OK, I have tried to model this more, and the bottom line is: without a test and trace system that absolutely jumps on rising cases when the number of cases is really low, the government has a really hard task. Brace for some ugly graphs: 1/
This models a Spring surge, harsh measures in April-May that crush the virus infection down, and leads to loosening in June and July.
Basically, the R rate rises fast when lockdowns end in June - but you can hardly see it .... Table shows measures (low = restrictive) 2/
and so further lockdowns etc are *politically impossible* at the point they may stop it rising. Imagine - 3 months of almost no cases, not many deaths - but the exponential force is building, and then BANG 3/
Basically, it is easy to construct a model where the most rational time to throw in an extra 10% of Lockdown measures (in terms of reducing deaths) is August - but it means having to do it when it looks like the pandemic is *barely there*. 4/
Looking backwards at the real data now, having modelled how it works, it appears clearer that mid Sep was when to get really alarmed. And when did Patrick Vallance get really alarmed? MID SEP 5/
So, bottom line: it is really hard, and perhaps politically impossible, to impose actual measures when the R is undetectably high and the cases low - like it must have been in August at some point. But the moment the cases confirmed it - the excuses go away, IMHO.
And Patrick Vallance was right. /ends
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First, you need to pick your moment - but the moment can last years. Peter Mandelson and @vincecable each recognised that post Financial Crisis was the time to build the case for intervention that changes the way the economy works. Now is another such time 2/
Let's face it: Johnson has always sounded like someone who ought to like Industrial Strategy, even if his "boosterish can-do-ism" largely focuses on concerns that other politicians going back to @Ed_Miliband have expressed 3/
Here @GeorgeDibb and colleagues have dived a little deeper into a topic I touched on in April: equity bailouts for the covid-wrecked: instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/…
But - as with my piece, you may say - the devilish details are still to be all filled in 1/
No self-respecting HMT official will hear of a broad plan to do this without muttering the word "Lemons", and asking "um, at what price?"
If there is a £1m loan outstanding to the bakery, how much equity does that get you? All of it? Half of it? 2/
... because if the bakery is a good commercial prospect, a private investor will get it. If not, the state picks it up. Result: the state gets a portfolio of rubbish companies
And note how many different kinds of magic IPPR want the equity to perform: 3/
A good example of the kind of document even a sceptical govt policymaker might be won over by 1/
The spinouts alone are fascinating 2/
Fusion in short is a neat manifestation of the sort of industrial strategy it is easier to believe in: not a nailed-on certainty*, but lots of spillover benefits, and they show their workings. 3/
*@PinsonRing is the account to follow for some smart scepticism
You know I'm not an uncritical fan of the UK government, but the past fortnight has really brought home how ridiculous is any comparison between Johnson's performance and Trump's 1/
Just play side by side the videos after emerging from hospital. Johnson really brought home how dangerous it is
But so much more: even if the PM did shift to economy-concerns early (in retrospect), this is nothing compared to the END LOCKDOWN idiocy we saw over the Atlantic 2/
and while our lot has been accused of hiding behind scientists - well, that's way better than actually *hiding* the scientists. Or promoting false cures. Or dissing masks
Why is the UK gov't so badly rated then? Well lots of valid reasons but.... 3/
This Economist piece is the best summary of the estimated knowledge of Covid so far and is worth showing some highlights economist.com/briefing/2020/… via @TheEconomist
1. We have had million recognised deaths, possibly there are a million more unrecorded 1/
2. We had no idea at the time but the world was probably seeing 1m infections a day at end Jan, a figure that may have peaked at 5m/day early May.
3. Probably 500m-730m have been infected so far, 6-9% of global population
4. The risk of death rises 13% with every year of age.
5. The ratio of official Covid deaths to actual Covid deaths varies. In the States, the likely figure is 30% above the official figure of 200k