Much can be learned on the payment system and the monetary-fiscal nexus from the rise and fall of the Bank of Amsterdam (1609 - 1820), one of the first central banks in Europe
The Bank of Amsterdam started life as a rigid stablecoin, where holders of silver and gold coins delivered them to the Bank, in return for deposits
These deposits were used for wholesale payments - for settlement of financial instruments like bills of exchange where a payment was settled by debiting the account of the payer and crediting the account of the receiver, much like the modern wholesale payment system
As a public institution owned by the City of Amsterdam, the Bank found itself increasingly thrust into a public policy role, fine-tuning financial conditions through its market operations, much like a modern central bank
But it lacked the fiscal backing of a modern central bank, and found itself in the awkward halfway house between a rigid stablecoin and a central bank without full fiscal backing; this halfway house ultimately proved untenable
The lessons are remarkably resonant of current debates on the monetary fiscal nexus, and how far a central bank can push monetary financing before crossing the line of no return
But it’s worth underscoring how successful the Bank was for much of its 170 year history; it famously saved the day in the systemic crisis of 1763 with tools that would make modern central banks blush
The weekly series on new borrowing in debt markets surged at the end of March (left panel); but most of the surge came from bond issuance (middle panel) rather than from syndicated loans
This decoupling of the bond and syndicated loan market is a repeat of what happened in the aftermath of Lehman, when loan volumes crashed and bond issuance surged (right-hand panel)
Phillips curve reasoning carries us a long way: subdued activity increases downside tail risk to inflation; but this is not the only story on inflation
The authors get at tail risks through quantile regressions that track outliers in realised inflation; the red curves below give the densities of 4-quarter ahead probability densities for inflation
Well done to @GitaGopinath and the team for the timely report and for putting together this superb panel chaired by @SoumayaKeynes; time was too short to explore all the issues, but a couple of the points deserve emphasis
We're accustomed to thinking of the global economy as a collection of "islands", each island being a national GDP area; exchange rates then adjust to bring balance of payments into balance
Today's report from the IMF shows that the short-term response of exports to a depreciation does not follow this script; imports decline and exports barely budge imf.org/en/Publication…
First thing to say is that #DollarFunding need outside the Unites States is big; dollar liabilities of non-US banks comes in at 13 trillion dollars - this is the same figure as just before the GFC
But notice the shift in the composition; the GFC was essentially a transatlantic crisis, with European banks at the eye of the storm.
European banks have retrenched, but others have taken their place; Asian EMEs are especially notable
In the breathless news cycle, some questions of genuine long-term importance can get left behind; spare some time to read our take on the state of money and the payment system... and where we should be headed
The pandemic has underlined why access, speed and cost of payment services for the general public are more important than ever; Covid-19 has been a real life stress test for our most important financial infrastructure: the payment system. The record here has been mixed...
Fiscal authorities put in place (very swiftly) much needed fiscal support measures to households and firms - around 10% of GDP in budgetary measures, and about the same again in terms of funding and guarantees bis.org/publ/bisbull23…
Outflows from bond mutual funds is an important and topical issue. A new BIS working paper posted today looks at the determinants of bond fund outflows and their consequences bis.org/publ/work868.h…