OK, long overdue, overlong thread thinking about Rachel's fundamental question here. My first reaction was to see what I have learned from the responses to my original tweet; is the answer necessarily "more business investment"? 1/18
1st obvious point: not necessarily. Biz inv can be wasted. More formally, it depends on your on marginal productivity of capital, depreciation, etc. Here a chart from a toy model where you pass quite soon the point at which more saving into capital no longer> higher wages 2/
There is an optimal K/L. But as others point out it is highly suggestive that we went below that overall level 3/
Since our actual investment in recent years has been low, and productivity growth low too, that is highly suggestive of it playing a role (see @JamesSmithRF
Here a slide from a heretical pack I made for Downing St in 2018 called "Time to revisit the Demand Side" 5/
Total heresy of course: it appears to go against decades of learning since 1976, a Labour PM said this... The whole speech is fascinating, of course 6/
But I find the simultaneous arrival of sub-trend AD growth, poor productivity growth, and a giant apparent increase in the UK supply of labour too much to justify keeping the old playbook open all the time. Others like Yellen have mused on this federalreserve.gov/newsevents/spe… 7/
Anyway, to your original question: what is *proven* to boost productivity in the UK? Lots of answers. Naming just three
- Strong correlations with poor skills
- Poor health in places (this by NHSA I found very persuasive thenhsa.co.uk/2018/11/major-…)
8/
& badly run businesses. Normally people quote Andy Haldane for this point but it is longstanding, and I think the Business Productivity Review has the most thorough look at this 9/ assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
But some - most terrifyingly, @ChrisGiles_ - have taken issue with this idea (see e.g. ft.com/content/cd4025…) Basically, they see this as a story of a few big sectors letting us down. We need to aim at those sectors, presumably? 10/
I cannot summarise the whole book (you may have seen the review by this up-and-coming columnist ft.com/content/217f6d…) but insofar as it has a normative conclusion, the support you offer needs to be *targeted* - on the right sectors etc that exhibit increasing returns ... 13/
I think the book usefully reminds us that different sectors have radically different dynamics. I mean, look at cotton, 1770 onwards blog.hubspot.com/marketing/a-br… but there are several important caveats 14/
if your aim is to boost wages, the industrial revolution asks that you exhibit almost supernatural patience. I mean, while cotton grew productivity ten-fold, look at what the worker got - virtually nil for 100 years
And ordinary people in San Francisco don't all benefit ... 15/
& so I think the "just build a high value cluster already" people need a good theory for how the value spreads to the 95% of people NOT in the cluster. And if it were obvious how to build those clusters, a theory for why it hasn't happened ... (which DS has tbf) 16/
Anyway, concluding. My view: it is complex, contains elements of demand AND supply, forces us to ask questions about specific types of technology (labour enhancing vs replacing, see Frey), and the evidence for a *general* business K boost doing it is not wholly there. BUT 17/
nor (see my report instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/i…) do I think that the alternative to purely general measures - targeted industrial strategy - is in any way straightforward! Sorry!
Thanks for the indulgence, a helpful aide memoire for me
/18
Oh, another point I throw in by tradition now. We a mostly services economy, which >> lower productivity gains. Which @DietzVollrath argues means we should expect it lower in future years, all things equal. But worth reading @RichardALJonessoftmachines.org/wordpress/?p=2… on that too
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Also very striking: we have a governance system that automatically disincentivizes learning. A consequence of centralisation
"It's a core-periphery problem, not a cities-towns-rural problem. In the core, the cities, towns and rural areas are all doing well - in the periphery, none of them".
McCann identifies a clear flaw in how we are misdiagnosing the problem
But also, there are cancelled urgent operations in the NHS. Does he think they do this for fun? 2/
Second, this bit that argues "well the lockdown won't make any difference". Again bizarre, because a. it makes an argument for a tougher lockdown, and b. clearly it does make a difference. Before, the schools were going to open. Now they are not. Contacts are reduced 3/
First, you need to pick your moment - but the moment can last years. Peter Mandelson and @vincecable each recognised that post Financial Crisis was the time to build the case for intervention that changes the way the economy works. Now is another such time 2/
Let's face it: Johnson has always sounded like someone who ought to like Industrial Strategy, even if his "boosterish can-do-ism" largely focuses on concerns that other politicians going back to @Ed_Miliband have expressed 3/
OK, I have tried to model this more, and the bottom line is: without a test and trace system that absolutely jumps on rising cases when the number of cases is really low, the government has a really hard task. Brace for some ugly graphs: 1/
This models a Spring surge, harsh measures in April-May that crush the virus infection down, and leads to loosening in June and July.
Basically, the R rate rises fast when lockdowns end in June - but you can hardly see it .... Table shows measures (low = restrictive) 2/
and so further lockdowns etc are *politically impossible* at the point they may stop it rising. Imagine - 3 months of almost no cases, not many deaths - but the exponential force is building, and then BANG 3/
Here @GeorgeDibb and colleagues have dived a little deeper into a topic I touched on in April: equity bailouts for the covid-wrecked: instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/…
But - as with my piece, you may say - the devilish details are still to be all filled in 1/
No self-respecting HMT official will hear of a broad plan to do this without muttering the word "Lemons", and asking "um, at what price?"
If there is a £1m loan outstanding to the bakery, how much equity does that get you? All of it? Half of it? 2/
... because if the bakery is a good commercial prospect, a private investor will get it. If not, the state picks it up. Result: the state gets a portfolio of rubbish companies
And note how many different kinds of magic IPPR want the equity to perform: 3/