Thread by @PerBylund

Much of the so-called theoretical advances in the social sciences appear to be limited to inventions of pithy terms for old (reinvented) ideas. Ignorance of the history of ideas drives this. I do not doubt many of these scholars believe they have discovered something new. In some

sense they have, because they are unaware of their ignorance that others have expressed similar, sometimes even the same, ideas before them. For example, Stinchcombe (1965) is credited with the "liability of newness" idea, which is very similar to Schumpeter's ([1911] 1934)

discussion (pp. 86-87) on people's "resistance" to the new and, thus, the necessity that the entrepreneur takes on a leadership role. The issue here is not the claim of novelty, but that scholars should in fact be knowledgeable about the history of the field and its theoretical

development. In other lines of business one might claim ignorance as a defense, but a scholar cannot. This is especially the case if the ideas one introduces as novel were expressed by highly influential, if not well-known, thinkers. But it is no excuse even if the ideas were

expressed by a marginalized or never influential predecessor--it is only understandable that one might have missed presumed minor contributions. Much worse, however, is those who outright copy others and slap on new labels or invent a pithy, more modern terminology to sell the

ideas. A scholar gives credit where credit is due, and so recognizes those previous thinkers to the degree they deserve. Rediscovery of forgotten contributions is still a contribution, and scholars should be inspired by previous contributions. But pretending one has come up with

something new when this claim of novelty is actually untrue, is decidedly unscholarly. Some would argue that this is the case with Keynes's adoption and reformulation of Malthus's long debunked view of the primacy of demand (rather than supply) in the economy. As @StevenKates has

uncovered, Keynes developed core ideas in the General Theory (1936) upon reading the correspondence between friends and great economists Malthus and Ricardo. One can discuss whether Keynes properly cited the source. My point here is not to make accusations, but to indicate that

the history of thought is full of examples of scholars knowingly stealing the ideas of others and pretending they are newly developed. Such dishonesty appears to be rather common in scholarly journals lately. I've come across a number of examples, including by well regarded

scholars, where ideas were obviously, not probably, taken from older literature without proper recognition but, instead, presented as though they were new. In scholarship, this is nothing short of fraud--it is plagiarism. But the universal ignorance of the history of thought that

burdens modern scholarship, this is unlikely to be recognized. Instead, it is a shortcut to scholarly fame. These old ideas are often well thought out, if not ingenious, the result of decades of thought. This is why they were deemed fit to be published in expensive books: for the

future to see, learn from, and enjoy. They were not published to be forgotten and then lifted by someone who wants to make themselves known to their peers or increase their chances for salary increase. There are of course other, better, and more important arguments for being

knowledgeable about the history of ideas than the problem of scholarly dishonesty and unethical behavior. Knowledge of historical debates that shaped the field facilitates progress in the present because it helps us avoid reinventing good ideas that were already developed, but

perhaps unfairly forgotten or dismissed. Old ideas are stepping stones to better understanding of the world around us. The decline of economics is an obvious example of the value of knowing one's past. It is about time scholarly training again included reading the classics.