that U.N. members “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security.” #KoreanWar

65/ As happened on 6/25, there was push back to the US position. Some delegates were surprised that the US wanted to “proceed with a resolution of such vigor” esp since the voting was rushed. Some had only just received the draft, incl the UNSC President. #KoreaWar

66/ The meeting was suspended for 5 hours as the Indian & Egyptian members tried to reach their country's leaders to consult. India had supported the first resolution, but thought the issues before the Council that evening were “more momentous.” #KoreanWar

67/ Why do these details matter? The Truman Admin in essence treated the 2nd Res as superfluous & used force based on the 1st one. UNSC members however thought the force resolution was broader & "momentous" & the entire meeting atmosphere illustrates this. #KoreanWar

68/ Very late that evening, Austin pressed for a vote, not waiting for India & Egypt. The American draft resolution passed 8-1, India & Egypt not voting & USSR absent. #KoreanWar

69/ And so, about 24 hrs after President Truman ordered military force in Korea, the U.N. Security Council authorized it. This timing is glossed over in many histories & obscured in the official State Dept memorandum on the legal basis for Truman's actions. #KoreanWar

70/ (An aside: this summer I'm expanding on this issue in a draft law review article on Korean War as war powers precedent. There is much more to say...)

71/ In the meantime US planes were already bombing & strafing targets in Korea. MacArthur established a “small advanced echelon” in the country. No American casualties had yet been reported. Seoul was quiet, as the city emptied. #KoreanWar

72/ To be continued 6/28.
Reminder: I am not responding to comments so as not to break the thread. Ok to tag me in a separate tweet to discuss. This is from a draft book chapter.

73/ In the first weeks of the #KoreanWar life was precarious for civilians. Bridges across the Han River were the escape route as Seoul fell just days after the invasion began. #KoreanWar70Years

On June 28, 1950, with the North Koreans advancing, ROK soldiers blew up the crowded bridges to block the DPRK from crossing the river. About a thousand civilians and soldiers were killed, and countless others were trapped. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

75/ In the U.S., Sen. Robert Taft turned up the political heat. Truman had “no legal authority for what he has done,” he argued in the Senate. “His action unquestionably has brought about a de facto war with the Government of northern Korea." #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

76/ Taft:“If the incident is permitted to go by without protest, at least from this body, we would have finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to declare war, which is granted to Congress alone by the Constitution of the United States.” #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

77/ Unfortunately, Taft was prescient. Congress never again passed a formal war declaration, and the Korea precedent has been relied on ever since to justify unilateral presidential decisions to use force. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

78/ The next day, 6/29/50, a reporter asked Truman: “everybody is asking in this country, are we or are we not at war?” Truman: “We are not at war.” It was a U.N. response to a “bandit raid.” Q: “Would it be correct…to call this a police action?” Truman agreed. #KoreanWar

79/ How did the president decide to bypass Congress? During the crucial week of 6/25-30/50, there was no serious discussion about the need for a Congressional authorization, according to Truman aide George Elsey, who closely recorded the events. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

80/ Elsey: “The real time for a resolution would have been on June 27, but apparently nobody thought of it at that time.”
Rpt: NOBODY THOUGHT OF IT AT THE TIME.
#KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

81/ Elsey: “The President & his staff, & his other advisers, were too busy thinking of military action & UN action to try to cover up their tracks with Congressional resolutions.”
...They were too busy to think about whether Congress should declare war.🤦‍♀️#KoreanWar

82/ Congress, the president’s constitutional partner charged with authority to declare war, was reduced to an adversary. The reason for Cong action was to “cover up their tracks” – to legitimate a course of action – not to debate and decide whether to commit U.S. forces to war.

83/ They began discussing whether to involve Congress in early July, but then a reason to avoid a vote was that “it was undoubtedly too late to get a resolution through by anything like a unanimous vote.” But many opposed the WWI declaration & even WWII had a no vote. #KoreanWar

84/ Truman treated a Congressional vote as a means of affirmation, not for the purpose of granting of constitutional power. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

85/ On 6/30/50, 34-year-old infantry officer Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith was asleep in his quarters in Japan when he was awakened by a phone call. “The lid has blown off -- get, on your clothes and report to the CP,” he commanding officer ordered. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

86/ Smith would soon be on the way to Korea w/ his battalion, the 1st US ground troops deployed in the #KoreanWar. 1 in 6 of his 406 men had combat experience. Most were 20 or younger. Their orders: stop the North Koreans as far North of Pusan, SK as possible.

87/ “All we need is some men up there who won’t run when they see tanks,” explained Gen. Church. But Smith’s troops were ordered into service w/o antitank mines, the most effective weapon at the time for stopping a tank. The US military had none in Korea at the time. #KoreanWar

88/ 540 Americans were in position at Osan early 7/5 when a NK tank column approached in the distance. At 8:16 am US artillery began firing, but the tanks continued to advance. @ 700 yds the infantry opened fire, but direct machine gun hits did not damage them. #KoreanWar

89/ A total of 33 tanks passed through, killing or wounding about 20 Americans, the 1st casualties of the #KoreanWar. This turn of events defied expectations. “Everyone thought the enemy would turn around and go back when they found out who was fighting,” an artilleryman said.

90/ Col. Smith & his troops dug in deeper in steady rain as they waited, expecting ground troops to follow the tanks. An hour later a column of trucks & foot soldiers 6 miles long, led by three tanks, approached in the distance. #KoreanWar

91/ Poor weather ruled out air support & it was only a matter of time before the battered American troops would need to withdraw. They had to leave behind their dead & seriously wounded. From Smith’s battalion, 150 were killed, wounded, or missing. #KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

92/ Gen. MacArthur later called these U.S. forces an “arrogant display of strength.”

A father wrote to Sen Taft: “Do you have a son in Korea, outnumbered 10 to 1?”

The Korean "police action" was underway.
#KoreanWar #KoreanWar70Years

And this wraps up my tweetstorm about the beginning of the #KoreanWar and how Truman decided to go to war w/o Congress.
He didn't actually decide. He didn't think about it at the time.
Most important were impacts were on civilians, which I'll take for the 70th anniv of #NoGunRi