Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #IS

Most recents (24)

#Britain: Ahmiri Azizi, 24, an asylum seeker from Iran living in Sheffield, a supporter of #IS, has been charged with seven counts of sharing terrorist material from June-November 2021, inc. one after the Liverpool women's hospital attack in Nov. 2021. examinerlive.co.uk/news/uk-world-…
A co-defendant alongside Azizi is Mohammed Hussini, also an #IS supporter, who has also been charged with four counts of disseminating terrorist material on Telegram between August and November 2021.
Interestingly, "Azizi's defence is that his phone was hacked by or on behalf of the Iranian government. John Jones QC, defending, said that Azizi supports Kurdistan becoming an independent nation and was an opponent to Iran and IS."
Read 4 tweets
1) This beautiful drawing of Salih Nasir Naso, a twelve-year-old #Yazidi boy murdered by #Turkey in #Sinjar on Wednesday, was done by @HishamHaji2:
2) The girl in the drawing is Salih’s sister, seen in a video captured moments after the bombings, screaming for help on the street, and saying "my brother is in there." At the end of the video she walks past a business named after Nadia Murad.
3) The U.S. is comfortable with Turkey murdering Yazidi children in the name of its “security.” Turkish bombings of Shingal are now in their sixth year. If the U.S. had a problem with it, it would have taken action by now.
Read 31 tweets
(This is normal when compelling the production of documents from entities that are not named parties in a lawsuit.)
ACLU's behavior is irrelevant

If you don't see "ACLU" as a named defendant in the case caption – in the lawsuit Johnny Depp filed, whose defendants he chose – then they're entitled by law to their discovery expenses
Nah. These sorts of amounts are normal in civil litigation, and I suspect all the moreso for a New York-based third party
Read 52 tweets
1. #IS deployed 342 attacks globally during Ramadan, 219 of them since 17 April as part of its global revenge campaign.

This is ten attacks more than it reported during Ramadan last year.

Here’s what that surge looks like when charted out.
2. Most attacks (by far) were reported from #Iraq, followed by #Nigeria, #Syria and #Afghanistan.

These four states accounted for three quarters of all #IS’s attacks in Ramadan.
3. Besides the sole attack reported from #Uzbekistan at the beginning of the month, no major new fronts were opened anywhere outside of #Nigeria.
Read 8 tweets
1. Here’s a new update on #IS’s global Ramadan campaign.

In the last week, #IS has deployed more attacks than at any other point since last Ramadan.
2. Since 17 April, #IS has carried out some 132 attacks as part of this campaign.

That's nearly three times more ops per day than usual.
3. #IS’s attacks have been spread far and wide, but with four clear front-runners: #Iraq, #Nigeria, #Syria, and #Afghanistan.

#Iraq: 43
#Nigeria: 34
#Syria: 19
#Afghanistan: 13
#Niger: 5
#DRC: 4
#Egypt: 5
#Somalia: 4
#Pakistan: 2
#India: 1
#Libya: 1
#Uzbekistan: 1
Read 8 tweets
Thread 🧵

1/

#IS spokesman Abu Omar congratulates IS fighters and all Muslims on the arrival of the month of Ramadan.

He announces the start of a new ghazwa (incursion/invasion).

He pays tribute to the late leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi and the former spokesman Abu Hamza.
2/

Sends greetings and thanks to IS fighters from all areas of activity and for swearing in new leader Abu Hassan al-Hashimi and invites them to new operations.

Praises and highlights in particular the operations of IS fighters in West #Africa.
3/

Very interesting mention in greeting all #IS supporters and activists and to the media, apps and social networks.
Read 9 tweets
Russland begeht Kriegsverbrechen, seine Soldat:innen töten Zivilisten, zerstören Städte. Und Kämpfer von #Asow verteidigen die Ukraine, z.B. in #Mariupol. Das #AsowRegiment zu verharmlosen, ist jedoch gefährlich.

Nicht nur für den Westen - vor allem für die Ukraine.
Thread 1/5 Image
Das ist Mykola Krawtschenko*, "Hauptideologe der Asowschen Bewegung“. Er war Nationalist, Rassist, Antidemokrat, antiwestlich eingestellt und gegen die EU. Sein Ziel war die „Großukraine“. In den kommenden 10 Jahren sollen ukrainische Nationalisten den Staat "beherrschen". 2/5 Image
2021 sagte er, wenn #Asow "die Schlüsselinstrumente des Staates in der Hand" hält, soll das "allgemeine Wahlrecht" für Jede:n abgeschafft werden. Er verabscheute #Selenskyj: "Wenn Clowns Präsidenten werden, wird es schwierig, über elitäre Themen in der Politik zu sprechen." 3/5 ImageImage
Read 7 tweets
1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
2. It was very defensive in tone.

Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.

Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.
Read 7 tweets
1. Earlier this month, we reported that #IS comms activity had fallen off a cliff in recent weeks.

In the last few days, the reason for that has become clear: its media team was putting everything into prepping for a global campaign drumming up support for the new caliph.
2. The campaign started on 10 March, when #IS published a statement from new spox Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir declaring that Qurashi had died and been replaced by Qurashi 2.0.

This came after a week-on-week drop in comms that left #IS supporter activities at a historic low.
3. It wasn’t enough to just publish a statement. #IS needed to show that its new leader was credible.

Accordingly, in the days that followed, it published hundreds of photographs showing fighters from West Africa to Southeast Asia pledging allegiance to the new caliph.
Read 7 tweets
Short Thread 🧵

1/ According to pro-#AQ channels, the new leader of the #IslamicState is Professor Zaid, also known as “Haji Zaid” (See photo).
His name is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaida'i.

#IS

@ColinPClarke @ToreRHamming @NihadJariri @hxhassan @colebunzel @Minalami Image
2/ Also according to pro-#AQ channels, al-Sumaida'i was previously a member of Ansar al-Sunna and joined #ISIS in 2013, in the city of #Mosul, #Iraq
3/ After the organization took control of #Mosul, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani appointed him as the head of the Court of Justice and Claims over the city of Mosul.
Read 3 tweets
Freunde und Freundinnen,
Liebe Lesende,

Viele sind in Aufruhr, ein #Schreck durchzieht sie seit einigen Tagen - der Krieg ist so nah!
Der #Krieg, der immer dagewesen ist, nur eben etwas entfernter war und daher bewusst ausgeblendet und verdrängt werden konnte - und somit den eigenen #Alltag nicht bestimmen.
Jetzt nähert sich das, was Bewegungen wie die @ezln und die @KckUnion / @KckKurdistan schon lange als #Weltkrieg bezeichnen und plötzlich kommt alles in #Bewegung: #Spenden werden gesammelt, Kisten gepackt, Freiwillige fahren...
Read 18 tweets
1. Yesterday #IS confirmed that Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in February. He has been succeeded by Abul Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.

It also revealed that Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, his spox, has been killed.

#IS has warned of revenge attacks in weeks to come. Image
2. ExTrac data suggests that this warning of revenge attacks is not likely to be ‘just’ rhetoric.

Just over two weeks after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abul Hasan al-Muhajir were killed in November 2019, #IS launched a global revenge campaign. Image
3. This saw it surging attacks globally.

L: #Syria operations more than doubled in the course of a single week.

R: #Nigeria operations also more than doubled. ImageImage
Read 9 tweets
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.

This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.

Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations. Image
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.

However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate. Image
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.

No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise. Image
Read 6 tweets
1. The latest issue of #IS's newspaper contained another nine reports of attacks in #Syria.

This means that, across the last week alone, #IS has reported 17 ops in #Syria.

That’s more attacks in a single week than were reported across August, September and October combined. Image
2. #IS is framing the recent surge in attacks in #DeirEzzor governorate as 'a strong comeback.'

The question remains as to whether or not it will be sustained in the coming weeks. ImageImage
3. Significantly, and in stark contrast with recent weeks, #IS also reported ops across #Raqqa and #Hasaka as well as in #DeirEzzor.

Per its comms at least, #IS has been totally inactive in #Raqqa and #Hasaka since June. Image
Read 4 tweets
Great piece by @Levitt_Matt: "The Assad Regime’s Business Model for Supporting the Islamic State" lawfareblog.com/assad-regimes-…
One of the first things I wrote in 2014, and kept updated for a while as a rolling compilation of evidence, at a time when it was regarded as something of a conspiracy theory: "The Assad Regime's Collusion With ISIS and al-Qaeda: Assessing The Evidence" kyleorton.co.uk/2014/03/24/ass…
Wrote about this a couple of times since then:

"Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists" kyleorton.co.uk/2014/09/03/pro…

"Partners in Terror: The Assad Regime and the Islamic State" kyleorton.co.uk/2016/03/10/par…
Read 8 tweets
1. On 19 September, following weeks of inactivity, #ISKP once again started reporting attacks from #Afghanistan.

That day alone, it claimed seven operations—this is the largest number of attacks reported by #ISKP in a single day in years.
2. This spate of attacks has so far focused on what #IS is calling the ‘apostate #Taliban militia.’

It appears to signal the start of the new, reinvigorated #Afghanistan campaign that #IS first said was on the horizon back in August.
3. Notably, aside from #ISKP’s two attacks on #KIA at the end of August, it had been entirely inactive in #Afghanistan until this week.

The last time it went dark for that long was in June/July 2020.
Read 9 tweets
1) #IS/#ISKP claims first attacks specifically targeting #Taliban in Afghanistan since the latter took power on 15 Aug. IS said it carried out a series of 7 IED attacks on Taliban members in the eastern city of Jalalabad on 18 and 19 Sep, allegedly "killing and wounding over 35"
2) In its claims, IS uses its typical wording to describe the Taliban, calling them an "apostate militia". IS released an image and a video of a low-profile IED blast to support its claims
3) As far as I can see, the Taliban have yet to comment on these attacks, which local media said also harmed civilians who were in the vicinity of the blasts
Read 6 tweets
#IS established itself in "Af-Pak" by building off the Afghan Salafist community that took root in eastern areas via the Arab presence there beginning many decades ago. The Salafis had some second thoughts, but the #Taliban is now pressuring them, too. trtworld.com/opinion/the-dy…
#pt: The Taliban made an approach to IS-Centre in 2015 to ask that ISKP not be used to open another jihadist front, since this would distract from the war with the West. No dice. IS didn't even bother to reply.
#pt: The original Pakistani, mostly TTP, leadership of #ISKP was killed off quite quickly and replaced with Afghan Salafis. The current leader, though, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir, seems to be a former Haqqani Network operative, and has peeled away other parts of that network.
Read 4 tweets
I have been reporting on these protests against the #SDF and the #Deir al-Zor region for years. I was one of the few to independently report from the area in 2019, a few months after the Baghouz was liberated from #IS (#ISIS).

Thread with links:
Mine from 2019: "...diesel is three times as expensive in Shuhail as it is in the Kurdish-dominant north, despite the proximity of key oil fields, and that this price gouging is only one of many ways the US-backed SDF is making local residents desperate"

al-monitor.com/originals/2019…
"....that doesn't justify what [the SDF is] doing. A 70-year-old man was killed. Four young men who had fought IS in the ranks of the SDF and two civilians were [killed] too. Why?”

Male relatives of those killed in a mysterious raid May 9 agreed to meet May 20 with Al-Monitor"
Read 11 tweets
"The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate is not the end of the project; rather, it is the start. The vision always has been global," writes @KatieZimmerman. A key point.
Our recent report was clear that the #Taliban and its associated jihadists under the control of #Pakistan's ISI are global in outlook, though Western analysts struggle with this due to ideological assumptions about nation-states eeradicalization.com/afghanistan-re…
#Taliban founder Mullah Omar made clear he did not care about #Afghanistan per se; his "bigger cause" was global in nature, namely bringing down America.

With Russian officials earlier, talibs openly used the same language as #IS about a global caliphate eeradicalization.com/afghanistan-re…
Read 3 tweets
1. Here’s our detailed briefing note on #ISKP:

public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:

i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan #Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.
Read 7 tweets
It is good that #Britain is prepared to play its role against #IS in Afghanistan. It is, however, a mystery what intelligence stream is going to be used and how planes in the Gulf could ever use such a stream in time.
Horrible to leave the dogs behind, though hardly a choice given hundreds of American and tends of thousands of Afghan humans were left.
#Pakistan overtly occupying a chunk of #Afghanistan in the south, even as it occupies the rest through the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and the other jihadists.
Read 45 tweets
In the early hours this morning in #Afghanistan, the U.S. carried out a drone strike against an Islamic State (#ISKP) "planner" in Nangahar province, retaliation for the 26 August massacre at the Kabul airport. It seems the strike killed the target alone.
Given the speed of the anti-#ISKP strike last night, the lack of intelligence streams after the withdrawal of troops, and the concentration of all remaining resources in-country on Kabul, looks opportunistic, rather than targeted to someone directly tied to the airport atrocity.
This is an amazing response from the State Department: legalistic fiction that it doesn't deal with the Haqqani Network, an integrated Taliban component (as it is with Al-Qaeda), because the Haqqanis are designated terrorists.
Read 36 tweets
Kilka spostrzeżeń nt. tzw. Państwa Islamskiego #IS w #Afganistan w kontekście wczorajszych zamachów bombowych w Kabulu:
- PI jest obecne w Afganistanie od 2015, kiedy w momencie swoich największych sukcesów w Iraku i Syrii ogłosiło utworzenie „Prowincji Chorasan”
#THREAD 1/20
- PI nigdy nie było siła dominującą w Afganistanie– zawsze działało w otoczeniu wrogich sił #USA i ich sojuszników z jednej strony, a talibów, utrzymujących kontakty z Al-Kaidą z drugiej; zawsze było mniej liczne, miało mniejsze możliwości logistyczne, poparcie ludności itd.
2/20
- nie zmienia to faktu, że PI było obecne na terenie Afganistanu, przede wszystkim w prowincjach Nangarhar i Kunar; zgodnie z raportami ONZ od 2016 obserwowany jest stopniowy wzrost obecności bojowników PI w tym państwie – ich siły szacowane są obecnie na kilka tysięcy
3/20
Read 20 tweets

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