There's not much in my survey data that hints that 1/6/2021 is on the horizon.
28% of respondents rate Trump above an 80 on the 0-100 feeling thermometer--which is lower than but not too far from 34% for Obama in 2018.
Repeatedly interviewing a sample of engaged American adults feels a bit like asking my Philadelphia-area friends which football team they root for.
"Still Eagles? After a season like that?"
"Ah, yeah. Why do you keep asking?"
Now there are some sub-group shifts our surveys can detect.
Below are OLS models of the 2016-2020 change among the same respondents in 1) vote choice (-1=Dem,0=neither,1=Trump), 2) Trump feeling thermometer (0-100), and 3) PID (7=strong GOP).
There's been a lot of talk about shifts among the Latino vote.
Note that these English-speaking, over-30 Latino respondents from a nat'l panel do shift notably toward Trump relative to others (~8 points)--but there is absolutely no change in their net partisanship 2016-2020.
Education works similarly, in that people with higher educational attainment become more anti-Trump--but also show no shift in party identification.
In terms of party ID, though, notice the pro-GOP move among 2008 union households. I wonder how much of that is public-sector unions (including the police) vs. private-sector unions.
What about gender, race?
Here's a model of the January 2016 Trump feeling thermometer.
Those who identified as female or Black were *already* much cooler on Trump.
Those identifying as White, Protestant, or Catholic were warmer on him.
Baseline=Asian Am./other, non-female
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Last week, I posted some results from the ISCAP general-population panel showing a 2016-2020 pro-Trump shift among English-speaking Latino respondents--but no corresponding shift in partisanship.
With respect to levels, it's key to note that English-speaking Latinos in that general-population panel were markedly cooler on Trump even in October '20 than White Americans--36 vs. 48 on a 0-100 scale.
2/
Still, with @EfrenPoliPsy and @cherylrkaiser, I collected additional panel data 2016-2018 via GfK/Ipsos tracking a different, population-based sample of Asian Americans and Latinos. This panel includes interviews in English and Spanish.
With @ProfHansNoel, I've been doing research that may shed some light on divides within the Senate GOP.
In 2016, we asked groups of 500 GOP and 500 Dem activists via YouGov to tell us who in a pair of senators was more conservative in 3 online surveys throughout the year.
1/
This is a fairly challenging task, since respondents could be asked about any of their party's senators (or centrist out-party senators) at the time. And let's just say not everyone has an opinion about every single senator.
2/
We then used a Bradley-Terry model to generate one-dimensional "perceived ideology scores."
Here are the perceived ideology scores (y-axis) by DW-NOMINATE's first dimension (x-axis).
Was Trump's 2016 victory driven more by turnout or persuasion? That question shadowed the 2020 Democratic presidential primary. In this new @monkeycageblog piece I try to answer it, drawing on new research with @seth_j_hill and Greg Huber.
That lets us make figures like this, which plots the GOP's gain on the y-axis by decile of precinct turnout stability (x-axis). Higher stability=more of the same voters in 2012, 2016.
Shift to GOP is *larger* on average in more stable precincts. Suggests persuasion is impt. 3/n
I've been fortunate to be able to track the political attitudes of a set of American adults recruited by Knowledge Networks using off-line methods before 2008. I've repeatedly surveyed these folks, most recently via Ipsos 10/7-10/22/20. n=1,131. Some initial results.
(By the way, if you are curious for some previous work using this panel, check out these @FiveThirtyEight articles:)
This is *not* a representative sample of the current electorate. Since this is a long-running panel, the youngest respondents are now 30. And it has been subject to attrition. Here I report unweighted results.
In early April, @spbhanot and I conducted a survey via @Civiqs to look at how online Pennsylvanians were responding to COVID-19. Now, @abuttenheim joins us for a second wave with many of the same respondents to see what those views look like (May 30-June 2, n=2,045).
In early April, 59% said "We must continue to stay home for as long as necessary, even if the economy suffers." By early June, that was down to 43%, with 46% instead saying "We must reopen the economy as soon as possible, even if more people will get sick." (Had been 27%.) 2/n
I teamed up with @abuttenheim and @spbhanot to administer an online survey via @civiqs of 1,912 Pennsylvania adults April 4th-8th focusing on residents' responses to coronavirus, and am going to tweet some of the topline results in this thread. 1/n
When asked about trade-offs between re-opening the economy and keeping it closed to prevent the spread of the virus, 59% said we should "stay home for as long as necessary" while 27% said we should re-open the economy as soon as possible, even if more people get sick." 2/n
On the economy question, there is a stark divide between Republicans and Democrats. The percentage of Democrats saying we should re-open the economy as soon as possible? Just 4%. Republicans? 49%. Independents come in at 29%.