I receive pushback by mainstream voices in Italy: "Don't say that 🇮🇹 pushed for large fiscal consolidation already! Don't say that there were labour market deregulation measures, which have not worked magic. It's too radical!"
The monopoly for criticising economic policy should not be in the hands of radical voices. I think one of the reasons why we are where we are is that the "mainstream" has for too long remained silent and fallen in line with the fiscal consolidation/structural reforms mantra. /2
I think we should be honest and say: running large primary surpluses over 30 years has had serious economic and political side effects. We should not just say: let's double down and push even more after the COVID19 crisis. It will not work. /3
I'm running this campaign because I think that European moderates and mainstream voices need to wake up. We won't get many more chances to make the €zone work with its current list of members. I fear that the years after the COVID19 crisis may actually be our last chance. /4
If we repeat the economic policy mix from after the financial crisis, the economics and politics in Italy and beyond will deteriorate further, and we'll see European disintegration. Everyone who does not want that should be willing to rethink old mantras. #CAIN
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This thread presents data that strongly reject claims that 🇮🇹's problem has been a lack of fiscal discipline.
Italy is the pre-Corona world champion of fiscal consolidation - with problems for investment, growth and debt sustainability /1
Many claim that Italy just didn't do enough fiscal consolidation to fix its public finances. In fact, fiscal consolidation in Italy was far more sizeable than in any other advanced country (from early 1990s up to financial crisis) - according to IMF data. /2
Due to Covid, Italy’s public debt has jumped to ~160% of GDP. It’s important to understand why Italy's public debt was high already before Corona: primarily because of the legacy of the 1980s and 1990s, when interest rates on government bonds skyrocketed. /3
I am today launching a small twitter initiative, the Campaign Against Nonsense about Italy (#CANI). I’ll be tweeting data and arguments for countering myths about Italy’s state and economy. In this thread, I’ll explain why I think this is necessary /1
The way journalists, politicians and economists write and talk about Italy and Southern Europe is often distorted – especially in the “frugal” public sphere. Italy is not the basket case of the popular narrative. The way we speak about stuff matters a lot for policy debates. /2
This was apparent in earlier stages of the COVID crisis, when “frugal” leaders used distorted pictures of Southern Europe to size down the grants in the EU recovery fund. If only Italy were willing to reform along "frugal" lines, things would be splendid! /3
My meta-analysis on corporate tax competition is out in European Journal of Political Economy. The results point to tax competition as a major factor in explaining reductions in corporate tax rates. Data and specification choices affect results: Thread /1
Statutory corporate income tax rates have declined substantially in EU countries over the past decades. However, it's not straightforward to what extent these observed declines in corporate tax rates are explained by tax competition; it could also be due to other factors. /2
The literature doesn't provide general conclusions on magnitude of corporate tax competition: while several papers report clear empirical support for corporate tax competition, other papers either find no clear support or at least present mixed evidence. Meta-analysis can help /3
It’s totally wrong to draw the lesson from history that you have to push for “drastic anti-inflation“ policy to counteract a rise of the Nazis. Nazi rise in Germany in early 1930s happened when there was DEFLATION, worsened by fiscal austerity. Thread /1
In 1928, the Nazis had 2.6% of the votes in Germany; in 1932, they had 37.4%. Most people – across the political spectrum – don’t know that Nazi rise happened in an environment of mass unemployment and DEFLATION. /2
Hyperinflation in Germany stopped in 1923 after the currency reform. And the real problem as the Nazis gained strength was the severe recession with deflationary pressures. Brüning’s emergency decrees introduced tax hikes and spending cuts, with devastating economic effects. /3
Austria has a plagiarism scandal of a new dimension. The PhD thesis of Labour Minister Christine Aschbacher (from the conservative party of Chancellor Kurz) opens unbelievable "abysses of gibberish, nonsense and plagiarism".
Labour Minister Aschbacher's Master's thesis was also riddled with plagiarism. And she defended her PhD thesis in the middle of the pandemic, when she should have focused all her efforts on coming up with the best possible policy response to the crisis.
Austrian Labour Minister Christina Aschbacher just resigned due to accusations of plagiarism. But she is now portraying herself as the victim of a campaign. Given the evidence shown by plagiarism hunter Stefan Weber, her defence is not very convincing:
EU-Wiederaufbaufonds wird dazu beitragen, dass EU-Länder nach Corona nicht weiter auseinanderdriften. €750 Milliarden durch EU-Anleihen; damit wird EU zu wichtigem Akteur auf den Anleihemärkten; ein Zukunftsmodell! Meine Kolumne @handelsblatt: Thread/1
In den letzten Monaten von 2020 begab die EU ihre ersten COVID-bezogenen Anleihen für das SURE-Programm (Unterstützung von Kurzarbeitsprogrammen in Mitgliedstaaten) - bei negativer Verzinsung und enormer Nachfrage nach den EU-Anleihen. /2
Das war erst der Auftakt: Zur Finanzierung wird EU-Kommission im Namen der EU bis zu €750 Milliarden auf den Finanzmärkten aufnehmen; €390 Milliarden Zuschüsse für Mitgliedstaaten, die nicht zurückgezahlt werden müssen; €360 Milliarden über Kredite. /3