Thread by @C_M_Dougherty

I'd like to share some thoughts from my recent @CNASdc #nextNDS paper on "Moving Beyond A2/AD," or Anti-Access/Area-Denial as an organizing concept. 👇🏻
cnas.org/publications/c… 1/20

This paper grew out of 1) the increasing mismatch between the A2/AD concept and emerging threats, 2) its misrepresentation of operational challenges, and 3) its misapplication to Russian military strategy as outlined by @KofmanMichael et al. 2/20

For years A2/AD focused thinking on Chinese threats to U.S. military operations in East Asia. The evolution of these threats strained its conceptual bounds. The phrase became an "intellectual junk drawer," into which DoD planners threw all aspects of the China problem. 3/20

Former CNO Adm John Richardson hit the nail on the head in his 2016 National Interest article: "A2AD is a term bandied about freely, with no precise definition..." nationalinterest.org/feature/chief-… 4/20

A2/AD also misleads strategists and planners by creating a false dichotomy between "permissive" and "denied" environments, with the latter portrayed by the much-derided "angry red bubbles" denoting "no-go zones." foi.se/en/foi/reports… 5/20

The reality is much more nuanced, with different regions and operating domains contested at varying levels of risk depending on a host of factors like tactics, techniques, and procedures. Area-denial wrongly turns a muddled spectrum into a clear binary distinction. 6/20

A2/AD arguably also reinforced a false dichotomy between "peacetime" competition and conflict. In describing conflict actions, A2/AD leaves out all the "peacetime" confrontations that China and Russia use to set conditions to their advantage. 7/20

By now, you're probably thinking, "ok, these critiques have been around for a while... What's the solution?" I'm glad you asked (even if I put the words in your mouth). 8/20

Just like every house needs a junk drawer, DoD still needs a shorthand way of describing the interactions between U.S. Chinese, and Russian military strategies and concepts. The key is: it needs to be more accurate and useful for strategists and planners. 9/20

Instead of A2/AD I propose "Exploiting Temporal Advantage," (ETA). China and Russia both face the same problem vs. the United States: they're weaker in global military power. They also share the same advantage: they're stronger in regional military power in key theaters. 10/20

ETA is their method of maximizing their advantages and minimizing their weaknesses by advantageously exploiting time. My @CNASdc colleague Billy Fabian noted this w/r/t posture in his #nextNDS piece here: cnas.org/publications/c… 11/20

ETA is pretty broad, so to prevent it from becoming an unruly junk drawer like A2/AD, I propose four conceptual "bins" for Chinese and Russian ETA approaches. 12/20

The 1st bin is information degradation and command (or cognitive) disruption (ID/CD). Attacking information and command systems is foundational to Chinese and Russian ways of warfare. They want to seize & hold advantage in sensing, communicating, processing, & deciding. 13/20

The 2nd bin is contesting theater access and maneuver (CTAM). This is close to the original intent of A2/AD, but makes clear that China & Russia are contesting--vice denying--US access & freedom of operation. It's a spectrum of risk, not impenetrable no-go zones. 14/20

The 3rd bin is degrading sustainment, logistics, and mobility (DSLAM). This is how China & Russia limit initial US op tempo in the theater, and inhibit the US from brining its aggregate global military advantage to bear in a relevant timeframe. 15/20

The 4th bin is Strategic Attacks to Deter, Coerce, and Terminate (SADCAT). And yes, that's on purpose. 16/20

Somewhat tongue-in-cheek acronyms aside, China & Russia both use strategic means to limit and shape a conflict to prevent it from getting beyond their control, and to terminate it advantageously. 17/20

These bins are distinct, but work synergistically as part of ETA. China and Russia will also leverage them in different ways. While both might strike a port, China might see it as CTAM with a side of DSLAM, while Russia views it as SADCAT with a side of CTAM. 18/20

A2/AD has outlived its usefulness as a description of adversary military operations and as a framework for U.S. concepts, planning, and strategy. DoD should abandon it in favor of ETA, or risk building a future force on a flawed problem diagnosis. 19/20

Moreover, DoD should put time and temporal considerations at the forefront of the next NDS and joint warfighting concepts still in development. I'd argue that adopting ETA, along with ID/CD, CTAM, DSLAM, and SADCAT is a good way of doing that. 20/20