1. Oil & gas companies still expect the world to consume large quantities of oil & gas in 2050. That view would seem to put the oil giants in conflict with the IPCC.
2. [O]il companies & the IPCC alike rely on a contentious strategy known as negative emissions — the practice of pulling carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. In theory, NETs would buy the world a little more time to phase out the use of fossil fuels ...
3. "[N]one of these models are forecast machines" @DetlefvanVuuren
"It's just an element, a tool to explore different trajectories on the basis of the knowledge we have today & to see what ... might encounter."
Both critics & modelers agree such nuance is often lost
4. Many policymakers have concluded that negative emission technologies are necessary for meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature benchmarks, even if modelers themselves are more circumspect.
5. "How great would it be if, rather than just having pathways that kind of put forward technological solutions like BECCS, that we would have pathways that really articulate in clear terms the need for immediate discussions & action towards phasing out fossil fuels" @wim_carton
6. "It's not like, oh, so we can definitely continue exploiting gas or using gas & then we can maybe think about also implementing CCS. No, it is only possible to exploit further [gas] ... if you really meet those key milestones in CCS development globally" @JoeriRogelj
7. [M]odels generally assume that NETs will wipe out anywhere from a few hundred billion tonnes of carbon dioxide to well over a trillion over the course of this century.
8. Oil companies are less reliant on NETs than IPCC.
BP projected BECCS would reduce emissions by 1.5GtCO₂/yr in 2050.
Equinor didn't even model BECCS because it said the technology's future was too uncertain.
The IPCC sees BECCS capturing 3-7GtCO₂/yr in 2050
9. There's a catch, though.
The pathways the models produce aren't necessarily the only ones possible. Most of the time, they're just the cheapest.
10. "If people see the UNFCCC, the actual document of the convention, it is stated that climate change mitigation should be pursued in a cost-effective manner" @JoeriRogelj
11. "If we bring this particular problem into the model & let the model try to solve it, then obviously it's part of the least-cost solution to have some of these negative emissions out there" @DetlefvanVuuren
12. "There is a sense that these scenarios are modeling the real world, and that is not necessarily how the world works," said me.
13. "What would it take to deploy hundreds of CCS facilities in the U.S. today? Modelers would say if you had $100-a-ton tax, it would pop everywhere. I struggle to see how you would deploy so much CCS in political reality" said me.
𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐈𝐀𝐌𝐬 𝐦𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠?
14. Freelancing now...
What is cost-effective? We assume that this means discounting & optimising costs over the 100 years, assuming everything runs perfectly smoothly & everyone behaves, & we know everything (like costs).
The world is not this nice, unfortunately...
15. A nice illustration comes from @DetlefvanVuuren, where he modelled alternative pathways that didn't require BECCS.
They could not model the cost effectiveness of this pathway. Is it cheaper or more expensive than a BECCS pathway? We don't know!
17. Even the IPCC found that including demand reductions halved costs, noting they could not model the costs of reducing demand. This was in 2014 (AR5)... ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/
18. While the UNFCCC argues for cost-effective strategies, the assumption here is that IAMs are actually modelling cost-effective.
Is cost-effective, as defined in an IAM, the same as the real-world definition of cost-effective?
This is the question we need to address...
19. ...and should cost-effective include real-world bumpiness. Like justice & equity issues, risk premiums, cost & investment uncertainties, inefficient climate policies (like standards over taxes), election of Trump or Morrison, technical barriers, social barriers, etc, etc.
20. We have to put the scenario outputs in the context of the assumptions used to generate them. And this goes well beyond technology costs, but also has to address overarching structural questions on how the climate problem is framed & implemented in a model.
/end
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1. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) often assume the same carbon prices in each region (left, orange dots): this is efficient but leads to large inequities (right).
More equitable distributions of carbon prices (left, blue dots) is less efficient.
2. @NB_pik addresses this problem in a new paper: "The core finding of this research is the strongly nonlinear trade-off between cost-efficiency and sovereignty in achieving the long-term PA climate target in an equitable way."
Small changes to efficiency have big equity gains.
3. The gaps between uniform & differentiated carbon prices (first tweet) was modified to create the trade-off curve (previous tweet). This was done by applying an exponential function to adjust pairs of regional prices.
Is the "core finding" dependent on the "exponential"?
Some updated carbon budgets from @CONSTRAIN_EU
→ 5 years left for 66% <1.5°C (HT @rtmcswee)
To what degree should we look at 66% <1.5°C?
* According to the 2018 #SR15, there are no scenarios 66% <1.5°C
* Huge gap between 50% 1.5°C & 66% 2°C (~1.7-1.8°C)
We have become so obsessed with these arbitrary lines at 1.5°C & 2°C, but I think the more relevant point, is that there is a HUGE gap between 1.5°C & 2°C.
While 1.5°C might be too late, there is still lots to fight for.
A slight technical point. 66% <1.5°C is probably around 1.3-1.4°C for 50%. We are at ~1.2°C today, so a 0.1°C increase or 200GtCO₂ is quite consistent with the remaining budget for 66% <1.5%...
[The 0.1°C ~ 200GtCO₂ is based on the TCRE, see link in previous tweet]
1. What happened to EU27 emissions in 2020 & what does it mean for the 55% 2030 target?
COVID19 sent CO₂ emissions down ~12%:
* Coal went down 18% in 2019, COVID cements this in
* Oil has grown last 5 years, 2020 needs to start a new decline
* Gas is stubborn, problem for 2030!
2. The EU target is for GHGs (not just CO₂), but now includes the forest sink.
The inclusion of the sink makes the relative reduction in emissions from 1990 larger (24% to 2018) & makes a 2030 target easier to achieve (in terms of reduced growth rates to achieve it).
But...
3. The inclusion of the land sink is probably necessarily to meet the 2050 net-zero GHG emission goal.
It may be hard to maintain the land sink, particularly in the face of climate change.
The alternative is using technical carbon removal (BECCS or DACCS, which have troubles).
An unprecedented 2.4 GtCO₂ (7%) drop in emissions in 2020 due to COVID19 restrictions. But, daily emissions are already edging up towards levels last seen in late 2019.
2. A drop of 2.4 GtCO₂ has not been seen before, but emissions have not been this high either.
After the global financial crisis emissions increased 1.7GtCO₂ in 2010. Will this record increase be surpassed in 2021?
Relative changes of >±7% were common before 1950...
3. Despite the rapid change in emissions, atmospheric CO₂ concentrations continued up as if COVID19 never happened.
Why?
* Emissions were high, as high as in 2012
* The relative change is smaller than interannual variability
* CO₂ is cumulative, so total emissions matter
Although the COVID-19 pandemic will cause a dip in 2020 emissions, this will not bring the world closer to the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming this century to well below 2°C & pursuing 1.5°C.