Ben Nimmo Profile picture
23 Jan, 11 tweets, 5 min read
One sidelight on the Russian protests today: #Navalny is probably the single most consistent target of Russian disinfo and influence operations.

He's been a target for at least 8 years, by ops including the Internet Research Agency, Secondary Infektion, and the Kremlin.
Way back in September 2013, @Soshnikoff investigated the then newly founded Internet Research Agency, and reported that it had been trolling Navalny when he ran for Mayor of Moscow.

mr-7.ru/articles/90769/
January 2014: op Secondary Infektion set up its most prolific persona, with a pic of Navalny’s face painted blue. It started out by attacking the Russian opposition.

The username, bloger_nasralny, is a toilet pun on his name.
Secondary Infektion kept on coming back, posting screenshots to communications that exposed Navalny as [insert pejorative here].

Weirdly, the only places those screenshots showed up was posts planted by the operation.

August 2017...
July 2018: forged letter that purportedly shows the EU Commission calling Navalny an "odious nationalist."

A narrative you'll still hear from Russian state outlets and employees today.
And yet another SI forgery from July 2019, this time trying to link Navalny to the US.

Secondary Infektion loved faking letters from the Senate.
(For @Graphika_NYC's deep dive into Secondary Infektion, see secondaryinfektion.org/report/seconda…)
It wasn't just Secondary Infektion. According to Twitter's archive of influence ops, the Internet Research Agency mentioned Navalny close on 6,000 times.

(Screenshot from scan of the earliest archive, up to 2017.)
In late 2020, the network of fake websites first exposed by @alexejhock and @DanielLaufer ran fake stories smearing Navalny, too. One was picked up by mainstream Russian media.

(Abendlich Hamburg was a pro-Kremlin fake site.)

graphika.com/reports/echoes…
Add to that the various Russian state outlets that either make, or amplify, claims about Navalny as a tool of the West - and the claims from the Kremlin itself that he has CIA handlers.
So overall, Navalny looks like the single most consistent target of Russian and pro-Russian IO since 2013.

But despite the attacks, he just got over 70 million views on his latest video on official corruption in Russia.

Despite... or because of?

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More from @benimmo

23 Jan
Question for the #OSINT community: can anyone else find TikTok videos about protests for Navalny that become unavailable if you watch via a Russian server?

I’ve got 8 so far on #свободунавальному and #23января2021.

Nearly 2 million likes between them.

#DigitalSherlocks Image
Background: the Russian telecoms authority, Roskomnadzor, said it’s got platforms to take down calls for minors to join the protests.

facebook.com/roskomnadzor.o…
If you check TikTok for key hashtags about Navalny and the protests, some of the most popular videos don’t show up when browsing through a Russian VPN.

Four of the nine most popular on #свободунавальному, for example. Image
Read 9 tweets
12 Jan
Just out: @Facebook's latest update on influence op (IO) takedowns. Fourteen new ones in this report, from nine countries. @Graphika_NYC did a write-up on one of them, from separatist-held Ukraine.

Never a dull week on the IO front...

about.fb.com/news/2021/01/d…
Here's the Graphika report.

A cluster of inauthentic assets on FB, boosting a network of fake websites focused on Europe and the former USSR: pro-Kremlin, anti-Ukraine, anti-Navalny, anti-EU.

Also, interestingly, anti-China in Central Asia.

graphika.com/reports/echoes…
H/t @alexejhock and @DanielLaufer for the first reporting on parts of this network, based around a fake outlet called Abendlich Hamburg ("evening Hamburg").

A couple other sites had "evening" in their names, others had "echo of [country]".

welt.de/politik/deutsc…
Read 11 tweets
17 Dec 20
Fun read here from @conspirator0 on a botnet that uses clips from Dracula, for that authentic "I'm a human so I write text" look.

Presumably designed to fool algorithms, as it wouldn't fool a human.

At @Graphika_NYC, we call it "Dracula's botnet".

graphika.com/posts/draculas…
We came across part this botnet in the summer, when it was boosting the pro-Chinese network "Spamouflage."

This, from @conspirator0, is a typical profile. Note the broken sentence and word in the bio. No human typed that... at least not on that Twitter account.
Now compare the bio with the version of Dracula that's online at Tallinn Technical University: lap.ttu.ee/erki/failid/ra…

Coincidence?
Read 9 tweets
15 Dec 20
BREAKING: @Facebook just took down two foreign influence ops that it discovered going head to head in the Central African Republic, as well as targeting other countries.

More-troll Kombat, you might say.

Report by @Graphika_NYC and @stanfordio: graphika.com/reports/more-t…
There have been other times when multiple foreign ops have targeted the same country.

But this is the first time we’ve had the chance to watch two foreign operations focused on the same country target *each other*.
In the red corner, individuals associated w/ past activity by the Internet Research Agency & previous ops attributed to entities associated w/ Prigozhin.

In the blue corner, individuals associated w/ the French military.

@Facebook report here: about.fb.com/news/2020/12/r…
Read 23 tweets
3 Nov 20
ELECTION THREAD: Today and tonight are going to be a wild time online.

Remember: disinformation actors will try to spread anger or fear any way they can, because they know that people who are angry or scared are easier to manipulate.

Today above all, keep calm.
A couple of things in particular. First, watch out for perception hacking: influence ops that claim to be massively viral even if they’re not.

Trolls lie, and it’s much easier to pretend an op was viral than to make a viral op.

Remember 2018? nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news…
There have been huge improvements in our collective defences since 2016. Teams like @Graphika_NYC, @DFRLab and @2020Partnership; takedowns by @Facebook, @Twitter and @YouTube; tip-offs from law enforcement.

Trolls have to spend more effort hiding.
Read 8 tweets
1 Oct 20
NEW: A Russian operation posed as a far-right website to target U.S. divisions and the election.

Most active on Gab and Parler.
A few months old.
Looks related to the IRA-linked PeaceData (which targeted progressives).

@Graphika_NYC report: public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphi…
Credit to @jc_stubbs of @Reuters, who tipped us off to this.

A legend in his own byline.

reuters.com/article/us-usa…
This op was based on a website called the Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens, NAEBC.

@Alexey__Kovalev might enjoy this name: it’s close to the Russian swear word “наёбка”.

Just like PeaceData sounded like the Russian epithet “пиздато.”

There’s a theme there.
Read 30 tweets

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