COVID-19, Lockdowns and Herding Towards Cryptocurrency Market Specific Implied Volatility Index papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
On Cryptocurrencies as an Independent Asset Class: Long-Horizon and COVID-19 Pandemic Era Decoupling from Global Sentiments papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
1/ Option Trading Costs Are Lower than You Think (Muravyev, Pearson)
"Options price changes are predictable at high frequency. Effective spreads of traders who time executions are less than 40% of the size given by conventional measures."
2/ * Trades and intraday bid/ask at one-minute frequencies for all U.S. listed equity options and the underlying stocks
* Option trades ≤ 10 cents, trades for which trade direction cannot be determined, and trades during the first and last five minutes of the day are removed
3/ "Conventional measures of transactions costs are large: The effective spreads are about 80% of the size of the quoted spreads. The price impacts are also large.
"ITM options have relative (dollar) spreads that are smaller (larger) than those of options in the full sample."
1/ Term Structure of Short Selling Costs (Weitzner)
"Forward short selling costs (derived from put-call parity) predict future costs and stock returns. Short selling costs are higher over horizons when negative information is more likely to arrive."
2/ * Dividend payers excluded
* Cost of shorting (median across strikes) over the term of the option is back-calculated using synthetic relationships, then forward rates are calculated
* Options with negative implied shorting costs are excluded
* Spot lending data is from Markit
3/ "If earnings announcements are periods when negative information is more likely to arrive, then the term structure's shape should be affected by when an announcement takes place.
"Options that expire after the earnings announcements do have higher annualized shorting costs."
1/ Causal Effect of Limits to Arbitrage on Asset Pricing Anomalies (Chu, Hirshleifer, Ma)
"We examine the causal effect of limits to arbitrage using Regulation SHO, which relaxed short-sale constraints for a set of pilot stocks, as a natural experiment."
"A sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward, but such sharp price increases predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash."
2/ "On average, industries that experienced a price run-up continue to go up by 7% over the next year (5% net of market) and 0% over the next two years (0% net of market).
"An *industry* run-up is also associated with poor average subsequent *market* returns."
3/ "If we study only cases in which a crash occurs, the average return experienced between the initial run-up and subsequent peak is 30% (107% for precious metal stocks in the late 1970s). It is difficult to bet against a bubble, even if one has correctly identified it ex-ante."
One of my favorite quotes from this eye-opening book:
"July 30, 1931: Newspapers are full of articles telling people to buy stocks, real estate at bargain prices. They say times are sure to get better... The trouble is that nobody has any money." (p. xii) mrzepczynski.blogspot.com/2020/12/one-ma…
"Reading his views in real time is fascinating. He has hopes for Hoover after 1929 and concerns with the Roosevelt policies. He writes about bank failures, the inability to collect on bills from those with nothing to give, fortunes made and lost in a wild stock market...