A story about the unpopularity of one-time checks in 2008 and their replacement with reduced withholding in Making Work Pay in 2009 and 2010.

Now checks are popular.

I don't think this has been told before. Will tell it, speculate about the reason, and guess at a moral.
In February 2008 Congress enacted a bipartisan plan that included checks that totaled $1,200 for a family of four (about $1,500 in today's dollars). The checks mostly went out in May, June and July.
When we went to Congress in November & December 2008 the near universal view of Democrats was please, please, please do not do another round of one-time checks.

We shifted to Making Work Pay which operated through reduced withholding and was spread out throughout the year.
The mythology is that MWP was done for policy reasons because we thought it would appear more permanent and be spent out more and were willing to sacrifice the political gains of one-time checks. That is indeed mythology and as much rationalization as reason.
So why were the checks unpopular then & popular now? My hunch is that it is because the economy tanked after the checks were sent out in 2008. Obviously not causal (the collapse would have been even worse without the checks). But it did discredit them in public perception.
This time around the economy got much less bad in the months after the checks went out. Again, not fully causal (but definitely partly) but they contributed and people wanted more of something that appeared to work.
A political problem in 2009 & after was that when the economy was worse-than-expected people mistakenly thought the aspirin caused the fever & the persistence of the fever led them to not want any more aspirin.

Now the more successful trajectory has increased support for more.
Above is my best guess. Some other hypotheses:

--Larger checks reverse the sign, taking it from unpopular to popular.

--Idiosyncracy of how the debate played out with Trump etc. last year.

--Congressional Democrats were wrong in late 2008 and checks were actually popular.
If there is a moral of the story it is the importance of automatic stabilizers. Automatic stabilizers are insurance against a public that thinks aspirin causes fevers and so wants to cut off the aspirin too soon precisely when it most needed to combat a worsening fever.

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More from @jasonfurman

5 Feb
Back in November the market was very worried about inflation. Worried it would be too low.

Now with rising stimulus expectations the market expects considerably more inflation. But still is below the Fed's average inflation target.
Technical note: market expects 2.25% CPI inflation over 5 yrs. Need to subtract ~35bp to get the PCE inflation measure the Fed targets. So the expectation for PCE inflation is more like 1.9%.

Under the Fed's average inflation targeting goal they should be above 2%.
Huge uncertainty.

So much is unprecedented: size of stimulus (absent wartime wage/price controls), size of supply-shift due if we get COVID under control, balance sheet improvements.

We don't know what multipliers will be like, how quickly the supply side can rebound, etc.
Read 7 tweets
27 Jan
Some confusion about the term "pent up demand".

Short version, should distinguish btwn:

"Excess savings" (which we know households, in aggregate, have)

"Pent up demand" (a hypothesis that people will buy more this year to make up for the stuff they didn't buy last year).
The "excess savings" (stock) is because saving (flow) was higher last year due to higher disposable personal income (due to transfers) and lower consumption. This was $1.6T for 2020 and it is more now with the latest checks.

Note, is an aggregate, many households worse off.
This "excess saving" *could* be used to satisfy "pent up demand" if everyone who skipped a travel vacation in 2020 took one that was twice as long in 2021 or ate out twice as much.

If this happened the saving rate would be lower-than-average in 2021 and could even be negative.
Read 7 tweets
27 Jan
GDP for Q4 is coming out tomorrow. It won't tell us much about how the economy is doing very recently but will be a great moment to look back at 2020 as a whole and will provide some glimpses of 2021. A preview thread.
We only get GDP numbers for quarters not for months. If we got them for months GDP would likely have fallen in November and December. But the way the quarterly arithmetic works, GDP will likely be up around 4% at an annual rate in Q4. Not a good measure of now.
GDP will be down about 3-1/2 percent for 2020 relative to 2019. This is the largest decline in GDP since the demobilization from World War II in 1946, worse even than the 2.5 percent decline in 2009.

This is because Q2 GDP was very low and then it only partly recovered in Q3&Q4. Image
Read 8 tweets
26 Jan
Historically rules/institutional frameworks for monetary and fiscal policy were motivated by the concern that politicians were BIASED towards too much deficit increase, inflation, living for the moment, etc.
Certainly some politicians are biased in the traditional manner but many have the opposite bias--they want excessive deficit reduction at the wrong times and oppose expansionary policies by the Central Bank too.
Instead we should motivate rules/institutional frameworks by the concern that politicians are INEFFICIENT in the statistical sense of sometimes delivering/wanting too much and other times too little often for random reasons like the timing of an election, the incumbent party, etc
Read 7 tweets
26 Jan
The argument for deficits & debt raising interest rates in the US is not increased credit risk, it is that interest rates are a function of economic fundamentals, flows & policy. Deficits/debt change those.

I can't tell if I'm agreeing or disagreeing with @jc_econ.
Increasing government spending or reducing taxes increases demand (or reduces saving). This raises the price of loanable funds or the interest rate.

In a dynamic context, more demand means a stronger economy, the central bank raises interest rates sooner, and long rates rise.
(As an aside, we are not close to the United States needing to worry about credit risk and the risks are more overstated than understated in most other advanced economies too. But credit risk is not always & everywhere irrelevant, just look at the UK in 1976 or Canada in 1994.)
Read 10 tweets
14 Jan
A few thoughts on the recovery plan that President-elect Biden is announcing tonight.

THREAD:
It is *very* large. Together with the December legislation it would be around $2.8T, which is about $300b per month for the nine months it is in effect.

For context in November GDP was about $80b below pre-crisis trend and compensation was about $20b below pre-crisis trend.
The motivation appears to be more "bottom up" (what the health situation, households, states, etc.) need than "top down" (how big is the output gap, what is the multiplier, what is needed to fill it).
Read 11 tweets

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