Also very striking: we have a governance system that automatically disincentivizes learning. A consequence of centralisation
"It's a core-periphery problem, not a cities-towns-rural problem. In the core, the cities, towns and rural areas are all doing well - in the periphery, none of them".
McCann identifies a clear flaw in how we are misdiagnosing the problem
Henry Kelly of Midlands Connect supplements this point by saying the object of regional policy isn't to create a second London. Better links to the core are a key variable
Next @Alison_McGovern says we should see the answer not in terms of London giving more, in a charitable way, to the rest of the UK, but other regions like her native Merseyside being faster-growing, emerging economies
McCann again: "The answer isn't simply devolve everything immediately. It is about the transition. There has been a lot of failure (internationally); the only two countries to do this successfully are France and Japan, and they took 25 years"
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But also, there are cancelled urgent operations in the NHS. Does he think they do this for fun? 2/
Second, this bit that argues "well the lockdown won't make any difference". Again bizarre, because a. it makes an argument for a tougher lockdown, and b. clearly it does make a difference. Before, the schools were going to open. Now they are not. Contacts are reduced 3/
First, you need to pick your moment - but the moment can last years. Peter Mandelson and @vincecable each recognised that post Financial Crisis was the time to build the case for intervention that changes the way the economy works. Now is another such time 2/
Let's face it: Johnson has always sounded like someone who ought to like Industrial Strategy, even if his "boosterish can-do-ism" largely focuses on concerns that other politicians going back to @Ed_Miliband have expressed 3/
OK, I have tried to model this more, and the bottom line is: without a test and trace system that absolutely jumps on rising cases when the number of cases is really low, the government has a really hard task. Brace for some ugly graphs: 1/
This models a Spring surge, harsh measures in April-May that crush the virus infection down, and leads to loosening in June and July.
Basically, the R rate rises fast when lockdowns end in June - but you can hardly see it .... Table shows measures (low = restrictive) 2/
and so further lockdowns etc are *politically impossible* at the point they may stop it rising. Imagine - 3 months of almost no cases, not many deaths - but the exponential force is building, and then BANG 3/
Here @GeorgeDibb and colleagues have dived a little deeper into a topic I touched on in April: equity bailouts for the covid-wrecked: instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/…
But - as with my piece, you may say - the devilish details are still to be all filled in 1/
No self-respecting HMT official will hear of a broad plan to do this without muttering the word "Lemons", and asking "um, at what price?"
If there is a £1m loan outstanding to the bakery, how much equity does that get you? All of it? Half of it? 2/
... because if the bakery is a good commercial prospect, a private investor will get it. If not, the state picks it up. Result: the state gets a portfolio of rubbish companies
And note how many different kinds of magic IPPR want the equity to perform: 3/
A good example of the kind of document even a sceptical govt policymaker might be won over by 1/
The spinouts alone are fascinating 2/
Fusion in short is a neat manifestation of the sort of industrial strategy it is easier to believe in: not a nailed-on certainty*, but lots of spillover benefits, and they show their workings. 3/
*@PinsonRing is the account to follow for some smart scepticism