Nobody wanted to see a repeat of the spring, with hospitalisations rising and stringent measures coming back in. But UK isn't in quite the same position as March, so here are some sources for medium-term optimism as we come into a difficult winter... 1/
First, UK now has far more testing capacity, with more becoming available (theguardian.com/world/2020/oct…). Everything needs to fit together much better to reduce transmission, but infrastructure should help create more control options than earlier in 2020: gov.uk/government/pub… 2/
Regardless of your views on best way forward, I hope we can agree that working to keep virus out of risk groups (& hence their contacts) is crucial. And to do this successfully, we need to know where infection is - and that means effective testing and tracing. 3/
Thanks to data like ONS, REACT, Zoe, we also have much better real-time situational awareness, which gave early signals about current problems back in September. Choices about what to do still difficult, but data created plenty of warning about rising hospitalisations. 4/
More broadly, we have evidence people can mount immune response after infection and this response can provide some protection from infection (e.g. medrxiv.org/content/10.110…) and disease (cell.com/cell/fulltext/…). 5/
Seasonal coronaviruses typically lead to temporary protection to infection & longer protection to severe disease, and SARS-CoV-2 looking similar. This isn’t totally new type of virus & above evidence means should be reasonably optimistic about vaccine prospects (it's not HIV). 6/
There are over 200 vaccines in development (vac-lshtm.shinyapps.io/ncov_vaccine_l…), several of which have promising immunogenicity data. Likely earliest ones will have interim efficacy results by end 2020 or early 2021. They won’t solve everything, but could be very useful additional tool. 7/
We have evidence on what treatments do (and don't) work effectively at reducing duration and impact of disease, thanks to trials like RECOVERY (recoverytrial.net/results) and Solidarity (who.int/emergencies/di…). As epidemic continues, such trials will generate more insights. 8/
We also have many international case studies to learn from, providing data on a range of control measures, and what the epidemiological, social and economic impacts of COVID and accompanying policies have been:
The above doesn’t make the current epidemic - or decisions around it - any easier in Europe, but it does point to more effective & less disruptive options for control in 2021. 10/10
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I'm increasingly seeing people quote a single 'global' estimate of infection fatality risk (IFR) for SARS-CoV-2 & use this value to try and make conclusions about specific countries. But, of course, this is missing out a crucial aspect of risk... 1/
We've known since the early days of the pandemic that fatality risk is strongly dependent on age (as well as other factors), which means that estimates will depend on population structure and age group that gets infected. 2/
For example, Singapore has reported around 58k cases and 28 deaths, which would imply that less than 0.05% of local infections resulted in death. But lot of these infections were concentrated in groups of younger migrant workers, rather than the wider - and older - population. 3/
If epidemic growing, question isn’t really ‘are more restrictions needed?’ The question is ‘given restrictions will eventually have to come in, do you want to have COVID at a high or low level over winter?’ 1/
With almost daily 100k infections in England & growing (imperial.ac.uk/news/207534/co…), we'd eventually expect to see some effects of immunity. But even if restrictions introduced to keep R near 1, that infection level means can expect huge number of hospitalisations & deaths first. 2/
Getting to lower infection levels requires restrictions earlier, but opens up more targeted control options (more of which are becoming available, e.g. theguardian.com/world/2020/oct…), which could mean less disruption in longer term. 3/
I’m seeing people share these kinds of plots on excess deaths to try and claim there isn’t COVID problem currently. But look at data for week 29 Mar 2020 - if this lagging metric had been used to drive action, nothing would've been done until *early April* (i.e. far too late) 1/
As anyone who’s worked on epidemics will tell you, there are imperfect data streams early on, and more conclusive data later. But as above shows, sitting around waiting for all the data is not an option in a fast moving outbreak. 2/2
), but there is also a 'bottom-up' method, which my @cmmid_lshtm colleagues have been using to track R... 2/
The basic idea is that R depends on four components: duration of infectiousness; opportunities for transmission (i.e. contacts); transmission probability during each opportunity; and population susceptibility... 3/
A common feature of a growing epidemic is that the % of cases detected by surveillance systems typically declines (just as the % detected typically increases as epidemics are brought under control)... 1/
In week ending 24 Sep, ONS estimated around 8,400 new infections per day in England (ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulati…). And on 24 Sep, the 7-day average for daily reported cases in UK was around 6,800. 2/
By week ending 16 Oct, ONS estimate was around 35,000 new infections per day in England (ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulati…), with 7-day average for UK cases by 16 Oct at around 18,500. 3/
First, let's be clear about difference between a 'scenario' and 'forecast'. Scenarios explore specific 'what if' questions, e.g. 'What if we don't introduce any control measures?' - Below are some examples from the March Imperial UK modelling report (imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-inf…). 2/
In contrast, epidemic forecasts provide an answer to the question 'What do we think is most likely to happen?' More on scenarios vs forecasts here: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/0… 3/