@jlmcardle01 & @DohrmanC provide an outstanding take on future of military readiness through synthetic environments. This could change the game in the techno-cognitive confrontation with China and Russia.
China and Russia both see this confrontation as central to defeating the US armed forces if war occurs. It will occur across domains and command structures. It will require personnel who can make quick, accurate decisions under duress with imperfect information.
Given the increasing salience of new warfighting domains like space, cyberspace, and the EMS, along with the increasing interactions between these domains, real-world training for this sort of decision making has become impossible or cost-prohibitive.
We've like reached a point where we can't train realistically in meatspace alone. We have to move to a mix of live and synthetic environs to train our minds effectively. And this only becomes more important for incorporation and training of AI.
Technological capabilities and operational concepts are fascinating and important. However, it takes people (and possibly bots) to operate those capabilities and execute those concepts. We need new methods to train them.
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I'd like to share some thoughts from my recent @CNASdc#nextNDS paper on "Moving Beyond A2/AD," or Anti-Access/Area-Denial as an organizing concept. 👇🏻 cnas.org/publications/c… 1/20
This paper grew out of 1) the increasing mismatch between the A2/AD concept and emerging threats, 2) its misrepresentation of operational challenges, and 3) its misapplication to Russian military strategy as outlined by @KofmanMichael et al. 2/20
For years A2/AD focused thinking on Chinese threats to U.S. military operations in East Asia. The evolution of these threats strained its conceptual bounds. The phrase became an "intellectual junk drawer," into which DoD planners threw all aspects of the China problem. 3/20
I arrived at the Pentagon in late 2014, as DoD's response to Russia's invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine was ramping up after decades in which Russia had been an afterthought (at best) in DoD strategy and planning. 2/25
It's tough to describe the state of DoD's thinking about Russia in 2014, but the best term is shambolic. Nearly every part of DoD--OSD, JS, DIA, EUCOM, the Services--had allowed their Russia-focused staff and thinking to atrophy. 3/25
As promised, Round 2 of @CNASdc’s remote wargame looking at #airpower in the context of a China-Taiwan warfight, but first a quick recap of yesterday’s events.
The purpose of this game is to develop new ways of fighting which will be necessary to deter and compete with China long term, as former Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and I describe here: cnas.org/publications/v…
Developing a New American Way of War and associated capabilities is just the defense portion of a whole-of-nation competition with China that will shape U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century.
The focus of this series of games is on developing new operational concepts as I described last year in a policy brief for Congress: cnas.org/publications/c…