A few tweets in response to breakout questions now that Iran is enriching uranium to near 20 %. (Side note: The law does not require the production of 120 kg within two months, it requires an annual production of 120 kg.) 1/
We do not know how many centrifuges at Fordow are currently dedicated to 20 % enrichment, although reports are that its approximately 1000 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades connected as tandem cascades will be used, at least initially. 2/
The law includes a requirement to install one cascade of IR-6 centrifuges, which is reportedly slated for Fordow, followed by the installation of a total of 1000 IR-6's over a year.  3/
For IR-1, we use achieved production rates from pre-Joint Plan of Action, when Iran was enriching to near 20 % at Fordow and Natanz. Current monthly rates would likely be higher, due to more experience & feedstock enriched to up to 4.5 %. For IR-6 involvement, we use estimates.4/
If all six IR-1 cascades at Fordow were enriching to 20 % from 3.5-4.5 enriched uranium, the site could produce ~ 15-20 kg per month (UF6 mass).  At 15-20 kilograms per month, it would take Iran about 10-13 months to produce enough near 20 percent enriched uranium for a bomb. 5/
If Iran installed one IR-6 cascade at Fordow, using it for making near 20%, assuming the IR-6's work, it could double the monthly rate to a total of 30-40 kg per month (UF6 mass) and take Iran about 5 - 6.5 months to produce enough near 20 % enriched U for a bomb. 6/
With enough near 20 percent enriched uranium for a bomb, the breakout timeline would reduce to as short as 1.5 months. 7/7

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More from @TheGoodISIS

7 Aug 20
IMPORTANT UPDATE: 1. As we are looking further into the reporting of a possible yellowcake production facility near Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, we keep in mind lessons were learned from Syria, both Al Kibar and Marj as Sultan.
2. The former, a nuclear reactor in a nondescript box, with minimum visible security barriers; the latter, a uranium conversion facility with no outward signatures.
3. Two days ago, we identified a suspect site south of Al Ula as a follow-up to a WSJ report. This morning, we discovered an identical site, constructed about the same time, that appears to be associated with bulk waste disposal.
Read 6 tweets
31 Jul 20
1. US media should not jump on the recent, false claims by Iranian news agencies on Iran's Nour-1 satellite imaging capabilities. The images circulating in Iranian media provide no basis to claim that Nour-1 has the capability to take high resolution electro-optical spy images.
2. The electro-optical images as published by Tasnim News and others were not taken by the Nour-1 satellite, but are commercially available satellite images as shown in our own analysis and others, @AuroraIntel, @inbarspace.
2 (cont'd) In fact, at least some of the electro-optical images claimed to be Nour-1 satellite imagery is datable to PRIOR the Nour-1 launch of 22 April 2020.
Read 8 tweets
3 Mar 20
As of Feb 19, 2020, Iran's enriched uranium stockpile of up to 4.5 % is 1020.9 kg in uranium mass, or 1510 kg in uranium hexafluoride mass. This is up significantly from 372.3 kg uranium mass ( 550.7 kg UF6 mass) on Nov 3, 2019.
However, a relatively large quantity of that amount is enriched to less than 2%. 268.5 kg uranium mass (397.2 hex mass) out of the total 1020.9 kg (1510 kg hex mass)  is enriched to less than 2 %.
The 3.67 % stock remained constant, while the 4.5 % LEU stock went up from to 129.2 kg to 537.8 kg uranium mass ( from 191 to 796 kg hex mass).
Read 6 tweets
10 Jul 19
NEW from @TheGoodISIS: Conversion of Fordow: Another Unfulfilled Hope of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Fordow now includes semi-indigenous nuclear equipment production

Read here: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
Our latest report contains four key findings:

1) The Fordow uranium enrichment facility has never been repurposed, as promised in the JCPOA. Everything required to enrich uranium to weapons grade could be quickly reconstituted in the underground portion of the facility.
2) Fordow is potentially part of Iran’s current threats to progressively go to higher enrichment levels and increase its stocks of enriched uranium, and if conducted there, Fordow’s underground tunnel complex is fortified to withstand aerial bombardment.
Read 12 tweets
25 Apr 19
1. A thread on the administration's consideration of terminating or suspending waivers for civilian nuclear work at Iran's Fordow, Arak, & Bushehr sites. In short: people are blowing this way out of proportion as far as killing the deal.
2. Fordow is now revealed with certainty to have been a military enrichment facility designed to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran should be required to shut it down. isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
3. If the JCPOA member states are worried about stable isotope separation, Iran should move it to Natanz. This is a small project and can easily be moved.
Read 7 tweets
14 Nov 18
"Albright, who has gone to Tel Aviv several times to comb through the archive—most recently two weeks ago—says he is certain the information, which has also been verified by the U.S. government, is authentic."
Albright: “The archive is littered with new stuff about the Iranian nuclear weapons program...It’s unbelievable how much is in there.” One of his key conclusions from studying the documents was that the Iranians “were further along than Western intelligence agencies realized.”
“The U.S. was issuing statements that it would take a year at least, perhaps two years, to build a deliverable weapon. The information in the archive makes it clear they could have done it a lot quicker,” said Albright.
Read 7 tweets

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