If the reproduction number drops below 1, an epidemic won't disappear immediately. But how many additional infections will there be before it declines to very low levels? Fortunately there's a neat piece of maths that can help... 1/
Let's start by considering a situation where one person is infectious. On average they'll infect R others, who in turn will infect R others, and so on. We'd therefore get the following equation for average outbreak growth: 2/
If R is above 1, the outbreak will continue to grow and grow until something changes (control measures, accumulated immunity, seasonal effects etc.) But if R is below 1, above transmission process will decline & converge to a fixed value. (Proof here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric…) 3/
For example, if we have a single case and R=0.8, we'd expect an overall outbreak size = 1/(1-0.8) = 5 (i.e. 4 additional infections if we don't count the initial one). If R=0.9, we'd expect 9 additional infections. 4/
So far we've assumed 1 initial infection, but if we start with more we can just multiply the outbreak size accordingly. So if we start with 10,000 infections and R=0.9, we'd expect an additional 90,000 infections before the outbreak fades to very low levels. 5/
Here's a plot to show the number of additional infections per initial infection for different values of R between 0.5 and 0.999 (note log scale on y-axis). In other words, even if R is below 1, amount it's below one makes a big difference to subsequent number of infections. 6/
"What if superspreading events can occur?" you ask... Well, the above method happens to work regardless of how much overdispersion there is: journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/a… 7/
As epidemic trajectories in Europe rise back towards their spring peaks, a thread on normalisation during a pandemic... 1/
In late Feb & early March, we modelled scenarios for what effect widespread social distancing measures might have in UK. Like others, we'd already modelled contact tracing (thelancet.com/journals/langl…) but characteristics of infection suggested additional measures would be needed. 2/
At the time we were doing this modelling, fewer than 3000 COVID deaths had been reported globally (below from 1st March). I remember doing media during this period and could tell many saw the potential impact of COVID-19 as rather abstract, given observed numbers to date... 3/
Comparison of SPI-M medium term projections for England hospitalisations/deaths and subsequent data has now been published (along with some model descriptions): assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl… 1/
Additional context on that early working analysis also now available (noting that unlike above, these were *scenarios* to illustrate a reasonable worst case without further interventions, not forecasts): assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl… 2/
I'm increasingly seeing people quote a single 'global' estimate of infection fatality risk (IFR) for SARS-CoV-2 & use this value to try and make conclusions about specific countries. But, of course, this is missing out a crucial aspect of risk... 1/
We've known since the early days of the pandemic that fatality risk is strongly dependent on age (as well as other factors), which means that estimates will depend on population structure and age group that gets infected. 2/
For example, Singapore has reported around 58k cases and 28 deaths, which would imply that less than 0.05% of local infections resulted in death. But lot of these infections were concentrated in groups of younger migrant workers, rather than the wider - and older - population. 3/
Nobody wanted to see a repeat of the spring, with hospitalisations rising and stringent measures coming back in. But UK isn't in quite the same position as March, so here are some sources for medium-term optimism as we come into a difficult winter... 1/
First, UK now has far more testing capacity, with more becoming available (theguardian.com/world/2020/oct…). Everything needs to fit together much better to reduce transmission, but infrastructure should help create more control options than earlier in 2020: gov.uk/government/pub… 2/
Regardless of your views on best way forward, I hope we can agree that working to keep virus out of risk groups (& hence their contacts) is crucial. And to do this successfully, we need to know where infection is - and that means effective testing and tracing. 3/
If epidemic growing, question isn’t really ‘are more restrictions needed?’ The question is ‘given restrictions will eventually have to come in, do you want to have COVID at a high or low level over winter?’ 1/
With almost daily 100k infections in England & growing (imperial.ac.uk/news/207534/co…), we'd eventually expect to see some effects of immunity. But even if restrictions introduced to keep R near 1, that infection level means can expect huge number of hospitalisations & deaths first. 2/
Getting to lower infection levels requires restrictions earlier, but opens up more targeted control options (more of which are becoming available, e.g. theguardian.com/world/2020/oct…), which could mean less disruption in longer term. 3/
I’m seeing people share these kinds of plots on excess deaths to try and claim there isn’t COVID problem currently. But look at data for week 29 Mar 2020 - if this lagging metric had been used to drive action, nothing would've been done until *early April* (i.e. far too late) 1/
As anyone who’s worked on epidemics will tell you, there are imperfect data streams early on, and more conclusive data later. But as above shows, sitting around waiting for all the data is not an option in a fast moving outbreak. 2/2