Interesting batch of data from Cano Health this morning, for those following the risk-bearing provider segment (or Medicare Advantage in general).
>110K patients under management, with a clear focus on the Hispanic population. And (twist!), the company is highly profitable.
Cano might be the clearest example I've seen of a large risk-bearing provider focused on a specific demographic group: elderly Hispanic patients.
In practice, that means that, per Cano, 80% of patients *and staff* come from minority groups, and 85% of employees are bilingual.
That focus fits pretty nicely in the MA segment, and it clearly tracks with their geographic expansion from a Florida base to Texas, Nevada, California and Puerto Rico. All very large MA markets.
MA penetration in PR exceeds 70%, which dwarfs the 40-45% in FL, CA etc.
As it stands, they have ~110K patients under management, which is 10 - 15K more than OSH and roughly double Clover's MA enrollment. But the financials look much healthier...with some pretty rich EBITDA margins in their mature markets.
To be fair, there are several venture-stage risk-bearing PCP chains with substantially larger patient panels.
Privia and VillageMD, for example, have cited numbers in the 600 - 700K range, though only a subset of patients are in risk contracts.
1) The longer the relationship [with the patient], the more impact we have [on costs]
2) The older the patient, the higher the margins
To put some data behind those points:
Last, there was an interesting discussion around Direct Contracting, which the CFO described as "complete upside." At the same time, seems like a lower priority than for OSH, largely due to patient preference.
Cano has signed up for DC in four states (FL, CA, TX and NV), but...
...the company noted that their target patients have historically opted for MA at pretty high rates (true). And, as patients enroll with Cano, they expect many to still choose the zero premium / copay options, prefer the SilverSneakers programs, etc. That is, stick with MA. /n
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A low-profile healthcare IPO on Thursday (@InnovAge) probably deserves a bit more attention, both as a case study in value-based care and given recent research on private equity investment in nursing homes.
Headline: $3.2B market cap, for just 6,600 patients under mgmt. 🧐
1/n
InnovAge is a PACE program, a form of capitated care for frail, elderly patients w/ extensive needs. PACE grew out of care models pioneered in San Francisco in the 1970s, and became a CMS program in 1986, but remains a niche model, with just ~55K enrollees nationwide.
In the late '90s, legislation opened PACE to for-profit players, pending a review of quality & access
In 2015, HHS delivered a rather “lightly powered” study (seemingly of just one for-profit operator in PA), found no significant differences, and…voila.
Kaiser Permanente's CEO sent a member email this morning which suggests that - even w/ ample supply - KP will not be able to vaccinate all of its adult members until the Spring or Summer of 2022.
At this point, relying on big health systems looks like the definition of insanity.
To clarify, KP says it has 9.3M members in California, of whom 75-80% are prob over 16, given CA's population structure.
Administering ~200K doses/week means 70 - 75 weeks to fully vaccinate 7 - 7.5M patients. Not even close to fast enough, even if they hit that pace on Monday.
Another way to look at this:
KP has ~12.4M members nationwide, or ~3.8% of the U.S. population, and they are *planning* to administer ~200K doses per week.
Extrapolate, and KP is apparently shooting for roughly half of the daily goal @JoeBiden has established for the country.
Caveat to all this is the startling lack of meat in the investor presentation. It is >100 pages, but most look something like this 👇, and cite only "internal company analysis."
We can start by unpacking that growth. As @chamath notes, Clover had 41K MA members at the end of 2019, and the investor deck projects 57K by end-2020. So, adding a net 16,000 MA members over the course of the year.
By contrast, @Humana added ~480,000 in the year to June 2020.
I'm late to this, but the @OakStreetHealth S-1 is well worth a tour.
Lots of fascinating detail on the economics of capitated primary care, building a business that straddles fee-for-service & value-based care, and even some tidbits on #COVID19's (mild) financial impact. 1/n
Big picture:
- 85K patients as of March 2020, of which about two thirds are capitated and at-risk
- $556M in 2019 revenue
- Very rapid growth - revenue up 75% YoY in FY 2019 and 72% in the first quarter of 2020
- Lost ~$100M last year
Hard to avoid a comparison to @onemedical, which reports 5x the # of patients, but half the revenue, primarily because Oak's at-risk/HMO model runs most medical spend for 55K patients through its own P&L.
ONEM's patient growth is also much slower, up ~22% in 2019 vs. 75% for Oak
The @Accolade S-1 made for an interesting weekend read.
Not just as #coronavirus distraction, but for the window into a health tech solution that *could* be more aligned with the fundamental cost problem for employers and patients with private coverage (ahem...prices).
Prior digital health IPOs have seen firms pitching employers on savings through lower utilization, either via chronic disease mgmt (@Livongo) or convenient services that might reduce ER visits (@Teladoc, perhaps @OneMedical).
But for employers, price is the problem, not volume.
Accolade, in short, is a fairly high-touch service (tech + lots of call center staff) to help employees navigate the M.C. Escher painting that is American health care (find an affordable etc).
That service could potentially save $$ by nudging employees toward lower-cost options.