On November 10th, @Delphi_Digital put forth a proposal for to fundamentally revise @AaveAave's current token architecture
We received incredible feedback from the community and are thrilled to present V2 of our proposal which incorporates much of this insight
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1/ Before diving into our proposal it's important to understand how the current Aave Safety Module (SM) works
The SM is an insurance product which underwrites all risks (SC, oracle and liquidation) for all users of Aave protocol
As an insurance product, it has a few flaws
2/ Because insurance is bundled in with Aave's money markets, it's impossible to compute cover demand, pricing, capacity or how much to pay underwriters
Any new money market added is also automatically insured by the SM, introducing unlimited contagion and systemic risk
3/ This hampers the speed at which Aave can innovate by increasing the costs of failed experiments
Finally, the current SM is capital inefficient since it is unlevered and bundles different risks to offer a blended return, appealing to a narrower capital base
4/ Our initial proposal sought to improve on this current model while keeping the bundled insurance + money-market design
This meant that demand for insurance was impossible to compute separately from money market demand
5/ Without a market based mechanism to price cover and therefore risk, our design instead offloaded these decisions to independent aDAOs who bore both the risk and reward of the money markets they managed
They provided risk capital and earned fees in exchange for not blowing up
6/ This, we hoped, would allow Aave to innovate quicker by segregating risk while incentivizing good decisions by the principle of skin in the game; ensuring those making decisions are forced to bear the potential downside if they are wrong
7/ In our new design, insurance is instead offered as a separate product on the demand side
This makes it possible to compute cover demand and capacity precisely and thus price risk using market mechanisms, scaling back some of the independence granted to aDAOs
8/ Based on this insight, we propose two models:
The first is a simplified, unlevered version which could act as an evolutionary step towards the second model which we see as the more efficient, final form design
9/ In both cases, users get access to one-click insurance with payment being streamed over time and netted out of deposit APYs rather than purchased upfront a la @NexusMutual and @CoverProtocol
10/ This is achieved by using a money market style architecture leveraging Aave’s current interest rate model to calculate cover pricing based on utilisation rate
Where the the designs differ is in terms of their supply-side experience.
11/ In the simpler model, users can only stake to the SM, underwriting all risks and receiving a blended return
In the second case, users can boost SM returns by staking to specific contracts using leverage, taking on varying amounts of risk and being rewarded accordingly
12/ In addition to serving as an improved SM, these designs would also allow Aave to sell its streamed cover products to other projects/protocols
We’re excited about the possibilities this presents and very much looking forward to hearing the community’s feedback on our ideas
1/9 I believe most DeFi credit protocols like will end up creating their own insurance pool underwritten by tokenholders. Why?
🔸Gives governors skin in the game and an incentive to make good decisions
🔸Better product for users who want insurance as they deposit
2/9
🔸Transforms idle market cap into balance sheet, generating fees
🔸Risks can be bundled into products and offered to users based on their particular preferences
3/9 While we believe this makes a lot of sense as a token model, we don't think it is competitive but rather complementary to @NexusMutual
This is because insurance relies on leverage to be efficient and leverage requires diversified, uncorrelated risk exposures
1/ Today, after 1 month of working closely with the @AragonProject team and community, our proposal to buyout $ANJ holders who lock their converted $ANT for 12 months was voted in at a conversion price of 0.044ANT/ANJ ($0.138 at current prices)
2/ This represents an excellent outcome for $ANJ holders who only 8 weeks ago were being forced to sell at 0.015 ANT ($0.05 at current prices)
The price of $ANJ has already reacted, up over 100% in the hours since the vote
3/ While this process has had its share of hiccups along the way, we’re proud of $ANT holders for listening to the $ANJ community, paying a multiple that appropriately reflects the commitment made by $ANJ holders and the upside given up via merging into $ANT
As someone who is #irresponsiblylong both Bitcoin and DeFi, I cannot understand the constant tensions and bickering between the communities
In yesterday's daily, I explore why I believe Bitcoin and DeFi are symbiotic rather than competitive
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1/11 Bitcoin can be seen as "Digital Gold", with its like for like characteristics as a store of value being superior in every way
However, it's also much more than this as it's natively digital nature enables programmability, utility and financial innovation at software speed
2/ Bitcoin is not only a financial asset that is no one else’s liability, it can also be used as part of a broader financial system without becoming someone else’s liability
Rather than trust a counterparty, users need only trust cryptoeconomic incentives and human greed
While my time investing in crypto and previously playing poker has gotten me used to experiencing large daily personal net worth volatility, it's never a pleasant experience
Short thread (by my standards...) with some ramblings that help me get through it 👇
1/10 Imo, some DeFi projects represent 10-1000x upside opportunities
Obviously, like all of crypto, it is extremely risky and can go to 0. That said, given the magnitude of potential outcomes, it just doesn't have to succeed that often to make it a massively +EV bet
2/10 As with all early stage tech, realising these outcomes will require 4-8 year holds
Unlike early stage tech, crypto investors will have liquidity, i.e. the possibility, and thus the temptation, to sell