Thread by @Mr0rangetracker

So, who joined #IS but has been ordered to keep it quite (by al-Qurashî's audio)? The keeping it quite part IMO rules out groups with a monopoly on jihâdist violence in their area. #IS has never been shy to announce such acquisitions even when this meant international scrunity. /

Cases in point would be its provinces in Libya and the Phillipines whose territorial control was crushed by bombings of international coalitions. I don't think that this approach has changed when looking at Mozambique right now. 2/

The #ISCA province is very much on the offensive and has been noted as a security risk by international actors. The military intervention of a strong local or global force is only a question of time. 3/

Strangely, local governments and area studies experts tend to deny the subordination of previously independent groups under #IS, e.g. claiming that #ISEA is actually 'Abû Sayyâf', #ISCA is the #ADF in DRC while being Ahl al-Sunnah in Mozambique. 4/

Nothing easier for those provinces than to use a local moniker to keep their pledge to #IS secret. But they don't. Their attacks are claimed on official #IS media, often including visual proof and there is abundant audio-visual material of fighters claiming #IS membership. 5/

Conquering areas, ruling them by their interpretation of Islamic law and fighting Muslims they excommunicated or non-Muslims under "a clear banner" - the #IS banner - is part and parcel of #IS ideology. 6/

All of that IMO rules out that a group without jihâdist rivals (read #AQ alligned) in their area pledged to #IS. There are only two places left, that would fit such a description anyway. 7/

https://twitter.com/Mr0rangetracker/status/1193134794433089536

There is precedent though, for jihâdist groups keeping their pledge to #IS secret while being in an area with other jihâdist actors, sometimes even in coalitions with them. Cases in point would be JMWA in Aleppo, Liwâ` Dâwûd in Idlib (both Syria) and the MSSM in Derna/Libya. 8/

A possibility would be #AQ defectors in Mâlî or Somalia who are dealing with strong #AQ affiliates and are meant to stay low until an opportunity (fight or flight) arises. The same holds true for Afghânistân and Yemen where #IS lost to local Islamist actors. 9/

When speaking about independent active jihâdist groups joining #IS there is only Syria to look at. There are clandestine groups in Idlib, likely former members of the pro-#AQ group Hurrâs ad-Dîn and the "third-way" party Tahrîr al-Shâm of Abû Muhammad al-Jawlânî. 10/

Two groups, Katâ´ib Khattâb and Ansâr Abî Bakr, have in recent months published claims of their attacks on Turkish and Russian forces under the protection of Tahrîr al-Shâm. I have previously said that

https://twitter.com/Mr0rangetracker/status/1291153715735465992

11/

As at least a part of the radical jihâdist current in Idlib has come out with an excommunication of al-Jawlânî and #HTS using basically the same arguments as #IS, these guys are my prime candidate for the secret pledge. (see @ajaltamimi aymennjawad.org/24655/the-apos…) 12/

A final conceivable acquisition would be (parts of) a previously non-violent or apolitical violent religious group (read vigilantism or communal violence) like the Tawhîd Jamâ'ah splinter that carried out the 2019 Easter bombings in Sri Lanka. 13/

Such a group would be rather small and wait for a fight or flight moment as well, fight likely being a terrorist attack instead of an insurgency. I suppose a year from now at the latest we will know who recently pledged to #IS. 14/14

Add.: Give me the edit button already! Scrutiny it is in the first tweet.