I've been mulling @Clover_Health's (superficial) investor deck. While I see huge potential in MA & other value-oriented models, my TL;DR take is:

1- Nothing here clearly establishes Clover as a differentiated MA plan

2- The Direct Contracting pivot is *very* interesting 1/n
Caveat to all this is the startling lack of meat in the investor presentation. It is >100 pages, but most look something like this 👇, and cite only "internal company analysis."
We can start by unpacking that growth. As @chamath notes, Clover had 41K MA members at the end of 2019, and the investor deck projects 57K by end-2020. So, adding a net 16,000 MA members over the course of the year.

By contrast, @Humana added ~480,000 in the year to June 2020.
We could also compare to a more recent MA-oriented IPO, in @OakStreetHealth, whose SEC filings show them adding ~19K members in 2019 and ~9K in the first half of 2020.

To be sure, 16K new members is material (would be ~$200M in incremental revenue), but does not seem exceptional
Then there is a quality question, most commonly measured via STAR ratings, which directly affect a plan's payments from CMS and enrollment growth.

Clover appears to be a 3 STAR MA insurer (overall), which sounds middling but would actually put them in the bottom 10%-ish.
Meanwhile, the deck touts a reduction in hospitalizations, relative to an un-sourced "benchmark," but it is not at all clear whether this number actually shows Clover doing better or worse than its peers.

For context, while the overall average number of hospitalizations (annually, per 1,000 enrollees) in traditional Medicare (aka FFS) is in the same ballpark as Clover's benchmark, there are huge variations by age, income and health status.
Oak, for example, says that it achieves a hospitalization rate of 183 per 1K members vs. a benchmark of 370. Since ~40% of Oak members are Dual eligible, 370 is prob about right.

In short, Clover looks like it has a healthier population than Oak, yet sees more hospitalizations.
For a non-Oak comparison, Humana's latest value-based care report claims a 29% reduction in hospitalizations relative to traditional Medicare, a figure that also seems rather better than Clover's claimed 22% reduction, though both companies are fuzzy on the baseline.
**Clover's chart isn't sourced, so unclear if they are b-marking vs. trad. Medicare or other MA plans. A possible source is this AEJ paper, which implies 252 admits/1K.

But that # is based on 2010 claims - would be dubious to compare to Clover in 2019.

web.stanford.edu/~leinav/pubs/A…
On net, Medicare Adv *is* a booming market. But it's also hotly competitive - there are ~3,000 MA plans, offered by >180 different companies, and the avg enrollee has 27 plans to choose from. Not obvious whether Clover really stands out in the crowd

As for Direct Contracting...
It is striking how much Clover touts the opportunity in MA, but is really selling a Direct Contracting (DC) business.

Their projections imply that almost three quarters of their membership will be in DC vs. MA, as soon as 2021.
This may be surprising, because DC is generally geared toward PCPs; it is arguably set up to let physician groups capture much of the margin that currently stays with MA insurers.

BUT...there's no particular reason that a carrier cannot become a "Direct Contracting Entity."
And, there could be real advantages to this path. Clover (and other MA plans) already have local provider networks, so can plug in add'l members. Moreover, CMS offers to act as a sort of re-insurer for DC lives, and takes on some of the admin tasks (e.g. claims adjudication).
Perhaps most interestingly, DC's voluntary attribution could shift member acquisition from PlanFinder (where a 3-STAR rating does you no favors) to the physician's office. The patient isn't choosing a new health plan, they are choosing a doctor (prob the one they already like).
All of which, I think, makes the Clover SPAC the first billion-dollar bet on Direct Contracting.

If you are buying in at a $3.7B valuation, about $2.8B of that number likely rests on the future growth and profitability of Direct Contracting, not MA. /n

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More from @dp_oneill

15 Jul
I'm late to this, but the @OakStreetHealth S-1 is well worth a tour.

Lots of fascinating detail on the economics of capitated primary care, building a business that straddles fee-for-service & value-based care, and even some tidbits on #COVID19's (mild) financial impact. 1/n
Big picture:

- 85K patients as of March 2020, of which about two thirds are capitated and at-risk

- $556M in 2019 revenue

- Very rapid growth - revenue up 75% YoY in FY 2019 and 72% in the first quarter of 2020

- Lost ~$100M last year
Hard to avoid a comparison to @onemedical, which reports 5x the # of patients, but half the revenue, primarily because Oak's at-risk/HMO model runs most medical spend for 55K patients through its own P&L.

ONEM's patient growth is also much slower, up ~22% in 2019 vs. 75% for Oak
Read 17 tweets
2 Mar
The @Accolade S-1 made for an interesting weekend read.

Not just as #coronavirus distraction, but for the window into a health tech solution that *could* be more aligned with the fundamental cost problem for employers and patients with private coverage (ahem...prices).

1/n
Prior digital health IPOs have seen firms pitching employers on savings through lower utilization, either via chronic disease mgmt (@Livongo) or convenient services that might reduce ER visits (@Teladoc, perhaps @OneMedical).

But for employers, price is the problem, not volume.
Accolade, in short, is a fairly high-touch service (tech + lots of call center staff) to help employees navigate the M.C. Escher painting that is American health care (find an affordable etc).

That service could potentially save $$ by nudging employees toward lower-cost options.
Read 19 tweets
11 Feb
I've shared concerns about @onemedical and their commercial strategy before; new data illustrates the issue.

TL;DR:
- In SF, some ONEM visit prices run 350 - 400% of Medicare
- Employers should be cautious. Proactive primary care can cut costs, but this is not the way.

1/n
Two points for context:

1) Evidence suggests that high-performing PCPs can save $$, even in the commercial population.

E.g. @Mass_HPC, finds risk-adjusted cost deltas up to $1,500 PMPY across medical groups, via referral patterns (i.e. secondary care prices) and low-value care
2) As noted elsewhere, One Medical's strategy seems to rely heavily on price arbitrage - i.e. billing under the umbrella of a higher-priced health system - which would be to the clear detriment of employers who pay these claims.

More on that here:

Read 14 tweets
28 Jan
I'm inclined to share a few thoughts on this (rather nauseating) news, having worked at Practice Fusion for a couple of yrs, though not when this episode occurred.

As @chrissyfarr notes, PF has become a bit of a cautionary tale. Perhaps there are useful lessons in that tale. 1/n
As full disclosure, this is partly speculative. I was at the company in the 2013 - 2015 time frame, and did not work on the pharma/life sciences business at any point.

From what I can glean via purely public info, the opioid episode seems to have happened in late 2016 and 2017.
At the outset, PF's basic thesis was arguably similar to @flatironhealth or perhaps AmeriSource's IntrinsiQ.

I.e. that cloud-based EHRs could help transform a fragmented care delivery landscape into a connected clinical community, while generating useful data for research/RWE.
Read 18 tweets
7 Oct 19
I am a huge fan of @afrakt, but I think this article inadvertently misstates the evidence on hospital reimbursement cuts and quality in a subtle but important way. 1/n

nytimes.com/2019/10/07/ups…
The @UpshotNYT article asserts:

"...studies show that when hospitals are paid less, quality can degrade, even leading to higher mortality rates."

If I'm not mistaken, however, all of the studies which showed lower quality examined *Medicare* payment reductions.
That's understandable, because Medicare offers natural experiments from legislative changes, and the data are readily available.

But, we also know that hospitals which rely most heavily on Medicare and Medicaid tend to be the most efficient...
Read 7 tweets
30 Aug 19
Let's tackle this. Ms. Ryan - a lobbyist for a $30B hospital chain - is dead wrong here, and she's not the only one.

Research finds that surprise billing has nothing to do w/ narrow networks, and any legislation to curb out-of-network payments will also cut insurer profits. 1/n
First, multiple studies have found little difference in the incidence of surprise billing across plan types.

For example, @cjrhgarmon & Ben Chartrock found that a 10th of hospital stays & 1 in 5 ER visits results in an OON bill, with no major differences by plan type (PPO etc).
The @commonwealthfnd found a similar story when comparing employer-sponsored insurance (where broad PPO networks are common) and ACA marketplace plans, where many members choose narrow network plans.

commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/…
Read 9 tweets

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