A few thoughts on the extent to which the EU does, or does not have a strategy when it comes to (i) #Brexit; and (ii) its long term relationship with the UK.
I have previously argued that the #EU appeared to be determined to treat the phase-two negotiations as though #Brexit were simply a matter of trade, rather than what it actually represents, namely the most extraordinary geopolitical curveball thrown in the west in a generation.
However, this depiction of the #EU’s approach isn’t quite fair. The EU is treating phase-two, both as a matter of trade, but also as a threat to it’s own short, medium & long-term interests.
The #EU has clearly articulated its objective for the phase-two negotiations. It wants as close a relationship as possible with the UK, whilst defending its strategic interests.
What is apparent from the way the #EU has negotiated is that defending its strategic interests is its primary goal, and having a close relationship with the UK is secondary to that. And the strategic interest the EU is defending is the integrity of the single market.
Why does this matter so much? Simply put, it’s because the single market is the only thing that gives the #EU a seat at the global table.
The single market is the largest market in the world, & through it the #EU can exercise global influence & play the role of regulatory super-power. Indeed, this is the only measure by which the EU could be consider a super-power.
So the single market is the #EU’s greatest asset, & the single market being undermined by #Brexit its greatest fear.
This explains the #EU approach to the negotiations, where it is resisting, tooth and nail, anything that smacks of cherry picking (i.e. getting the benefits without the obligations).
More than anything, the #EU wants to make sure that #Brexit doesn't result in a back door being left opened to the single market.
If that back door can be closed with the UK still in the house (complying with single market rules, part of #EU commercial policy), that would suit the EU just fine. But that simply isn’t an option with this government. So…
…the #EU is left having to defend its strategic interests by pushing the UK away. It always understood that this was likely. This is why it only ever spoke of securing as close a relationship “as possible”.
So when we get to the end of phase two, no matter whether or not we get a deal, the #EU will have delivered its primary objective - maintaining the integrity of the single market, & in doing so, the integrity of the EU itself, as well as its global influence – because...
...it has stuck firm to a strategy of resisting any attempt by the UK to leave a back door open to the single market.
However, in solving this immediate problem, (i.e. the threat #Brexit poses to the #EU’s greatest asset), another one is created, namely a distant, & potentially toxic relationship between the EU and the UK.
I don’t blame the #EU for us ending up here. Faced with a govt. whose primary objective is to create as distant a relationship as possible, there is little the EU could have done differently. However, this is where strategic thinking in the EU now falls short.
Knowing as we do, that the UK/#EU future relationship will be distant, competitive, frosty at best, & toxic at worse, there appears to be very little thought being given in the EU as to how to handle this (nor is any thought being given to this in the UK either).
Add to the mix that the UK looks set to start breaking apart, & that if/when it does, parts of today’s UK will want to become part of tomorrow’s #EU, it is clear that the UK’s problems will continue to be the EU’s problems.
All indications point towards the UK being a volatile, proud, prickly, well armed & seriously problematic neighbour for the #EU. It already has one of these to the east, & having another to the west is not going to make life any easier.
Yet, surprisingly little thought seems to be being given to how to handle this. It is here, that the #EU needs to apply its strategic thinking.
Following some interesting exchanges, here’s a few late night thoughts on the extent to which the EU does, or does not have a strategy when it comes to (i) Brexit; and (ii) its long term relationship with the UK.
I have previously argued that the EU appeared to be determined to treat the phase-two negotiations as though Brexit were simply a matter of trade, rather than what it actually represents, namely the most extraordinary geopolitical curveball thrown in the west in a generation.
However, this depiction of the EU’s approach isn’t quite fair. The EU is treating phase-two, both as a matter of trade, but also as a threat to it’s own short, medium & long-term interests.
Stuck in a queue at the border? Take a quick break at the #Brexit drive-thru.
What can I get you?
Brexit
Okay. And how would you like that?
Hard
Can you be a bit more precise?
Certainly. I want complete regulatory autonomy, no EU laws anywhere in this most united of United Kingdoms, and the same Brexit for all four nations. Got it?
Sure. Anything else?
Well, I’m told I shouldn’t threaten peace and security. Best add a side order of “respecting the Good Friday Agreement”.
The #InternalMarketBill is a legal, political and geopolitical wrecking ball, that is crashing through the devolution settlement with one swing, the rule of law with another, & the UK’s international reputation as the pendulum takes it through for a final pass.
The main purpose of the Bill is to ensure barriers to trade do not emerge within the UK after it has left the single market and customs union. This is the right thing to do.
I recall Spanish colleagues telling me that the overarching framework of EU law was critical in making Spain’s internal market function properly and the UK is no different. So there is work to be done.
One could stay up all night reading the Withdrawal Agreement and still find no reference to a free trade agreement or UK sovereignty, but why quibble over small details hey?
I'll tell you where references to a Free Trade Agreement and UK sovereignty can be found though, the Political Declaration, but that's not legally binding though, is it?
Still, it just isn't cricket not to grant what is in the Political Declaration though. Legally binding or not, the EU agreed to it and it should abide by it, right?
Excellent thread from @pmdfoster. We’re definitely heading for a constitutional crisis. For me the roots don’t lie in #Brexit, but this is brutally exposing just how badly the devolution settlement has been managed politically and administratively.
At the heart of the tension between govt. & the devolved admins is a failure by Westminster & Whitehall to recognize that devolution doesn’t just mean giving power to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, it also means sharing power in London.
I suspect Labour didn’t think twice about this in ’98, believing that they wld be in power in London, Edinburgh and Cardiff (if not Belfast) for yrs to come. Managing the devolution settlement was to them an internal party issue.
Some thoughts on #Brexit & an extension to the transition period.
(Note - This is not an argument against extending, I think an extension is essential, but an explanation as to why I think as an extension does not, at least today, look likely. Tomorrow is another day)
There is a growing belief that an extension to the #Brexit transition is almost inevitable. I wld like to believe that that is the case, but think we are still a long way from an extension being requested, let alone agreed.
Some note that within govt. (& #EU), #Covid19 response trumps everything, with personnel being moved and all other priority work paused. Yes, civil servants in UK are being repurposed to work on #Covid19, but not those negotiating with the #EU.