1. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) often assume the same carbon prices in each region (left, orange dots): this is efficient but leads to large inequities (right).
More equitable distributions of carbon prices (left, blue dots) is less efficient.
2. @NB_pik addresses this problem in a new paper: "The core finding of this research is the strongly nonlinear trade-off between cost-efficiency and sovereignty in achieving the long-term PA climate target in an equitable way."
Small changes to efficiency have big equity gains.
3. The gaps between uniform & differentiated carbon prices (first tweet) was modified to create the trade-off curve (previous tweet). This was done by applying an exponential function to adjust pairs of regional prices.
Is the "core finding" dependent on the "exponential"?
4. A sensitivity is done in the Annex, compared to a linear. A linear scaling does not give the trade-off gains as does the exponential, so there is quite some sensitivity to how the scaling is done.
The trade-off frontier lies to the left of the exp, but is hard to compute.
5. What does this mean?
First, there are many near optimal solutions that may have better characteristics. Important to explore this "near optimal" solution space, as it could hold some gems.
6. Second, in this particular study, to get the rapid gains would require a rather top-down specification of regional carbon prices, that relate quite specifically to this exponential scaling (?). These will also vary by IAM.
The better solution is even harder to achieve?
7. @NB_pik gets some bonus points for mentioning "corner solutions" & "trade-off curves" in a Nature paper as this is what it is all about in a model. The challenge is how to map the model world to the real world to make better policy.
8. While a model operates in a model world, the implication here is that we need regional differentiation in carbon prices (or stringency of climate policy). I don't think this needs to follow the scaling suggested in the paper, as we will never get optimal policies.
9. This leads to the discussion of broader policy mixes, which is perhaps more relevant and interesting, as these are the sorts of policies most likely to be implemented. How to sort out the equity vs efficiency issues here...
10. Thoughts welcome.
@NB_pik, my understanding correct? It struck me most that the "core finding" is quite sensitive to scaling assumptions, but I presume the exponential is closer to the theoretical optimal than the linear. Then it is really an interpretation issue.
/end
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1. Oil & gas companies still expect the world to consume large quantities of oil & gas in 2050. That view would seem to put the oil giants in conflict with the IPCC.
2. [O]il companies & the IPCC alike rely on a contentious strategy known as negative emissions — the practice of pulling carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. In theory, NETs would buy the world a little more time to phase out the use of fossil fuels ...
3. "[N]one of these models are forecast machines" @DetlefvanVuuren
"It's just an element, a tool to explore different trajectories on the basis of the knowledge we have today & to see what ... might encounter."
Both critics & modelers agree such nuance is often lost
Some updated carbon budgets from @CONSTRAIN_EU
→ 5 years left for 66% <1.5°C (HT @rtmcswee)
To what degree should we look at 66% <1.5°C?
* According to the 2018 #SR15, there are no scenarios 66% <1.5°C
* Huge gap between 50% 1.5°C & 66% 2°C (~1.7-1.8°C)
We have become so obsessed with these arbitrary lines at 1.5°C & 2°C, but I think the more relevant point, is that there is a HUGE gap between 1.5°C & 2°C.
While 1.5°C might be too late, there is still lots to fight for.
A slight technical point. 66% <1.5°C is probably around 1.3-1.4°C for 50%. We are at ~1.2°C today, so a 0.1°C increase or 200GtCO₂ is quite consistent with the remaining budget for 66% <1.5%...
[The 0.1°C ~ 200GtCO₂ is based on the TCRE, see link in previous tweet]
1. What happened to EU27 emissions in 2020 & what does it mean for the 55% 2030 target?
COVID19 sent CO₂ emissions down ~12%:
* Coal went down 18% in 2019, COVID cements this in
* Oil has grown last 5 years, 2020 needs to start a new decline
* Gas is stubborn, problem for 2030!
2. The EU target is for GHGs (not just CO₂), but now includes the forest sink.
The inclusion of the sink makes the relative reduction in emissions from 1990 larger (24% to 2018) & makes a 2030 target easier to achieve (in terms of reduced growth rates to achieve it).
But...
3. The inclusion of the land sink is probably necessarily to meet the 2050 net-zero GHG emission goal.
It may be hard to maintain the land sink, particularly in the face of climate change.
The alternative is using technical carbon removal (BECCS or DACCS, which have troubles).
An unprecedented 2.4 GtCO₂ (7%) drop in emissions in 2020 due to COVID19 restrictions. But, daily emissions are already edging up towards levels last seen in late 2019.
2. A drop of 2.4 GtCO₂ has not been seen before, but emissions have not been this high either.
After the global financial crisis emissions increased 1.7GtCO₂ in 2010. Will this record increase be surpassed in 2021?
Relative changes of >±7% were common before 1950...
3. Despite the rapid change in emissions, atmospheric CO₂ concentrations continued up as if COVID19 never happened.
Why?
* Emissions were high, as high as in 2012
* The relative change is smaller than interannual variability
* CO₂ is cumulative, so total emissions matter
Although the COVID-19 pandemic will cause a dip in 2020 emissions, this will not bring the world closer to the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming this century to well below 2°C & pursuing 1.5°C.