Output gap nonsense: European Commission is doing it again in its most recent forecast: producing crisis-driven, pro-cyclical downward estimates in economic slack (measured in terms of output gaps). This will reduce fiscal space once the fiscal rules are reactivated. A thread: /1
How does the COVID-19 shock affect the European Commission’s potential output estimates? In its Autumn 2020 forecast, the Commission systematically reduced its potential output forecast to a larger extent in countries that are predicted to suffer from a larger drop in GDP. /2
One additional percentage point in predicted losses of actual output is associated with a loss in potential output of about 0.6 percentage points (on average), suggesting that the revisions in PO-model estimates are again strongly related to changes in economic activity. /3
Downward revisions in potential output translate into higher ‘structural’ deficits, which will again become important once the temporary suspension of the EU’s fiscal rules is lifted. Countries such as Germany are now also affected by this. /4
Model-based estimates of 'structural' deficits are used for evaluating and supervising member states’ fiscal performance and underlie recommendations related to medium-term budgetary objectives. Larger 'structural' deficits will require more fiscal consolidation down the road. /5
Especially for the period 2010 to 2014, there is ample evidence that the reliance on pessimistic views of potential output triggered pro-cyclical adjustments in fiscal policy with negative economic growth effects and path dependency in public debt.
Fiscal consolidation caused hysteresis effects, leading to successive rounds of downward revisions in potential output that partly validated the original pessimistic potential output forecasts and, in turn, caused further fiscal consolidation requirements. /7
We need to avoid that this self-defeating process is repeated after Corona. Improve estimates of potential output (account for hysteresis and low core inflation!). Reform the EU's fiscal rules. Do not reactivate the status quo, it would lead to counterproductive austerity. /end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Last week, ECB president Lagarde acknowledged mismeasurement of output gaps. This seems a technical side note. In fact, it has huge implications for monetary and fiscal policy. Here is a thread on what it implies for EU fiscal policy-making and assessing the fiscal stance: /1
Lagarde: “revisions to potential output mistook cyclical changes for structural trends”. Implication: official estimates of what €Z economies should be able to produce without generating inflationary pressures have been systematically too pessimistic. /2
Output gaps were large before Corona, implying severe underutilization of resources. Implication: Policy-makers should have been using more expansionary policy measures to stimulate production and employment to reduce big output gaps. /3
Die Einigung zum "EU-Wiederaufbaufonds" ist in zentralen Aspekten bahnbrechend und wird zur Erholung in schwer getroffenen Ländern beitragen, aber sie hat einen hohen politischen Preis. Meine Einschätzung ist heute bei @FESonline erschienen. Ein Thread /1
Vor Corona wäre es sicherlich undenkbar gewesen, dass die EU in dieser Dimension zusätzliche Schulden auf der Grundlage von Garantien der Mitgliedstaaten aufnimmt, um temporär zusätzliche EU-Ausgabenprogramme zur Bekämpfung einer Wirtschaftskrise zu lancieren. /2
Zum ersten Mal wird ein EU-weites „sicheres Asset“ geschaffen, welches es Anleger_innen ermöglicht, die unterschiedlich risikobehafteten Anleihen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten zu vermeiden und direkt in EU-Anleihen zu investieren. /3
Commission announced: 1) EU fiscal rules remain suspended in 2021; 2) focus of reviewing the rules is on reducing reliance on output gap estimates. A thread on why changing these output gap estimates is essential to promote recovery from 2022 onwards: /1
The European Commission’s potential output model is the core technical backbone of EU fiscal surveillance. Model-based estimates are used for evaluating and supervising member states’ fiscal performance and underlie recommendations related to medium-term budgetary objectives. /2
Given the importance of model-based estimates in the EU’s fiscal rules – avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal tightening in the near future will require that policymakers’ hands are not tied by overly pessimistic views on the development of potential output. /3
The agreement on the “EU recovery fund” is ground-breaking in some respects and will contribute to recovery in countries hard hit by the pandemic, but it comes at a high political price. Here is my assessment of the #EUCO deal @wiiw_news: A thread /1
Before Corona it would certainly have been unthinkable for the EU to take on so much additional debt based on guarantees from Member States in order to temporarily launch additional EU spending programmes to combat an economic crisis. /2
This is the first time that an EU-wide "safe asset" will be created, enabling investors to avoid different risk levels attached to bonds of EU Member States and to invest directly in EU bonds. /3
*out now* my meta-analysis on the effect of globalisation on income inequality: the impact of trade globalisation is small, but financial globalisation shows a sizable inequality-increasing effect. Just published in "The World Economy"; thread: /1
For the meta-analysis, I built a new data set consisting of 1254 observations from 123 primary studies on the globalisation-inequality nexus /2
The meta-analysis reveals that the average (precision-weighted) globalisation-inequality effect is positive and robustly different from zero suggesting that globalisation increases income inequality. /3
Dutch prime minister Rutte and other "frugals" have been using distorted images of Italy and Southern Europe to water down the EU recovery fund. Here are seven ("surprising") facts about Italy's economy to counter the "frugal" narrative. A thread: #EUCO
1. Italy does not live beyond its means. Since 2012, Italy has been recording higher exports of goods and services than imports. The country consumes less than it produces – if anything, it lives below its means.
2. Private debt is relatively low in Italy compared to other OECD countries. The issue of debt is not a problem for all sectors of the Italian economy.