First, you need to pick your moment - but the moment can last years. Peter Mandelson and @vincecable each recognised that post Financial Crisis was the time to build the case for intervention that changes the way the economy works. Now is another such time 2/
Let's face it: Johnson has always sounded like someone who ought to like Industrial Strategy, even if his "boosterish can-do-ism" largely focuses on concerns that other politicians going back to @Ed_Miliband have expressed 3/
And Brexit will be a painful reminder that as a country we need to learn to focus on what we do best - whatever that is 4/
My major beef, echoing the formulation of Professor @rodrikdani, is with the HOW not the WHY of industrial strategy. Pointing to a shiny future of better jobs, fuelled by science, a green transformation and better infrastructure - that is the easy bit! HOW will you do it? 5/
And I feel that the signs under Johnson - and Cummings in particular - were not good. Sheer weight of infrastructure spending doesn't transform economies. Science-obsessed dilettantes picking cutting edge sectors from Whitehall hasn't worked 6/
So, as another such politically-appointed Industrial Strategy dilettante, what are my recommendations for a successful approach? There are many, but if they could be summarised in a tweet - don't exclude the sceptical thinking of @hmtreasury when you do it! 7/
The Treasury is the guardian of key economic virtues in government, in particular defence of competition, and an all-round wise scepticism and belief in markets (which you can read in gov.uk/government/spe… by @nickmacpherson2) 8/
Just as important: HAVE EDGES around your industrial strategy. You need to have a reason to say you are intervening here and not there. An inability to provide that reason is proof that you don't really have a methodology underpinning your approach 9/
Over 2017-2019, the government showed a failure to create 'edges' in its Sector Deal policy: it was open all comers. That is not strategic. And it meant whatever was done was under-resourced 10/
So choose some criteria on which you are intervening. It isn't rocket science*. Is the sector big enough? Likely to face significant structural reform? And, crucially, can the government make a difference with its conscious intervention?
*though it can include rocket science 11/
Another rule: focus on institutions. That means structures that change the incentives of the agents in the economy that do the actual delivery of economic outcomes. You don't lift up an economy with direct government action, but by influencing how the private sector works 12/
Another negative, and a real bugbear of mine: industrial strategy is NOT TECH CHAMPION CREATION POLICY. Rows of Tory advisers going back to Cameron have acted like good economic policy EQUALS creation of a venture capital hit based on tech. It. Isn't. 13/
It is easy to imagine why people think messing with the science budget = the significant bit of industrial strategy. Technological change drives long term growth. But the real benefit of innovative change occurs in its USE. Very influenced by work of @Nightingale_P here 14/
And learn to love your constraints. If a system like State Aid is forcing you to subject your interventionist idea to more checks, it is probably improving the policy, and preventing moronic behaviour like the sort this MP wanted: 15/
Finally, the point of all this scepticism: when you know that you are right to intervene, COMMIT. Be lumpy - but with well-chosen lumps 16/
Anyway, thanks to @gemmatetlow for suggesting I write it, and all the help from numerous readers. I realise I have barely scratched the surface, and need to do more work on what building the right institutions etc looks like. Maybe in 2021. Maybe ... /ends
OK, I have tried to model this more, and the bottom line is: without a test and trace system that absolutely jumps on rising cases when the number of cases is really low, the government has a really hard task. Brace for some ugly graphs: 1/
This models a Spring surge, harsh measures in April-May that crush the virus infection down, and leads to loosening in June and July.
Basically, the R rate rises fast when lockdowns end in June - but you can hardly see it .... Table shows measures (low = restrictive) 2/
and so further lockdowns etc are *politically impossible* at the point they may stop it rising. Imagine - 3 months of almost no cases, not many deaths - but the exponential force is building, and then BANG 3/
Here @GeorgeDibb and colleagues have dived a little deeper into a topic I touched on in April: equity bailouts for the covid-wrecked: instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/…
But - as with my piece, you may say - the devilish details are still to be all filled in 1/
No self-respecting HMT official will hear of a broad plan to do this without muttering the word "Lemons", and asking "um, at what price?"
If there is a £1m loan outstanding to the bakery, how much equity does that get you? All of it? Half of it? 2/
... because if the bakery is a good commercial prospect, a private investor will get it. If not, the state picks it up. Result: the state gets a portfolio of rubbish companies
And note how many different kinds of magic IPPR want the equity to perform: 3/
A good example of the kind of document even a sceptical govt policymaker might be won over by 1/
The spinouts alone are fascinating 2/
Fusion in short is a neat manifestation of the sort of industrial strategy it is easier to believe in: not a nailed-on certainty*, but lots of spillover benefits, and they show their workings. 3/
*@PinsonRing is the account to follow for some smart scepticism
You know I'm not an uncritical fan of the UK government, but the past fortnight has really brought home how ridiculous is any comparison between Johnson's performance and Trump's 1/
Just play side by side the videos after emerging from hospital. Johnson really brought home how dangerous it is
But so much more: even if the PM did shift to economy-concerns early (in retrospect), this is nothing compared to the END LOCKDOWN idiocy we saw over the Atlantic 2/
and while our lot has been accused of hiding behind scientists - well, that's way better than actually *hiding* the scientists. Or promoting false cures. Or dissing masks
Why is the UK gov't so badly rated then? Well lots of valid reasons but.... 3/
This Economist piece is the best summary of the estimated knowledge of Covid so far and is worth showing some highlights economist.com/briefing/2020/… via @TheEconomist
1. We have had million recognised deaths, possibly there are a million more unrecorded 1/
2. We had no idea at the time but the world was probably seeing 1m infections a day at end Jan, a figure that may have peaked at 5m/day early May.
3. Probably 500m-730m have been infected so far, 6-9% of global population
4. The risk of death rises 13% with every year of age.
5. The ratio of official Covid deaths to actual Covid deaths varies. In the States, the likely figure is 30% above the official figure of 200k